The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics [1901] The Online Library Of Liberty This E-Book (PDF format) is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a private, non-profit, educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. 2010 was the 50th anniversary year of the founding of Liberty Fund. It is part of the Online Library of Liberty web site http://oll.libertyfund.org, which was established in 2004 in order to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. To find out more about the author or title, to use the site's powerful search engine, to see other titles in other formats (HTML, facsimile PDF), or to make use of the hundreds of essays, educational aids, and study guides, please visit the OLL web site. 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Author: Aristotle Translator: Edmund Spencer Bouchier About This Title: Aristotle sets out the conditions under which scientific arguments will provide true knowledge; where true conclusions are deduced from first principles and basic principles are used to explain more complex ones. PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 2 http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/902 Online Library of Liberty: Posterior Analytics About Liberty Fund: Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. Copyright Information: The text is in the public domain. Fair Use Statement: This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit. PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 3 http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/902 Online Library of Liberty: Posterior Analytics Table Of Contents Introductory Note. Book I. Chap. I.: Whether a Demonstrative Science Exists Chap. II.: What Knowing Is, What Demonstration Is, and of What It Consists Chap. III.: A Refutation of the Error Into Which Some Have Fallen Concerning Science and Demonstration Chap. IV.: The Meaning of ‘distributive,’ ‘essential,’ ‘universal’ Chap. V.: From What Causes Mistakes Arise With Regard to the Discovery of the Universal. How They May Be Avoided Chap. VI.: Demonstration Is Founded On Necessary and Essential Principles Chap. VII.: The Premises and the Conclusion of a Demonstration Must Belong to the Same Genus Chap. VIII.: Demonstration Is Concerned Only With What Is Eternal Chap. IX.: Demonstration Is Founded Not On General, But On Special and Indemonstrable Principles; Nor Is It Easy to Know Whether One Really Possesses Knowledge Drawn From These Principles Chap. X.: The Definition and Division of Principles Chap. XI.: On Certain Principles Which Are Common to All Sciences Chap. XII.: On Questions, And, In Passing, On the Way In Which Sciences Are Extended Chap. XIII.: The Difference Between the Demonstration and Science of a Thing’s Nature and Those of Its Cause Chap. XIV.: The Figure Proper to Demonstrate Syllogism Chap. XV.: On Immediate Negative Propositions Chap. XVI.: On Ignorance Resulting From a Defective Arrangement of Terms In Mediate Propositions Chap. XVII.: On Ignorance Resulting From a Defective Arrangement of Terms In Immediate Propositions Chap. XVIII.: On Ignorance As Resulting From Defective Sense Perception Chap. XIX.: Whether the Principles of Demonstration Are Finite Or Infinite Chap. XX.: Middle Terms Are Not Infinite Chap. XXI.: In Negations Some Final and Ultimate Point Is Reached Where the Series Must Cease Chap. XXII.: In Affirmations Some Final and Ultimate Point Is Reached Where the Series Must Cease Chap. XXIII.: Certain Corollaries Chap. XXIV.: Whether Universal Or Particular Demonstration Is Superior Chap. XXV.: That Affirmative Is Superior to Negative Demonstration Chap. XXVI.: Direct Demonstration Is Superior to Reduction Per Impossible Chap. XXVII.: What Science Is More Certain and Prior, and What Less Certain and Inferior Chap. XXVIII.: What Constitutes One Or Many Sciences Chap. XXIX.: Concerning Many Demonstrations of the Same Thing Chap. XXX.: On Fortuitous Occurrences PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 4 http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/902 Online Library of Liberty: Posterior Analytics Chap. XXXI.: Sense Perception Cannot Give Demonstrative Science Chap. XXXII.: On the Difference of Principles Corresponding to the Difference of Syllogisms Chap. XXXIII.: The Distinction Between Science and Opinion Chap. XXXIV.: On Sagacity Book II. Chap. I.: On the Number and Arrangements of Questions Chap. II.: Every Question Is Concerned With the Discovery of a Middle Term Chap. III.: The Distinction Between Definition and Demonstration Chap. IV.: The Essence of a Thing Cannot Be Attained By Syllogism Chap. V.: Knowledge of the Essence Cannot Be Attained By Division Chap. VI.: The Essence Cannot Be Proved By the Definition of the Thing Itself Or By That of Its Opposite Chap. VII.: Whether the Essence Can In Any Way Be Proved Chap. VIII.: How the Essence Can Be Proved Chap. IX.: What Essences Can and What Cannot Be Proved Chap. X.: The Nature and Forms of Definition Chap. XI.: The Kinds of Causes Used In Demonstration Chap. XII.: On the Causes of Events Which Exist, Are In Process, Have Happened, Or Will Happen Chap. XIII.: On the Search For a Definition Chap. XIV.: On the Discovery of Questions For Demonstration Chap. XV.: How Far the Same Middle Term Is Employed For Demonstrating Different Questions Chap. XVI.: On Inferring the Cause From the Effect Chap. XVII.: Whether There Can Be Several Causes of the Same Thing Chap. XVIII.: Which Is the Prior Cause, That Which Is Nearer the Particular, Or the More Universal? Chap. XIX.: On the Attainment of Primary Principles Appendix. Prior Analytics. Book II. Chap. XXIII.: On Induction XXIV.: On Example PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 5 http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/902 Online Library of Liberty: Posterior Analytics [Back to Table of Contents] INTRODUCTORY NOTE. The text used is that of the ‘Selecta ex Organo Aristoteleo Capitula,’ published by the Clarendon Press, and, for portions of the work not included in those selections, the Tauchnitz edition of the Organon (1893). Where the numberings of the chapters differ, the system adopted in the Clarendon Press selections has been followed. I am much indebted, as regards the short analyses placed at the head of each chapter, to St. Hilaire’s ‘Logique d’Aristote’ (Paris, 1838), and, for the translation, to Dr. Zell’s ‘Zweite Analytica’ (Stuttgart, 1840). Two chapters of the Prior Analytics (Bk. II. cc. 23, 24) have been added in an Appendix, as illustrating Aristotle’s doctrine of Induction and Example. E. S. B. Oxford, June, 1901. PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 6 http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/902 Online Library of Liberty: Posterior Analytics [Back to Table of Contents] BOOK I. CHAP. I. Whether A Demonstrative Science Exists Previous knowledge is required for all scientific studies or methods of instruction. Examples from Mathematics, Dialectic and Rhetoric. Previous knowledge as variously expressed in theses concerning either the existence of a thing or the meaning of the word denoting it. Learning consists in the conversion of universal into particular knowledge. All communications of knowledge from teacher to pupil by way of reasoning pre- suppose some pre-existing knowledge. The truth of this statement may be seen from a complete enumeration of instances:—it is thus that the mathematical sciences are attained and every art also. The same is the case with dialectical arguments whether proceeding by means of the syllogism or of induction, for the former kind makes such assumptions as people who understand the meaning admit, the latter uses the recognized clearness of the particular as an indication of the universal, so that both convey their information by means of things already known. So too orators produce conviction in a like manner, using either Example, which is equivalent to induction, or Enthymeme, which corresponds to syllogism. Pre-existing knowledge of two kinds is required: one must either assume beforehand that something exists, or one must understand what the word means, while sometimes both sorts of knowledge are required. As an example of the first case we may take the necessity for previously knowing the proposition ‘everything must be either affirmed or denied.’ Of the second case an instance would be the knowledge of the meaning conveyed by the word ‘triangle’; of the combination of both kinds, the knowledge both of what ‘Unit’ means, and of the fact that ‘Unit’ exists. The distinction is necessary, since the grounds of certainty differ in the two cases. Some facts become known as a result of previously acquired knowledge, while others are learned at the moment of perceiving the object. This latter happens in the case of all things comprised under a universal, with which one is already acquainted. It is known to the pupil, before perceiving any particular triangle, that the interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles; but it is only at the moment of sense- perception that he learns that this figure inscribed in the semi-circle is a triangle.