ABSTRACT The Argument from Divine Hiddenness: An Assessment Ross Parker, Ph.D. Mentor: Trent Dougherty, Ph.D. The argument from divine hiddenness against God’s existence has become one of the most important atheistic arguments in the contemporary philosophical literature. In this dissertation I offer an assessment of this argument. Specifically, I provide some needed conceptual clarity to the discussion of the argument from hiddenness and respond to various strands of the contemporary discussion of the argument. In the first chapter I argue that the argument from hiddenness is best understood as a family of arguments, and I give an account of what binds these arguments together. In the second chapter, after surveying extant presentations of arguments from hiddenness, I provide a conceptual map of various ways an argument from hiddenness can be presented. I then in the third chapter I develop a Schellenbergian argument from the existence of inculpable nonbelief which serves as the focus of my critical evaluation. In the fourth chapter I address the relationship between that argument from evil and the argument from hiddenness. Chapters five and six offer critiques of two recent attempts to respond to the argument from evil. Then in the seventh chapter I develop my own response to the Schellenbergian argument from hiddenness, arguing that God would be justified in allowing temporary inculpable favorably disposed nonbelief because of various goods that make possible or are made possible by the existence of nonbelief. Copyright © 2014 by Ross Parker All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements Dedication CHAPTER ONE: The Argument from Divine Hiddenness 1 §1.1: Introduction to the Dissertation §1.2: Some Preliminary Issues §1.3: An Analysis of Arguments from Hiddenness §1.4: Conclusion CHAPTER TWO: A Historical and Conceptual Overview of the Argument from Divine Hiddenness 14 §2.1: A Survey of Arguments from Divine Hiddenness §2.1.1 The Discussion of Divine Hiddenness before the Modern Period §2.1.2 Summaries of Arguments from Divine Hiddenness §2.1.3 Differences and Commonalities in the Arguments from Divine Hiddenness §2.2: The Conceptual Space of Arguments from Hiddenness §2.3: Conclusion CHAPTER THREE: A Defense of the Argument from Inculpable Nonbelief 42 §3.1: In Defense of the Theological Premise §3.2: In Defense of the Existence Premise §3.3: Conclusion CHAPTER FOUR: The Argument from Divine Hiddenness and the Argument from Evil 67 §4.1: The Argument from Evil §4.2: Commonly Acknowledged Connections between the Argument from Evil and the Argument from Divine Hiddenness §4.3. The Argument from Hiddenness is a Version of the Argument from Evil §4.3.1: The Positive Case §4.3.2: Van Inwagen’s case for conceptual independence §4.3.3 Schellenberg’s case for conceptual independence §4.4: Conclusion v CHAPTER FIVE: An Inadequate Response to Arguments from Divine Hiddenness 95 §5.1: Jordan on (L), the Nature of Love, and Intensity of Love §5.2: Jordan’s Divine Perfection Argument against (L) §5.3: Jordan’s Nature of Love Argument against (L) §5.4: Evaluating the divine perfection argument against (L) §5.5: Evaluating the Nature of Love Argument against (L) §5.6: Conclusion CHAPTER SIX: A Critical Evaluation of Rea’s Response to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness 121 §6.1: Rea’s argument from hiddenness §6.2: Rea’s Response to RIT §6.2.1: Defending T1 §6.2.2: Defending T2 §6.2.3: Defending T3 §6.3: Evaluating Rea’s Presentation of the Argument from Divine Hiddenness §6.4: Evaluating T1 §6.4.1: Interpreting Divine Silence §6.4.2: Rea’s Defense of his God-justifying Good §6.4.3 Another Problem for Rea’s God-justifying Good §6.5: Evaluating T3 §6.6: Evaluating T2 §6.7: Conclusion CHAPTER SEVEN: A Cumulative Case Response to the Argument from Inculpable Nonbelief 147 §7.1: What is Required to Reply to the Argument? §7.2: Responding to the AIN §7.2.1: A Consideration of the Existence Premise §7.2.2: Rejecting the Theological Premise of the AIN §7.3: Responding to AIFDN §7.3.1 Evaluating the Existence Premise §7.3.2 A Consideration of the Value of Theistic Belief for the Favorably Disposed §7.3.3 Relating Personally to God without Theistic Belief §7.3.4 The Cumulative Case Response to the Theological Premise §7.3.4.1: Nonbelief and the Good of Moral Freedom §7.3.4.2: Divine Hiddenness and the Good of Intellectual Probation §7.3.4.3: Divine Hiddenness and the Goods of Social Dependency §7.3.4.4: Divine Hiddenness and the Good of Learning for Oneself vi §7.3.4.5: Divine Hiddenness and the Good of Desiring to Know God §7.3.5 Conclusion of My Evaluation of the AIFDN §7.4: Responding to Schellenberg’s Accomodationist Strategy §7.4.1 The Accomodationist Strategy Stated §7.4.2: Critical Evaluation §7.5: Conclusion WORKS CITED 200 vii ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE: The Argument from Divine Hiddenness §1.1: Introduction to the Dissertation I provide a brief and intuitive statement of the argument from hiddenness. I then give a brief overview of the chapters of the dissertation. §1.2: Some Preliminary Issues This section addresses the following issues: I first state that I will use the term “God” as an honorific title and not as a proper name, referring minimally to a being who is all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good, worthy of worship, and creator of the universe. This allows theists and atheists to talk about what God would and would not do. Second, I discuss the phrase “argument from divine hiddenness,” pointing out that it’s not the best title for the argument since it seems to imply that God exists (though I continue to follow the literature and use the terminology of divine hiddenness following the literature). Third, I acknowledge that I will be drawing on the resources of the Christian tradition in my evaluation of the argument from hiddenness. §1.3: An Analysis of Arguments from Hiddenness This section defends my claim that the argument from divine hiddenness is a family of arguments with the following common core: arguments from hiddenness argue (i) that states of affairs describable as instances of divine hiddenness (ii) are incompatible or in evidential tension with a perfectly good God. Concerning (ii), to have an argument from hiddenness for God’s nonexistence, hiddenness must be something that is unexpected, surprising, or incompatible with God’s existence. Concerning (i) I argue that divine hiddenness is best understood as a lack of epistemic support for truths about God necessary for being in a loving relationship with God (with an epistemic lack concerning the existence of God as the most important of these truths). Below is a summary of my argument for this understanding of divine hiddenness: ASSUMPTION: The divine hiddenness connected to arguments from hiddenness is epistemic hiddenness. (1) It is not the case that the following is a sufficient condition for divine hiddenness: there is some proposition about God such that someone lacks epistemic support for that proposition. viii (2) Divine hiddenness is broader than lack of epistemic support for the proposition <God exists>. (3) If (1) and (2), then divine hiddenness is a lack of epistemic support for some sub-set of propositions about God. (4) The best account of divine hiddenness is to understand divine hiddenness as a lack of epistemic support for truths about God important for being in a personal relationship with God. §1.4: Conclusion CHAPTER TWO: A Historical and Conceptual Overview of the Argument from Divine Hiddenness §2.1: A Survey of Arguments from Divine Hiddenness I overview the extant statements of atheistic arguments from the existence of divine hiddenness. I do this in order to give a survey of the literature on the argument, as well as to provide support for the account of what constitutes an argument from hiddenness defended in §1.2. §2.1.1 The Discussion of Divine Hiddenness before the Modern Period Though arguments from hiddenness are not often made in the history of philosophy, there was a fair bit of discussion concerning the issue of divine hiddenness (I consider Anselm’s discussion of hiddenness). I offer two considerations for why arguments from hiddenness were not made throughout the history of philosophy: (1) If one is to give an argument from hiddenness, then one must claim that divine hiddenness is in evidential tension with the existence of God. But many accounts of God on offer in ancient times consider God as unconcerned with human existence, which means there’s no evidential tension between God’s existence and divine hiddenness. (2) Many Theistic thinkers believed that they had strong evidence for God’s existence. So they approached divine hiddenness as something that must be compatible with God’s existence, instead of seeing it as a evidence against God existence. §2.1.2 Summaries of Arguments from Divine Hiddenness I summarize arguments from hiddenness given in the following works: Berkeley 1710; Butler 1736; Nietzsche 1881; Hepburn 1963; Hanson 1971; O’Hear 1984; Schellenberg 1993; Schellenberg 2007; Schellenberg 2004 (analogy argument); Schellenberg 2007 (four arguments from specific kinds of nonbelief); Drange 1993, 1998; Maitzen 2006; Rowe 1996, 2001 ix §2.1.3 Differences and Commonalities in the Arguments from Divine Hiddenness Concerning the arguments outlined in §2.1.2, there are differences in the understanding of God argued against, the type of hiddenness that motivates the argument, and the amount of hiddenness that is taken to be problematic (other differences could be identified). But there are important similarities – all argue from the existence of epistemic lack concerning relationally-necessary truths about God, all assume an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God, and all claim that hiddenness is in some way in evidential tension with God’s perfect goodness.
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