TAKING DEMOCRACY TO THE STREETS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND THE RISE OF ANTI-NEOLIBERALISM IN BOLIVIA A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the degree requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Meghan E. Giulino, M.A. Washington, DC August 27, 2009 Copyright 2009 by Meghan E. Giulino All Rights Reserved ii TAKING DEMOCRACY TO THE STREETS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND THE RISE OF ANTI-NEOLIBERALISM IN BOLIVIA Meghan E. Giulino, M.A. Thesis Advisor: John Bailey, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The Andean country of Bolivia holds a dubious distinction as one of the most politically unstable countries in the world. Throughout its 184-year history, it has had 82 different rulers or ruling coalitions, and heads of state have routinely arrived at the highest office in the land via coups, counter-coups, revolts, and popular protests. From 1985 until 2003 Bolivia appeared to buck this trend with five consecutive free and openly contested elections. However, in the year 2000, symptoms of its chronic instability once again resurfaced as citizens took to the streets to protest the neoliberal economic policies put in place over the previous decade and a half. A five-year period of sustained defiance culminated with landslide victories for anti-neoliberal political parties, and most notably the election of President Evo Morales and his political party MAS. This dissertation asks: What is the relation between acts of contentious politics and electoral outcomes? Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, I argue that expressions of contentious politics have a strong and statistically significant effect on the election of anti-neoliberal politicians and parties. I argue that these informal expressions of defiance both provide movement leaders with practical lessons for their candidacies and transform the ways in which voters conceptualize elections and their role in them. Staging acts of contentious politics, though, is not a sufficient condition in guaranteeing electoral success. Rather, some long-standing conditions make certain movements more successful at the polls than others. In this dissertation, I contrast the iii electoral success of the cocaleros in the department of Cochabamba with the comparatively weak performance of the kataristas in the department of La Paz. I argue that the coca growers’ union provided them with material and organizational resources that gave them distinct advantages on election day. In contrast, the absence of union networks among the kataristas inhibited their success. I conclude by examining two prolonged periods of social unrest: the Water War in Cochabamba (2000) and the Gas War in La Paz (2003). I use these events to illustrate the potent ways that contentious politics aids in the development of influential and highly competitive anti-neoliberal political parties. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many different individuals and institutions. The contributions of my committee, consisting of John Bailey, Marc Howard, and Mark Rom, greatly improved the quality of this work; any shortcomings within it are mine alone. I am truly fortunate to have mentors that so easily dispensed sound advice, good judgment, patience, and encouragement throughout the process. I am indebted to Georgetown University for financial support through all stages of my doctoral studies. Fieldwork was accomplished through the generosity of the Cosmos Club Foundation of Washington, DC and the Harry S. Truman Foundation. The American Association of University Women (AAUW) provided crucial assistance in the final year of writing through the American Fellows program. I thank all of the above for their confidence in me and my work. I would like to offer sincere thanks to my family and friends, without whom this project would have never come to fruition. If I were to name everyone individually who offered assistance, this dissertation would quickly double in length. Suffice to say, I could have never done this alone. Special thanks are due to my colleagues at Georgetown, the Ilijic and Davila families in Bolivia, and the many people in DC and elsewhere who have made the last several years rewarding and—dare I say it—enjoyable. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unflinching support and characteristic good humor. I am so happy that we can celebrate this achievement together. v TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………...vii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………..viii Abbreviations and Acronyms………………………………………………………….....ix Chapter 1 Introduction: Contentious Politics and the Rise of Anti-neoliberalism in Bolivia …………………………………………..…1 Chapter 2 The State of Democracy in Bolivia: Theory and Practice……………….25 Chapter 3 From Contentious Movements to Anti-regime Parties: A Statistical Analysis…………………………………………………….63 Chapter 4 Cochabamba: The Electoral Success of the Cocaleros…………………..87 Chapter 5 La Paz: The Limited Success of the Kataristas…………………………147 Chapter 6 The Water War: Cochabambinos Challenge Neoliberalism……………189 Chapter 7 The Gas War: The End of Pacted Democracy in Bolivia………………214 Chapter 8 Conclusion: Widening the Scope of Analysis………………………….253 Appendix …………………………………………………………………………..275 Sources Consulted………..……………………………………………………………..277 vi LIST OF TABLES 2.1 Presidents of Bolivia (1982-2005)……………………………………………….41 2.2 School attendance rates for indigenous and non-indigenous, by sex…………….55 2.3 Illiteracy rates for indigenous and non-indigenous, by sex……………………...55 3.1 Percept support for anti-regime candidates, by department and election year…..68 3.2 Summary statistics for dependent variable………………………………………68 3.3 Total social mobilizations per year, by department (1995-2005)………………..69 3.4 Summary statistics for independent variable…………………………………….70 3.5 Unstandardized coefficients for the fixed effects model………………………...77 3.6 Unstandardized coefficients for the random effects model……………………...78 3.7 Unstandardized coefficients of departments for constrained linear regression model…………………………………………………………………84 4.1 Land use in Bolivia (1950)………………………………………………………97 4.2 The effects of agrarian reform in Bolivia………………………………………110 4.3 Departmental support for anti-systemic candidates (1985)…………………….144 4.4 Decline in support for MNR by department (1985-2005)……………………...144 4.5 Support for anti-systemic parties in western bloc (1985, 2005)………………..145 5.1 Haciendas in La Paz (1786-1797)………………………………………………151 5.2 Party affiliations: Chamber of Deputies (2005)………………………………...177 5.3 The legacy of haciendas on indigenous identity………………………………..180 6.1 Population density of Bolivia’s departments….………………………………..193 6.2 The performance of ECP/IU/MAS in Cochabamba in general elections………199 6.3 Support for political system, by department……………………………………208 6.4 Electoral support for ADN in general elections (1997, 2002)………………….209 6.5 General election results in Cochabamba (1985-2005)………………………….210 7.1 1989 general election results, department of La Paz…………………………...223 7.2 Results of 2005 general election………………………………………………..240 7.3 Voter turnout in general elections (1985-2005)……………………………...…242 8.1 GDP per capita in each of Bolivia’s departments (1995-2005)………………...258 8.2 Contentious politics and the rise of anti-neoliberal politicians…………………265 vii LIST OF FIGURES 3.1 Scatterplot of support for anti-regime candidates by social mobilization……….71 3.2 Residuals plotted by election year……………………………………………….81 3.3 Residual values plotted by department…………………………………………..83 viii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADN Acción Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Action) Alianza PAIS Alianza Patria Altiva I Soberana (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance) ASP Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples) CIDOB Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia) CNCB Confederación Nacional de Colonizadores de Bolivia (National Confederation of Bolivian Colonizers) CNE Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court) CNTCB Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers) COB Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Central) COMIBOL Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia) COR Central Obrera Regional (Regional Workers Central) CONDEPA Conciencia de Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland) CSCB Confederación Sindical de Colonos Bolivianos (Sindical Confederation of Bolivian Colonists) CSUTCB Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unitary Sindical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) DIRECO Dirección de Reconversión de La Coca (Administration of Conversion of Coca) ECM Error Component Model ECP Eje de Convergencia Patriótico (Axis of Patriotic Convergence) EGTK Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari (Túpac Katari Guerrilla Army) ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) FDI Foreign Direct Investment FEJUVE Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighborhood Councils) FEM Fixed Effects Model FP Federación Provincial (Provincial Federation) FRI Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda (Revolutionary Front of the Left) GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund IPSP Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples) INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute)