688 Rational Choice Theory Ecology and the Sacred: Engaging the Anthropology Beliefs refer to perceived cause-effect relations, of Roy A. Rappaport , as well as a special issue of including the perceived likelihood with which an the journal American Anthropologist , guest edited individual’s actions will result in different possible by Aletta Biersack, suggest the breadth and depth outcomes. For example, a village head may believe of Rappaport’s ongoing influence. Rappaport’s ideal that raiding a neighboring village A has a higher of creating a holistic, engaged anthropology, both probability of success than raiding a neighboring scientific and humanistic, and committed to under- village B. Constraints define the limits to the set of standing and solving the problems that continue to feasible actions (e.g., the amount of credit one can challenge humanity, may be more important than get imposes a budget constraint on those considering ever in an increasingly frictional world. buying a house). Brian A. Hoey Key Assumptions See also Bateson, Gregory; Fried, Morton; Material Key ideas of the theory can be traced back to the Production, Theories of; Religion; Sahlins, Marshall; writings of moral philosophers such as Adam Smith. Systems Theory; University of Michigan; Vayda, The theory’s core was subsequently developed by Andrew P. what is now referred to as neoclassical econom- ics. Three assumptions are important: (1) individu- Further Readings als have selfish preferences, (2) they maximize their own utility, and (3) they act independently based on Biersack, A. (Ed.). (1999). Ecologies for tomorrow: Reading full information. These assumptions have also met Rappaport today [Special issue]. American increasing criticism from within economics, result- Anthropologist, 101 (1), 5–122. Darnell, R. (2002). Roy A. Rappaport, 1988–1989. In ing in adjustments and the birth of “behavioral eco- R. Darnell & F. W. Gleach (Eds.), Celebrating a century nomics.” This branch uses insights from psychology of the American anthropological association: and the cognitive neurosciences to refine the over- Presidential portraits (pp. 277–280). Lincoln: University simplified and highly stylized conceptualization of of Nebraska Press. Homo economicus . Rather than dismissing devia- Hoey, B., & Fricke, T. (2007). From sweet potatoes to God tions from the model as cognitive anomalies that almighty: Roy Rappaport on being a hedgehog. would cancel each other out when aggregated to the American Ethnologist, 34 (3), 581–599. collective level, behavioral economics and related Messer, E., & Lambek, M. (2001). Ecology and the sacred: fields attempt to develop a more realistic behavioral Engaging the anthropology of Roy A. Rappaport. Ann microfoundation. Arbor: University of Michigan Press. There are many different variants of rational choice theory. Depending on the degree to which they adhere to the assumptions of the neoclassical RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY model, rational choice explanations come in “thin,” strictly neoclassical, versus “thick,” sociological ver- sions, in which these strict assumptions are relaxed. Rational choice theory is an umbrella term for a They differ on three dimensions: (1) the type of variety of models explaining social phenomena as rationality, (2) preference, and (3) individualism outcomes of individual action that can in some way assumptions. be construed as rational. “Rational behavior” is behavior that is suitable for the realization of specific Rationality goals, given the limitations imposed by the situation. The key elements of all rational choice explanations “Thin” versions of rational choice theory (neoclas- are individual preferences, beliefs, and constraints. sical economics) assume full rationality : Individuals Preferences denote the positive or negative evalu- are fully informed about all their decision alterna- ations individuals attach to the possible outcomes tives, the probabilities of their outcomes, and their of their actions. Preferences can have many roots, consequences, and there are no cognitive limitations ranging from culturally transmitted tastes for food in the perception or processing of this informa- or other items to personal habits and commitments. tion. Individuals base their decisions on cost-benefit Copyright © 2013. SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or Copyright © applicable copyright law. EBSCO Publishing : eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/14/2015 9:14 AM via RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN AN: 719563 ; Warms, Richard L., McGee, R. Jon.; Theory in Social and Cultural Anthropology : An Encyclopedia Account: rug Rational Choice Theory 689 calculations and choose the alternative that gener- explanation: (1) a macro-micro step, or “situational ates the highest expected utility. Models of bounded mechanism”; (2) a micro-micro step, or “action gen- rationality , for example, those proposed in 1957 by erating mechanism”; and (3) a micro-macro step or Herbert Simon, relax these assumptions: Selective “transformation mechanism.” attention limits the amount and kind of informa- tion, and limited information-processing capa- Rational Choice Theory in Anthropology bilities lead to satisficing rather than maximizing: Individuals tend to accept solutions that are “good Along with structural-institutional theory, on the enough.” More recently, Siegwart Lindenberg has one hand, and cultural theories, on the other, the proposed “thick” models of social rationality that rational choice approach constitutes one of the three specify under which conditions gain-maximization major metatheoretical paradigms in the social sci- and other rationality traits contained in full- or ences. Though originally developed in economics, bounded-rationality approaches will guide human rational choice reasoning is now applied in other decision making, and under which conditions other subdisciplines of the social sciences, though applica- processes, such as learning or automatic responses, tions in the field of social and cultural anthropol- will guide behavior. ogy are still rare. Here, economic anthropologists hotly contested rational choice arguments during the Preferences “formalism vs. substantivism” debate in the 1960s and 1970s. Currently, rational choice reasoning in In the “thin” version of the rational choice approach, anthropology seems to be largely restricted to the preferences are exogenously given and stable, and domains of economic, ecological, and evolution- individuals are selfish egoists striving toward the ary anthropology. For example, James Acheson maximization of material gain. Selfishness can take uses rational choice theory to explain the differ- the form of opportunism (self-seeking with guile), ences between the Maine lobster industry and the in which individuals break the rules to realize their New England ground fishery in their ability to solve objectives. “Thicker” variants of the theory assume collective-action dilemmas resulting in overexploita- that individual behavior may be motivated by social tion. The volume Kinship, Networks, and Exchange , preferences ; that is, they have a concern for the well- edited by Thomas Schweitzer and Douglas R. White, being of others. The benefits individuals strive for contains several contributions drawing on rational are not restricted to material gains but can be psy- choice theory to explain, for example, the emergence chological or social (like prestige or behavioral con- of social and economic structure in the Highlands of firmation). Papua New Guinea or the pattern of cattle exchange Individualism among the Pokot in Kenya. All rational choice explanations are reduction- Rafael Wittek ist: They share the assumption that explanations of societal-level outcomes (e.g., institutions, group See also Economic Anthropology; Evolutionary structures, collective action, warfare, etc.) need to Anthropology; Evolutionary Psychology; Formalism/ Substantivism; Game Theory; Gift Exchange; Human be grounded in a microlevel behavioral theory of Universals individual action. This analytical strategy is also called “individualism.” In the “thin version” (meth- odological individualism ), social structures are not Further Readings relevant as constraints on behavior (since all the nec- Acheson, J. (2002). Rational choice, culture change, and essary information is contained either in the objec- fisheries management in the Gulf of Maine. Research in tive prices of goods or in the subjective meanings). Economic Anthropology, 21, 133–159. “Thick” versions ( structural individualism) consider Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of social theory. social and institutional embeddedness as major con- Cambridge, MA: Belknap. ditions affecting individual decisions and behavior. Ensminger, J. (1998). Anthropology and the new As a result, structural individualism models social institutionalism. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical phenomena through a three-step social mechanism Economics, 154, 774–789. Copyright © 2013. SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or Copyright © applicable copyright law. EBSCO Publishing : eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/14/2015 9:14 AM via RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN AN: 719563 ; Warms, Richard L., McGee, R. Jon.; Theory in Social and Cultural Anthropology : An Encyclopedia Account: rug 690
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