Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reforms Automatic Voter Registration and Reduction of the Voting Age Andrew Aeria, Phd Dept ofPolitics and International Relations Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1. Automatic Registratiou ofVoters and Reductiou in Votiug Age 1.1 Currently, there is no automatic registration of voters in Malaysia. This is unacceptable since it defeats the process of equal participation and democratic choice in the electoral process. It disenfranchises over 3.7 million eligible voters in the country who are not registered. 1.2 The current registration process ofthe Election Commission (EC/SPR) relies on registration ofa voter on an official form. This is cumbersome and lengthy (taking over three months to process) and reflects poorly on bureaucratic efficiency in the era ofelectronic government. 1.3 It defies all logic that in the era ofefficient, electronic government the Election Commission (EC/SPR) cannot link its computer system with that of the National Registration Department (NRD). It is entirely possible to automatically and systematically capture new voter registration when citizens renew their ICs at age 21; and also to delete voters from the electoral roll on registration of deaths with the NRD. The internet era not only allows for this, it can facilitate this in a seamless fashion - provided there is the political will to do this. 1.4 Furthermore, maintaining the current age ofvoting at 21 is illogical. Individuals in Malaysia can marry and legally enter into contracts by the age of 18. This means that Malaysian law recognises all individuals as being capable of mature judgment once they reach the age of 18. Hence, if someone can decide whom he/she wants as a life partner and if someone can decide what legal contract they wish to enter into on a long or short term basis, it defies logic that they cannot be allowed to exercise sound judgment and vote for their choice of government when they reach the age of 18. 1.5 The voting age in all Southeast Asian countries is 18 years except for Indonesia and East Timor (17 years). Only Singapore and Malaysia maintain an outdated mindset in maintaining the voting age at 21 with no substantive reasons for doing so. 2. Recommendations 2.1 That the PSC recommends the lowering ofthe voting age to that of 18 immediately. 2.2 That the PSC recommends the EC/SPR link up its computer system with that ofthe NRD to facilitate automatic registration of voters at age 18 and automatic deletion of voters on registration oftheir death. Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reforms Duration of Campaign Period and Free, Fair and Equal Access to the Media Andrew Aeria, PhD Dept ofPolitics and International Relations Faculty ofSocial Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1. Campaign Duration 1.1 Currently, the usual eight-day duration ofcampaigning during elections is too short. This very brief campaign period undermines a key basis of a democracy namely that voters make informed choices about whom they want as their elected representatives and which party they wish to represent them in government. 1.2 The current time frame of eight days is insufficient since it does not allow for any substantial discussion of the real campaign issues and no robust evaluation of party manifestos and the candidates contesting the election. The performance ofpower holders is seldom scrutinised. The quality ofthe opposition is seldom evaluated. 1.3 Consequently, election campaigns in Sarawak often end up being ethnic, religious or developmental 'beauty contests' in which contesting parties attempt to outdo their competitors by showing how good they are in relation to how bad their competitors are! There is too much ridicule and disparaging of the competition by all parties involved given the short election period. There is no discussion ofissues, little debate and still less comparison ofcandidates and party platforms. 1.4 As well, the brevity of election campaigns often sees candidates distributing money and all sorts of developmental goodies to voters to solicit their support instead ofsharing their well-thought out ideas and party manifestos in support of good governance and democracy to solicit support. 2. Lack ofEqnal and Fail" Access to the Media 2.1 Presently, the structure of the Malaysian media industry is such that most mainstreanl media is owned by the government or interests closely aligned to or linked to political parties and individuals in government. 2.2 During elections, the mainstream media have consistently acted as the unvarnished propaganda arm ofthe governing political party. This has been eloquently documented in numerous articles, the key ones being Zaharom Nain (2002), Mustafa Anuar (2002), various issues of the Aliran Monthly and the work of the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ).l 2.3 In the interest offreely and fairly informing the electorate about the key electoral issues, party manifestos, candidates, their positions on issues, etc. and to allow for a critical evaluation of past performance and future commitments/pledges, the mainstream media 1 Zaharom Nain, 'The Structure ofthe Media Industry. Implications for Democracy' and Mustafa KAnuar, 'Defining Democratic Discourses. The Mainstream Press'. Both articles were published in an edited volume by Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (2002), Democracy in Malaysia. Discourses and Practices, Surrey: Curzon Press. Aliran Monthly monitors and regularly comments on the health ofthe mainstream press in its publications and website ,,",'WW.aliran.com. Similarly CIJ at their website: http://cijmalaysia.OI:g/. has a key role to play in strengthening democracy and informed choice. But for this, there needs to be fair access to the media for all. As well, there is a need for the media to report truthfully and without bias on all issues and all parties contesting an election. 3. Recommendations 3.1 The PSC is thus urged to recommend that the EC/SPR set campaign duration of at least 21 days to allow all political parties and their candidates sufficient time to traverse their far-flung constituencies in Sarawak. This will also allow them enough time to communicate effectively with all voters about their party manifestos and campaign commitments. It will also allow the electorate to meet, to scrutinise and get to know critically the party platforms of their candidates and also their potential as elected representatives. Together with a free and fair press, this will also allow the electorate to be fully infonned about the key issues in an election. 3.2 The PSC is also urged to recomlnend that the EC/SPR be given independent powers to monitor and discipline the mainstream media to ensure that they provide free, fair and unbiased coverage ofall contesting parties in an election. Free airtime should be allocated to all contesting parties by the mainstream media. There should be provision for the right of reply to all parties in all mainstream media and there should be selected televised debates for all key party leaders. Together with a 21 day campaign period, this will allow the electorate to be fully infonned about the key issues in an election. Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reforms Mal-apportionment and Gerrymandering of Constituencies Andrew Aeria, PhD Dept ofPolitics and International Relations Faculty ofSocial Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1. Mal-apportionment of Constituencies 1.1 A key principle of democracy is that of one person having one vote. In principle, every vote in a democracy has equal value. This means everyone's vote - irrespective of their constituency - has equal weightage in terms ofits ability to influence electoral outcomes. 1.2 Historically, there has been some divergence in this principle especially between rural and urban constituencies whereby 'differences in constituency electorate sizes were limited to 15 percent above or below the average constituency electorate at the time of Merdeka" (Lim Hong Hai in Malaysiakini Comments, 3.12.11). 1.3 'These clear numerical limits were relaxed in 1962 and then removed in 1973 by constitutional amendments: the federal constitution now allows, rather imprecisely, "a measure ofweightage" in favour ofrural constituencies' ((Lim Hong Hai in Malaysiakini Comments, 3.12.11). 1.4 Consequently in Malaysia, this principle of every vote having equal value has been subverted by successive mal-apportionment ofconstituency sizes. By mal-apportionment, I mean that constituencies have been gerrymandered into sizes with vastly different total vote numbers which undermine the basic principle of one person having one vote of equal value and weightage to that ofanother person. 1.5 In Sarawak, there are 31 parliamentary and 71 state constituencies. All these constituencies suffer from the phenomenon of mal-apportionment. This is not a phenomenon that is unique to Sarawak. It also exists in all parts ofthe country. 1.6 Table I shows: (a) the total voters of all state constituencies and their mal-apportionment in terms of relative percentage differences between the smallest to the largest constituency, and (b) the relative percentage differences between all constituencies and what I consider to be a fair average total voter sized constituency. Table 2 shows the same but for parliamentary constituencies in Sarawak. 1.7 For state constituencies, a voter in Ba'kelalan (6958 voters) has a vote that is approximately five times more value in terms of weightage than that of a voter in Pending (29488 voters). For an urban comparison, a voter in Satok (10431 voters) has a vote with a weightage that is more than twice that of a neighbouring voter in Padungan (23576 voters). 1.8 For parliamentary constituencies (Table 2), a voter in Lawas (15717 voters) has a vote that is approximately five times more value in terms ofweightage than a voter in Stampin (67257 voters).