BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS IN ARGENTINA by Juan Javier Negri Malbrán B. A. in Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, 2002 M. A. in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2008 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Political Science University of Pittsburgh 2015 i UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Juan Javier Negri Malbrán It was defended on August 9th, 2015 and approved by Scott J. Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science B. Guy Peters, Maurice Falk Professor, Political Science Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Political Science Louis Picard, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs Dissertation Advisor: Scott J. Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science ii BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS IN ARGENTINA Juan Javier Negri Malbrán, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2015 Copyright © by Juan Javier Negri Malbrán 2015 iii BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS IN ARGENTINA Juan Javier Negri Malbrán, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2015 Studying the appointment process is essential for understanding the way modern bureaucracies interrelate with politics. In Latin America, bureaucracies have traditionally operated more as arms of the elected officials rather than an as professionals who are autonomous from the political process. In this dissertation, I explain that this politicization and its effects are defined by the process by which bureaucrats are appointed. The power to appoint bureaucrats is one of the president’s most important powers and is vital to the latter’s administrative power and policy influence. Given its importance, this dissertation explores the dynamics of presidential appointments to the bureaucracy by analyzing a database of more than thirty thousand presidential decrees and determining when the president decides to appoint an individual to a position (Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary, Undersecretary or lower echelons). Exploring, describing and explaining how the President utilizes this political tool is a fascinating way of grasping how executives build political support in Argentina. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 WHY STUDY APPOINTMENTS ...................................................................... 4 1.2 WHAT DETERMINES APPOINTMENTS? THE ARGUMENT ................. 6 1.3 THIS WORK AND THE BUREAUCRACY LITERATURE ......................... 7 1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS WORK ......................................................... 10 1.5 PLAN OF ATTACK .......................................................................................... 11 2.0 WHY PRESIDENTS POLITICIZE THE BUREAUCRACY IN ARGENTINA 12 2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 12 2.2 THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ROLE ............................................................. 18 2.3 THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINE CONGRESSES ..................... 23 2.4 THE VOTER’S ROLE ...................................................................................... 31 2.5 COMMITMENTS FOR STATE REFORM ................................................... 33 2.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 40 3.0 THE LOGIC OF BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS…………………………42 3.1 APPOINTMENTS AND POLITICIZATION ................................................ 43 3.1.1 Politicization and performance .................................................................. 45 3.2 EXPLANATIONS FOR APPOINTMENTS ................................................... 58 v 3.2.1 Presidential term dynamics: The initial quest for control ...................... 58 3.2.2 Inter-party (governmental) dynamics: Coalition building ..................... 63 3.2.3 Intra-party (organizational) dynamics: Holding up together ................. 68 3.3 EVIDENCE FROM CABINET APPOINTMENTS ....................................... 83 3.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 92 4.0 A CLOSER LOOK TO THE EFFECTS OF POLITICIZATION ....................... 93 4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 93 4.1.1 Why study taxation? ................................................................................... 97 4.2 ARGENTINA’S PUBLIC REVENUE SERVICE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES ....................................................................................................................... 100 4.2.1 AFIP before Abad ..................................................................................... 102 4.2.2 How did Abad arrive? .............................................................................. 107 4.2.3 Abad at work: Meritocratic administration ........................................... 110 4.2.3.1 Tax Collection………………………………………………………….116 4.2.3.2 Auditing/Supervision……………………………………………….....119 4.2.3.3 Staff Training……………………………………………………….....122 4.2.3.3 Technology….……………………………………………………….....122 4.3 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... 131 5.0 A QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF POLITICIZATION. ............................. 132 5.1 THE ARGENTINE BUREAUCRACY: A DISORGANIZED ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................ 132 5.2 A FIRST (GENERAL) PICTURE OF POLITICIZATION ....................... 140 5.2.1 Politicized vs. meritocratic agencies ........................................................ 144 vi 5.2.1.1 Most dissimilar comparison…………………………………………..153 5.3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 159 6.0 WHAT DETERMINES APPOINTMENTS? A QUANTITATIVE ANSWER 160 6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 160 6.1.1 Presidential dynamics ............................................................................... 161 6.1.2 Inter-party dynamics ................................................................................ 163 6.1.3 Intra-party dynamics ................................................................................ 164 6.2 FINDINGS ........................................................................................................ 169 6.2.1 Measures of fit ........................................................................................... 172 6.2.2 Hypothesis testing with logit .................................................................... 173 6.2.3 Substantive interpretation: Predicted Probabilities .............................. 179 6.2.3.1 Discrete change in predicted probabilities…………………………...203 6.2.4 Oriented case approach ............................................................................ 207 6.2.5 A different specification: Count models ................................................. 210 6.2.5.1 Marginal change……………………………………………………….217 6.3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 220 7.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 222 7.1 REMARKS AND FINDINGS ......................................................................... 222 7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH ................................................. 225 7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................. 227 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 230 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Néstor Kirchner’s cabinet members in 2003 .................................................................. 84 Table 2. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s cabinet members in 2011 .......................................... 87 Table 3. Different agencies culture within AFIP ........................................................................ 104 Table 4. Summary of organizational change at AFIP ................................................................. 113 Table 5. Subdivisions in the Argentine Public Sector ................................................................ 135 Table 6. Appointments at the Nuclear Energy Agency and Social Development Ministry ....... 158 Table 7. Variables and measurement .......................................................................................... 167 Table 8. Descriptive statistics ..................................................................................................... 168 Table 9. Logistic regression results ............................................................................................ 170 Table 10. Measures of fit ............................................................................................................ 172 Table 11. Predicted values for variable partychange .................................................................. 184 Table 12. Predicted probability of appointment combining effect of partychange and beginterm ....................................................................................................................................................