2016 3rd International Conference on Social Science (ICSS 2016) ISBN: 978-1-60595-410-3 China’s Policy Adjustment toward Myanmar in the Context of China-U.S. Relations 1 Xue-Feng BAI 1College of Foreign Languages and Cultures, Xiamen University, Fujian, China. 361005 Keywords: Myanmar, China, Foreign relations Abstract. A complicated process of political and economic change has begun in Myanmar and the convergence of a series of geopolitical dynamics needs to be addressed, specifically in the context of the relationship between the US and China. The key to the possible future coexistence depends on what all three parties (China, the US and Myanmar) can derive from developing interactive collaboration. If differences can be mitigated, including the disagreements around the internal domestic policy of Myanmar, then the chances of peaceful coexistence and cooperation will be high. Introduction In recent times the question of the continued political development of Myanmar has arisen for two reasons. Firstly, it is clear that a complicated process of political change has begun in Myanmar, which is important to study in its own right. Secondly, the convergence of a series of geopolitical dynamics, specifically the relationship between the US and China as it relates to this political development needs to be addressed. The key to the possible future coexistence is the potential benefits that all three parties (China, the US and Myanmar) can derive from developing an ongoing collaboration. Much of the question of whether cooperative or disruptive strategies will be employed by one or more of the agents will revolve around the way that individual actors project the intentions of the other actors. For example, if China projects that the US is attempting to develop a long term process to contain China, and then China will take a stance based in attempting to break out of the ring of containment. If the US assumes that China is attempting to conduct an expansionist foreign policy, and China could pose a danger to existing international balances of power, then a US policy to contain the presumed expansion will assume great importance in its policy towards Myanmar. Myanmar, the object within this tripartite relation, does not just play a role as an object of containment for two big countries. It has managed to take advantage of the policy adjustment and increased engagement by China and USA to drive the transition from a military junta to a civilian government, increasingly move in the direction of economic development and consolidate its power in the region. As such, the way that Myanmar interacts within this dynamic must be centered on the attempt to maintain the changes that have occurred while preventing this process from becoming an arena of contention for two world powers.To achieve this Myanmar must remain neutral and promote cooperation between the US and China as it relates to Myanmar itself. 920 Myanmar’s Attempt to Solve the Legitimacy Crisis Was the Decisive Factor That Caused Myanmar and US Rapprochement The dynamics of US-China relations as they converge around the question of Myanmar can be interpreted through the lens of the attempt by the military junta within Myanmar to solve a lingering crisis in political legitimacy, one that derives from two primary sources. The first of these sources revolves around the literal life cycle of the junta itself; when Than Shwe chose to retire in 2011; after ruling Myanmar for 22 years, he was already 78 years old. The literal age of the regime has begun to create a scenario in which the obvious question of succession of transition must be asked. This occurs within a backdrop formed by the social disruptions of 1988 and 2007, and the sanction regime and international isolation that resulted from the suppression of these disruptions. Within this context Myanmar has been beset with a strict sanctions regime imposed by Western nations, an increasingly impoverished population, widespread political discontent and the rise of a series of separatist armed struggles being waged by several of the country's major ethnic groups. Under such circumstances, it was hard to predict when the next social unrest would erupt and probably topple the military regime, or as the junta feared that a US led invasion would strike and establish a new government as it did in Iraq. Thus, creating a scenario that could result in a “soft-landing” for the regime became the most urgent goal for the regime leadership. It is within this context that Myanmar began to make a series of moves toward rapprochement with the US. There are a series of theories as to why this decision was seen as a way to generate a “soft-landing” scenario. One of the most common ways of thinking about these moves centers around the claim that Myanmar began to move closer to the US in an attempt to lower its dependency on China. If this is the case then China was not aware of much reluctance in the scope of the relationship between the junta in Myanmar and the Chinese administration, which partially affirmed the leadership of Than Shwe in discussions with US diplomats, and attempted to facilitate dialogue between Myanmar and the US. In a meeting with the US diplomats, the then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister told the US counterparts that Than Shwe described the United States as a "great power" and made it clear to the US that Myanmar did not wish to antagonize nor be the enemy of the United States. It was further stated that Than Shwe agreed that Burma was ready to restart a bilateral dialogue with the US. [1] In another occasion, the Chinese MFA Asian Affairs Department Director General told her US counterpart that Than Shwe was easy-going and not difficult to engage in conversation. She noted that Than Shwe held the US in high regard and did not want an antagonistic relationship with the US, suggesting that US should engage the junta “in a positive way and on an equal footing”.[2] From an alternative point, Myanmar’s rapprochement with US was not because China played too large of a role in Myanmar, but rather, because China was in no position to solve the legitimacy crisis of Myanmar’s military regime. Internationally, the junta believed in the probability of a US led invasion for a regime change. Domestically, the plethora of social, ethnic and economic problems in Myanmar’s society has the possibility of turning into violent eruptions of social unrest. Metaphorically speaking, the Myanmar junta had a forest on fire, and China could only send a cup of water. No matter how big China’s influence was on Myanmar, it could not help much in these two aspects, and the solution that the junta sought lay somewhere else. The best solution to mitigate the threat from the US came from the US itself. The new policy of “Pragmatic Engagement” by the Obama administration provided an opportunity for the new 921 Myanmar government to establish fresh diplomatic ties with the US government and eradicate the threat from the hostility of a powerful nation. Domestically, with the implementation of the seven-step roadmap and the successful transition from the military junta to a quasi-civilian government garnered considerable legitimacy, given the fact that the most staunch opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi joined the political process of the new government, ran for the 2012 by-election and was elected into the Myanmar’s assembly, the Pyithu Hluttaw. The landslide victory in the general election of 2015 by the National League for Democracy marked the beginning of a new era of fundamental transition for Myanmar. China’s Vested Interest in Myanmar Poses Questions for China’s Formulation of New Policies Myanmar’s shift away from China and toward the US has generated a series of specific problems for China in its attempt to cope with in this new political dynamic. Central to this attempted pivot are two primary concerns, the vested economic interest that China already has in Myanmar and the geopolitical importance of Myanmar for future Chinese foreign and military policy. The accumulated investment of China in Myanmar from 1988 to 2013 is over 14 billion US dollars. In 2013, and China’s bilateral trade with Myanmar totaled over 8 billion US dollars (China’s export to Myanmar in 2013 was 6.2 billion and import from Myanmar 2.2 billion. Both have seen sharp increases) [3]. China is now the largest investor and trade partner of Myanmar. This economic interest is combined with Myanmar’s geopolitical importance, both as a partner in an oil pipeline with the Chinese and as a country with direct access to the Indian Ocean. Within Chinese academic circles there has begun thediscussion of the “Malacca Dilemma”, based in imagining a worst possible scenario in which China is cut off from oil transport by hostile forces. Within this scenario, countries like Myanmar become crucial to securing a multiplicity of sites of access for oil coming into China. Although limited amount oil can be transported into China via the China-Myanmar oil pipeline, the aforementioned scenario largely neglected the fact that pipelines over 700 kilometers are as equally vulnerable as the oil tankers, if not more. These interests have been threatened by the political transition process in Myanmar, and we are already beginning to see the effects of this, beginning with Tatmadaw’s attack of the Kokang area in 2009. It was estimated that from ten thousand to thirty seven thousand refugees fled to China, and investment and properties by Chinese businesses in the region were damaged. In the routine press conference by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the spokeswoman said that the Yunnan government had accommodated over ten thousand refugees, and their “emotional state was stable”.