Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Loxton, James Ivor. 2014. Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13070023 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America A dissertation presented by James Ivor Loxton to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, MA July 2014 © 2014 James Loxton All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Professor Steven Levitsky James Ivor Loxton Dissertation Advisor: Professor Jorge I. Domínguez Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America Abstract Beginning in the late 1970s, with the onset of the third wave of democratization, a host of new conservative parties emerged in Latin America. The trajectories of these parties varied tremendously. While some went on to enjoy long-term electoral success, others failed to take root. The most successful new conservative parties all shared a surprising characteristic: they had deep roots in former dictatorships. They were “authoritarian successor parties,” or parties founded by high-level incumbents of authoritarian regimes that continue to operate after a transition to democracy. What explains variation in conservative party-building outcomes in Latin America since the onset of the third wave, and why were the most successful new conservative parties also authoritarian successor parties? This study answers these questions by developing a theory of “authoritarian inheritance.” It argues that, paradoxically, close links to former dictatorships may, under some circumstances, be the key to party-building success. This is because authoritarian successor parties sometimes inherit resources from the old regime that are useful under democracy. The study examines five potential resources: party brand, territorial organization, clientelistic networks, business connections and a source of cohesion rooted in a history of joint struggle. New conservative parties that lack such inheritance face a more daunting task. Such parties may have better democratic credentials, but they are likely to have worse democratic prospects. ! iii! This argument is developed through an analysis of four parties: Chile’s Independent Democratic Union (UDI), Argentina’s Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE), El Salvador’s Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and Guatemala’s Party of National Advancement (PAN). Drawing on interview and archival data gathered during 15 months of fieldwork in five countries, this study contributes to three literatures. First, as the first book-length comparison of conservative parties in Latin America, it contributes to the literature on Latin American politics. Second, by developing a new theory of how successful new parties may emerge—the theory of authoritarian inheritance—it contributes to the literature on party-building. Third, by developing the concept of authoritarian successor parties, it sheds light on a common but underappreciated vestige of authoritarian rule and, in this way, contributes to the literature on regimes. ! iv! Table of Contents Tables and Figures vi Acknowledgements vii 1. Introduction: Conservative Party-Building in Latin America 1 2. Authoritarian Inheritance: A Theory of Conservative Party-Building 62 3. Chile’s UDI: Origins of an Authoritarian Successor Party 123 4. Chile’s UDI: Authoritarian Inheritance and Party-Building Success 208 5. Argentina’s UCEDE: Democratic Credentials and Party-Building Failure 287 6. El Salvador’s ARENA: Origins of an Authoritarian Successor Party 359 7. El Salvador’s ARENA: Authoritarian Inheritance and Party-Building Success 423 8. Guatemala’s PAN: Democratic Credentials and Party-Building Failure 504 9. Conclusion 562 Bibliography 582 ! v! Tables and Figures Table 1.1. New conservative parties in Latin America (1978-2000) 25 Figure 1.1. Four Parties’ Electoral Performance Over Time 28 Figure 1.2: Four Cases, Three Paired Comparisons 33 Figure 2.1. Conservative Parties and Authoritarian Successor Parties 77 Table 2.1: Authoritarian Successor Parties and Conservative Party-Building Success 86 Figure 4.1. UDI’s Support among Economic Elites 214 Figure 4.2. UDI in Chamber of Deputies Elections (%) 216 Figure 4.3. Votes vs. Seats for UDI-RN Coalition 283 Figure 5.1. UCEDE in Chamber of Deputies Elections (%) 336 Figure 7.1. ARENA in Legislative Elections (%) 430 Figure 8.1: PAN in Legislative Elections (%) 544 vi Acknowledgements I would like to thank the members of my committee—Steven Levitsky, Jorge I. Domínguez, Kenneth M. Roberts and Daniel Ziblatt—for their extraordinary support during the long process of writing this dissertation. Each provided invaluable feedback and advice along the way, and I am truly indebted to all of them. I would particularly like to thank my chair, Steven Levitsky, who has supported me from day one. Without his guidance and encouragement, it is very unlikely that this dissertation would have turned out as it did. I would also like to thank my beautiful, wonderful wife Julieta, whose love and support has kept me going during this odyssey. Te amo, Shooli. vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction: Conservative Party-Building in Latin America This is a story about life after dictatorship—in two distinct senses. First, the study examines the political response of Latin American elites to the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). The third wave, which spread democracy to nearly every country in the region during the last two decades of the 20th century, presented a challenge to these groups. Historically, economic elites in much of Latin America had depended on the military for protection. In the event of threats from below, they always had the option of seeking help by “knocking on the barracks door.” The third wave put an end to this tradition. For a number of reasons, including changes in the international environment, the coup option became both costly and undesirable. No longer able to rely on the military, elites found themselves political orphans and, consequently, would have to fend for themselves. This unprecedented situation is the first meaning of the phrase “life after dictatorship.” The second meaning refers to the main puzzle that this study seeks to unravel. In response to the third wave, elites throughout Latin America turned seriously to electoral politics. The most important manifestation of this electoral turn was the formation of new conservative parties. Several of these parties quickly grew into significant electoral players and appeared to have promising futures. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, however, many of these new parties fell into terminal crisis. While just a few years earlier scholars had believed a conservative renaissance to be underway, they now spoke of a “conservative party deficit” (Roberts 2006a). The new conservative parties that succeeded, meanwhile, shared an unusual characteristic: all of them were also authoritarian successor parties, 1 or parties founded by high-level incumbents of former dictatorships that continue to operate after a transition to democracy. What allowed such parties to thrive while other conservative parties floundered? Why did parties with deep roots in former authoritarian regimes, such as Chile’s Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and El Salvador’s Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), succeed, while parties with better democratic credentials, such as Argentina’s Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE) and Guatemala’s National Advancement Party (PAN), failed? The puzzling phenomenon of successful authoritarian successor parties is the second meaning of the phrase “life after dictatorship.” In this study, I develop a theory of authoritarian inheritance to explain variation in conservative party-building in Latin America since the onset of the third wave. The central argument is that new parties may inherit valuable resources from defunct dictatorships that help them to flourish under democracy. While one might expect parties with deep roots in former authoritarian regimes—regimes often guilty of massive human rights violations—to repel voters in the context of democracy, I argue that such roots are sometimes the key to electoral success. Because of their connections to previous dictatorships, such parties may inherit crucial determinants of party-building, including a party brand, territorial organization, sources of cohesion, clientelistic networks and business connections. While other new parties usually must amass these resources from scratch, authoritarian successor parties may simply inherit them and are thus born with an important advantage. Paradoxically, parties formed by individuals with better democratic credentials sometimes have worse democratic prospects, while parties whose leaders have close links to past dictatorships are sometimes born with the tools for electoral success. 2 In making this argument, I add to three scholarly