September 8, 2003 NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond A periodically updated document demonstrating our progress toward safe return to flight and implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond A periodically updated document demonstrating our progress toward safe return to flight and implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations September 8, 2003 An electronic version of this implementation plan is available at www.nasa.gov NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond A Message From Sean O’Keefe Shortly after the tragic loss of Mike Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark, Rick Husband, Willie McCool, Ilan Ramon, and the Space Shuttle Columbia, I committed on behalf of the NASA family that we would find the cause of the terrible disaster, fix it, and safely fly again. To do less would be a disservice to the memory of the STS-107 crew. In order to achieve the first objective, I assigned a group of distinguished, uniquely qualified individuals led by Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. (USN-Ret.) to form the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) and determine the cause of this tragic event. The CAIB thoroughly and intensely examined the cause of the accident and recently issued its exhaustive report and recommendations, completing our first objec- tive. We deeply appreciate the personal sacrifice that the CAIB members and staff have made over the last seven months in conducting this extraordinary investigation. NASA and the entire nation are in their debt. Now we embark on the second objective—to fix the problems identified by the CAIB. In this, our Return to Flight Implementation Plan, we embrace the CAIB report and its recommendations as our roadmap to do so. But we will not stop there. We have also undertaken to raise the bar above the CAIB recommendations. In this plan, we have included critical actions to respond to our own internal review as well as observations from external sources that will make flying the Space Shuttle safer. This plan is intended to be a living document and will be modified as progress is accomplished or as other safety concerns require. When the fixes are completed and the Space Shuttle is fit to fly safely, then, and only then, will we be able to meet our third objective—return to flight. In the meantime, I offer this plan as a tribute to the memory of the STS-107 crew who were dedicated to the NASA vision and devoted their lives to further it. It is our job to see their vision through. Sean O’Keefe NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond Return to Flight Message from the Space Flight Leadership Council The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report has provided NASA with a roadmap “to resume our journey into space.” The recommendations “reflect the Board’s strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety.” NASA fully accepts the Board’s findings and will comply with its recommendations. To do this, the NASA Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond outlines the path that NASA will take to respond to the CAIB Report. It is a “living document” that will be continually updated to record NASA’s progress toward safe return to flight as well as activities to institutionalize the technical, managerial, cultural, communications, and safety changes necessary to sustain safe flight operations for as long as the Space Shuttle’s unique capabilities are needed. This implementation plan addresses each CAIB recommendation with a specific plan of action. Recommendations identified as return to flight by the CAIB or NASA must be completed before resuming Space Shuttle flight operations. All other recommendations and their implementation timing and strategies are included as well. We are beginning a new chapter in NASA’s history, recommitted to excellence in all aspects of our work, strengthening our culture, and enhancing our technical capabilities. In doing so, we will ensure that the legacy of Columbia continues as we strive to improve the safety of human space flight. Smarter, stronger, safer! Dr. Michael A. Greenfield, Ph.D. William F. Readdy Associate Deputy Administrator Associate Administrator for Technical Programs for Space Flight NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond Contents Summary . ix Overview . ix Response Summaries . xv CAIB Recommendations Implementation Schedule . xxv Part 1 – NASA’s Response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Recommendations 3.2-1 External Tank Thermal Protection System Modifications . 1-1 3.3-2 Orbiter Hardening . 1-11 3.3-1 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Nondestructive Inspection . 1-15 6.4-1 Thermal Protection System On-Orbit Inspect and Repair . 1-19 3.3-3 Entry with Minor Damage . 1-25 3.3-4 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Database . 1-27 3.3-5 Minimizing Zinc Primer Leaching . 1-29 3.8-1 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Spares . 1-31 3.8-2 Modeling Reviews . 1-33 3.4-1 Ground-Based Imagery . 1-35 3.4-2 Downlink Post-Separation . 1-39 3.4-3 On-Vehicle Ascent Imagery . 1-41 6.3-2 National Imagery and Mapping Agency Memorandum of Agreement . 1-45 3.6-1 Update Modular Auxiliary Data System . 1-47 3.6-2 Modular Auxiliary Data System Redesign . 1-49 vii NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond Contents 4.2-2 Enhance Wiring Inspection Capability . 1-51 4.2-1 Solid Rocket Booster Bolt Catcher . 1-53 4.2-3 Closeout Inspection . 1-57 4.2-4 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk . 1-59 4.2-5 Foreign Object Debris Processes . 1-61 6.2-1 Scheduling . 1-63 6.3-1 Mission Management Team Improvements . 1-65 7.5-1 Independent Technical Engineering Authority . 1-67 7.5-2 Safety and Mission Assurance Organization . 1-67 7.5-3 Reorganize Space Shuttle Integration Office . 1-69 9.1-1 Detailed Plan for Organizational Changes . 1-67 9.2-1 Mid-Life Recertification . 1-73 10.3-1 Digitize Closeout Photographs . 1-75 10.3-2 Engineering Drawing Update . 1-77 Part 2 – Raising the Bar – Other Corrective Actions SSP-1 Quality Planning and Requirements Document/Government Mandated Inspection Point . 2-1 SSP-2 Public Risk of Overflight . 2-3 SSP-3 Contingency Shuttle Crew Support . 2-5 SSP-4 Acceptable Risks . 2-7 SSP-5 Critical Debris Sources . 2-9 SSP-6 Waivers, Deviations, and Exceptions . 2-11 SSP-7 NASA Accident Investigation Team Working Group Findings . 2-13 SSP-8 Certification of Flight Readiness Improvements . 2-15 SSP-9 Failure Mode and Effects Analyses/ Critical Items Lists . 2-17 SSP-10 Contingency Action Plans . 2-19 Appendix A – NASA’s Return to Flight Process Appendix B – Return to Flight Task Group viii NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond Summary Overview The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) updated to reflect changes to the plan and progress toward report has provided NASA with the roadmap for moving implementation of the CAIB recommendations, and our forward with our return to flight efforts. The CAIB, return to flight plan. through its diligent work, has determined the causes of the accident and provided a set of comprehensive recom- In addition to providing recommendations, the CAIB mendations to improve the safety of the Space Shuttle has also issued observations. Follow-on appendices may Program. NASA accepts the findings of the CAIB, we provide additional comments and observations from the will comply with the Board’s recommendations, and we Board. In our effort to raise the bar, NASA will thor- embrace the report and all that is included in it. This oughly evaluate and conclusively determine appropriate implementation plan outlines the path that NASA will actions in response to all these observations and any other take to respond to the CAIB recommendations and safely suggestions we receive from a wide variety of sources, return to flight. including from within the Agency, Congress, and other external stakeholders. At the same time that the CAIB was conducting its assessment, NASA began pursuing an intensive, Agency- Through this implementation plan, we are not only fixing wide effort to further improve our human space flight the causes of the Columbia accident, we are beginning a programs. We are taking a fresh look at all aspects of the new chapter in NASA’s history. We are recommitting to Space Shuttle Program, from technical requirements to excellence in all aspects of our work, strengthening our management processes, and have developed a set of inter- culture and improving our technical capabilities. In doing nally generated actions that complement the CAIB so, we will ensure that the legacy of Columbia guides us as recommendations. we strive to make human space flight as safe as we can. NASA will also have the benefit of the wisdom and guid- Key CAIB Findings ance of an independent, advisory Return to Flight Task Group, led by two veteran astronauts, Apollo commander The CAIB focused its findings on three key areas: Thomas Stafford and Space Shuttle commander Richard • Systemic cultural and organizational issues, Covey. Members of this Task Group were chosen from including decision making, risk management, among leading industry, academia, and government experts. and communication; Their expertise includes knowledge of fields relevant to safety and space flight, as well as experience as leaders and • Requirements for returning safely to flight; and managers of complex systems.