Qualia explained away A Commentary on Daniel C. Dennett David H. Baßler In his paper “Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems?” Daniel Commentator Dennett argues that philosophers and scientists should a"andon #ed Bloc$%s dis& tinction "etween access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. 'irst he David H. Baßler lays out why the assumption o( phenomenal consciousness as a second medium is davidh"assler1!mail.com not a reasona"le idea. In a second step he shows why "ein!s li$e us must "e con& vinced that there are )ualia that is, why we have the stron! temptation to "elieve 2ohannes 3uten"erg&4niversit5t in their e*istence. +his commentary is e*clusively concerned with this second part ,ain6 3ermany o( the target paper. In particular I o((er a more detailed picture !uided "y (ive )uestions that are not addressed "y Dennett. ,y proposal however still resides +arget Author within the (ramework o( Dennett%s philosophy in !eneral. In particular I use the notion o( intentional systems o( di((erent orders to (ill in some details. I tell the Daniel C. Dennett counterfactual story o( some (irst-order intentional systems evolvin! to "ecome daniel.dennett1tu(ts.edu "elievers in )ualia as "uildin! "loc$s o( their world. +u(ts 4niversity ,ed(ord ,A, 4.7.A. Keywords Dispositions - Intentional systems - .redictive processin! - /ualia - 0om"ic hunch 8ditors +homas ,et6in!er met6in!er 1uni&main6.de 2ohannes 3uten"erg&4niversit5t ,ain6 3ermany 2enni(er ,. Windt 9enni(er.windt1monash.edu ,onash 4niversity ,el"ourne Australia 1 Introduction The first of Rapoport’s Rules1 for composing a views' especially his argument against the e/ist$ critical commentary states that one should ence of 4ualia (constituting the first part of the present the target view in the most charitable target paper)' the diagnosis that there is the way possible (Dennett 2013a ! Although # gen$ zombic hunch'2 along with his strategy for e/$ erally agree with many of Daniel Dennett’s plaining why it e/ists' the connection between 1 Dennett named these rules after social psychologist and game theor$ 4ualia and predicted dispositions' was hard to ist Anatol Rapaport! They are not to be confused with another %Ra$ grasp! Dennett presents the idea that when we poport’s Rule&' named after (duardo )! Rapaport (cf! *tevens 1989 ! Here is the full list of Dennett’s Rapaport’s Rules- tal1 about 4ualia, what we really refer to are 1. %.ou should attempt to re$e/press your target’s position so our dispositions in earlier works (e!g.' Dennett clearly' vividly' and fairly that your target says' 0Than1s' # wish #’d 1991 ! But the connection to predictive pro$ thought of putting it that way!’& 2. %.ou should list any points of agreement (especially if they are not matters of general or widespread agreement !& 2 " philosophical 6ombie has nothing to do with any other sort of 3. %.ou should mention anything you have learned from your target!& 6ombie! #t behaves in every way li1e a normal person! The only dif$ 2! %3nly then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebut$ ference is' that it lac1s phenomenal e/periences (though ex hypothesi tal or criticism!& it believes that is has phenomenal e/periences ! The 6ombic hunch is (Dennett 2013a' p! 33) the intuition that a philosophical 6ombie would be different from us! Baßler D. H. :;<=>?. /ualia e*plained away & A Commentary on Daniel C. Dennett. In +. ,et6in!er @ 2. ,. Windt :8ds?. Open MIND: =<:C?. 'ran$(urt am ,ainA ,I#D 3roup. doiA 10.=>><;BCDEFC>E>D<>G; 1 | == www.open&mind.net cessing is new (see also Dennett 2013b ! There # want to draw attention to )ume’s Of still seem to be some stepping stones missing, Miracles ()ume 1++B' C ' where he states which # hope to fill in with my reconstruction! that the li1elihood of a testimony about mir$ My goal is to provide a complete story that acles being wrong is always greater than the stic1s as close to Dennett’s argument as pos$ li1elihood of the miracle itself! This serves as sible! This paper is not supposed to be a %re$ a nice analogy for the case at hand- we might buttal& or “criticism”' but an “attempt to re$e/$ thin1 of our own mind as a good %witness&' press [Dennett9’s position& (see footnote 1 ! but we already 1now too much about its The structure of this commentary is as shortcomings! *o we should be suspicious follows- in the first section # shall give a short when it cries out for a revolution in science or outline of Dennett’s e/planation of why we metaphysics' because this cry rests on the be$ have the 6ombic hunch! *ince this involves the lief that something is missing' when no data predictive processing framewor1' # shall give a but this very belief itself ma1es the demand very short introduction to this first! :ollowing necessary! #nstead we should e/amine what this' # present a short list of five 4uestions else could have led our minds to form this that have not' in my opinion' yet been suffi$ conviction! ciently addressed! #n the second section # present an interpretation' or perhaps an e/$ 2 Dennett’s proposal tension' of Dennett’s answers to these 4ues$ tions' by relying on the concept of an inten$ #n %<hy and how does consciousness seem the tional system and using a strategy involving way it seems=& Dennett gives an argument for telling the counterfactual story of the evolu$ why philosophers and scientists should aban$ tion of some agents who end up believing in don Ded 5loc1’s distinction between access 4ualia (although ex hypothesi there are none ! consciousness and phenomenal consciousness' #n the third section # shall analy6e which fea$ 6ombies' and 4ualia altogether! The argument tures 4ualia should have' according to the be$ is twofold- first Dennett lays down his argu$ liefs of these agents' and show that there is at ment for why the assumption of phenomenal least a significant overlap with features many consciousness as a second medium whose states consider 4ualia to have! are conscious e/periences or 4ualia is %scien$ # want to give a short ;ustification for tifically insupportable and deeply misleading& the unorthodo/ way of accounting for beliefs (Dennett this collection' section 2 ! #t is insup$ about x instead of for x’s e/istence itself! This portable because there is simply no need to is a general strategy found in other areas of posit such entities to e/plain any of our beha$ Dennett’s wor1! :or e/ample' he has as1ed' vior' so for reasons of parsimony they should %<hy should we thin1 there is intentionality not be a part of scientific theories (see also although there is none=& (Dennett 1+>1 ' Dennett 1++1' p! 132 ! The assumption is %<hy should we believe there is a god al$ deeply misleading because it ma1es us loo1 for though there is none=& (Dennett 200? ' and the wrong things' namely' the ob;ects our ;udg$ %<hy should we thin1 there is a problem with ments are about' rather than the causes of determinism and free will although there is these ;udgments' which are nothing li1e these none=& (Dennett 1+,2' 2002 ! Dennett’s philo$ ob;ects! sophy can in parts be seen as a therapeutic #n a second step Dennett shows why approach to %philosopher’s syndrome&@%mis$ creatures li1e us must be convinced that there ta1ing failures of imagination for insights into are 4ualia, that is' why we have such a strong necessity& (e!g!' Dennett 1++1' p! 201A Dennett temptation to believe in their e/istence' even 1++,a' p! 3?? @by ma1ing it easier to see why though there are no good reasons for this (Den$ we are convinced of the e/istence of some$ nett this collection' section 2 and 3; other places thing' even when there are good reasons to where Dennett ac1nowledges this conviction' believe that it doesn’t e/ist! the 6ombic hunch' are Dennett 1999A Dennett Baßler D. H. :;<=>?. /ualia e*plained away & A Commentary on Daniel C. Dennett. In +. ,et6in!er @ 2. ,. Windt :8ds?. Open MIND: =<:C?. 'ran$(urt am ,ainA ,I#D 3roup. doiA 10.=>><;BCDEFC>E>D<>G; 2 | == www.open&mind.net 2005' Ch! 1; Dennett 2013a' p! 283 ! The follow$ that this leads to an action that changes the ing sections are e/clusively concerned with this input in such a way that the prediction is vin$ part of the target paper! dicated (active inference' see e!g!' :riston et After completing the second step' Dennett al! 2011 ! )owever' although this aspect of GG e/plains why we ascribe 4ualia their character$ @that it provides one formally$unified ap$ istic properties—simplicity and ineffability proach to perception and action@is a strength (Dennett this collection' section 2 F B ! Al$ of the framewor1' it is not important here' though # also say something about this point given the conte/t of this commentary! These (see section 2 ' *ection ? is an intuition pump changes are supposed to follow 5ayes’ The$ (cf! e!g!' Dennett 2013a that will help the orem' which is why one might spea1 of reader to apply Dennett’s alternative view to 5ayesian prediction (cf! e!g!' )ohwy 2013 ! the e/perience of colors! The higher the layer in the hierarchy the Before # present a short outline of Den$ more abstract the contents and the longer the nett’s second step' # want to briefly describe the time-scales or the predictive hori6on! 3ne e/$ predictive processing framework! This is neces$ ample of a very abstract content is %only one sary since both Dennett’s argument as well as ob;ect can e/ist in the same place at the same my reconstruction make use of this framework! # time& (Hohwy et al! 2008' p! 691, 4uoted after shall not go into details of hierarchical predict$ Elark 2013' p! 5 ! ive processing (GG accounts here' since at least 3ne point to 1eep in mind is that' accord$ three papers in this collection (Elark' Hohwy' ing to Hohwy (2014 ' this framework implies a and *eth ' as well as the associated commentar$ clear-cut distinction between the mind and the ies (Madary' Harkness' and <iese ' are con$ world! That is' there is an evidentiary boundary cerned with this topic and also offer ample ref$ between %where the prediction error minimi6a$ erences for introductory as well as further read$ tion occurs& and %hidden causes 8of the sensory ing.