ap;azi ne 'larch 72 A Sho -t Of CIA. Intervention in Stx.elen Foreign Countries In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties: I. To advise the National Security Council on matters concern- ing intelligence. 2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intel- ligence matters. 3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments. 4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." 5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct." Francis In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, Gary allowing the agency'to disregard laws that required disclosure PaYwers 9 U.S. of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising. With such unprecedented au- thority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act with- out regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self- contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China. Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign coun- tries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November. What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record: °LINEA: 1964 An up ising of the Bolivian people and Army took the reins of s ower from the National Revolu- tionary Movement and ppointed Antonio Arguedas as Minister of the Interior. Within two months he was ap- proached by United Stat s Air Force Colonel Edward Fox. Fox told Arguedas to res gn his new post or economic aid to Bolivia would be sus • • nded. Soon after his resignation Arguedas was approache • by a known CIA operative and asked to co-operate with them in a secret mission, and in return the CIA, workin behind the State Department's back, pledged to restore Arguedas as Minister of the In- terior. When Arguedas w s back in office the CIA requested that he exercise authorit on an American mining claim. When Arguedas claimed hat he could do nothing, the CIA attempted to frame him with pro-Castro/Guevera docu- ments. Luckily Arguedas aw the ploy and related the entire story at a press conferen e held in Peru several days later. BOLIVIA: 1971 A CIA "Brain trust" was formed for the specific purpose of gath ring together exiled leaders of several Latin American ountries. Victor Paz Estenssoro, former President of Boli ia, was contacted by the Agency while residing in Lima, eru. A revolt was arranged to re- turn Paz to power. But th agency's plans went unexpectedly awry when Colonel Hug Banzer took over the office just prior to Paz's triumphan return. BRITISH GUIANA: 19 2-66 CIA operations in British Guiana revealed the exte t to which the Agency has pene- trated the mainstream of American life. Cheddi Jagan, the Marxist-oriented Premier of British Guiana was not trusted by the US. The CIA thr u ugh operatives in AFL-CIO affil- iated unions supported 1 ngthy strikes in this small South American country in th it eventually successful effort to overthrow Jagan. Appro imately $1,000,000 of American union and government m • ney was channelled through the CIA-controlled affiliate u ions. Mohammed MossaclegI-a, Iran BRAZIL: 1965 Organiz d labor again became a tool of the CIA in its effort to break u the politically active labor unions of Brazil. Masquerading s the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemic . 1 Workers, the CIA funnelled $30,000 into various Bra ilian petroleum unions, persuad- ing them to join with th Interamerican Regional Organ- ization of Workers, an A L-CIO affiliate. So far the CIA has been successful in its effo ts. CHILE: 1970 With Ma xist-leaning Salvador Allende as President, Chile is curr ntly beyond the bounds of CIA activities. The policy of t e agency is to "wait and see." The CIA hopes that Allende's ocialization program will go sour with the peasants within he next year and a half, and that the country will be ripe or a takeover by Allende's pred- ecessor, Eduardo Frei, a hristian Democrat. CONGO: The CIA, fea ing Soviet influence on the new republic, chose to suppor Joseph Mobutu as their champion over Patrice Lumumba, horn the agency claimed was too much influenced by the ommunists. Although there is no direct evidence there ha e been many implications that the CIA was instrumental i Lumumba's murder. Many of the CIA and State Depart ent personnel were later moved nearly en masse from the Congo to Laos under the assump- tion that similar situation required similar solutions. COSTA RICA: 1954-56 Jose Figueres was a moderate socialist who became President of this small democratic country in an open election in 1953. His presence was particularly bothersome to the CIA because of Figueres' government policy allowing asylum to anyone who desired it. The CIA accordingly saw this as a strain upon their in- telligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. To get rid of Figueres the CIA engineered a twofold plan; first, to create embarrassment within the Communist Party, and second to somehow link Figueres with the Communists. The first succeeded in creating confusion within the State De- partment, since the straight diplomats hadn't been informed of the plan; and the second failed entirely. The agency also managed to work at cross purposes with the US Ambassa- dor, who at the same time had been urging President Eisenhower to invite Figueres to Washington in order to lend him a measure of prestige. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 1962 Through contacts with the CIA made by the American Consulate, two prominent landowners and former politicians conspired with the help of the CIA to assassinate Rafael Trujillo, the arrogant dictator of this small Carribbean nation. EGYPT: 1952 Seeing no advantage in supporting the de- caying monarchy of King Farouk, the CIA played an import- ant role in support of the revolt that placed General Naguib and Gamal Abdul Nasser at the head of the country. Nasser, though, proved to be more independent than the US govern- ment would have liked; so the State Department convinced President Eisenhower to refuse American aid in building the Aswan Dam. GUATEMALA: 1954 One of the most tragic examples of CIA intervention in foreign affairs was the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the popularly elected socialist President of the small country was a man marked by the CIA. Guzman had become too friendly with the Soviet Union, and had committed the unpardonable sin of expropriating 225,000 acres of United Fruit Company holdings. The U.S. started to move against Guzman in June of 1954 with the CIA calling the shots. Supporting John F. Kennedy Carlos Castillo-Armas, an American- and Allan Dulles, U.S. trained Guatemalan Colonel, the agency trained men in Honduras and waited patiently for the right moment to move against the Arbenz government. That moment came when a Swedish freighter docked at Puerto Barrios and prepared to unload 2,000 tons of Czechoslovakian arma- ments. The Arbenz govern- ment fell in ten days and Castillo-Armas' repressive regime took over, fully sanc- tioned by the CIA. One of the first actions of the new government was to appoint "defense committees" which could meet in secret and declare anyone a "Com- munist." 45 INDONESIA:1958 W . hington became annoyed at Presi- dent Sukarno's leftist te dencies. He had become friendly with the Soviets, began propriating huge tracts of former Dutch properties, and we corned a Communist coalition into his Jakarta government. With the wild riches of the In- donesian Archipelago a stake, the CIA took to the air to strike at the Sukarno go ernment. Once again the familiar scenario emerged: the S te Department denied everything while the CIA flew its -26 bombers out of the southern Philippines, raining bo bs on the small islands populated by Indonesians partial Sukarno. When one American pilot was shot down ove Ambonia in the Spring of 1958, the State Department in ashington was left to answer for the CIA. IRAN: 1953 Mohamm d Mossadegh, the Shah-appointed Premier of Iran, bowed to popular sentiment and nation- alized the British-owne Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1953. The action spawn d a boycott of Iranian oil and the economy began to falter. n the face of these conditions, the British and American go ernments decided that Mossadegh would be better done aw y with. Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy, illegally entered the country and began organizing CIA o eratives to overthrow Mossadegh.