SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Daniela Kietz and Volker Perthes (Eds.) The Potential of the Council Presidency An Analysis of Germany’s Chairmanship of the EU, 2007 RP 1 January 2008 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008 SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Marie McGinley, Alexandra Wagner, and Markus Wagner (English version of SWP-Studie 24/07) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Conclusions 56 Holding all the Cards. Strong German Impulses for Police Co-operation 7 The Presidency in the Council System: Daniela Kietz Functions, Scope for Manoeuvre and Room for Improvement 64 The Profile of the German Presidency in the ENP: Daniela Kietz Regulated Stimulation and Complex Bargaining Kai-Olaf Lang 19 The ‘Berlin Declaration’— Trial Run for Negotiations on the 71 Efficiency and Its Costs: Constitutional Treaty The “Strategy for a New Partnership” Daniela Schwarzer with Central Asia Andrea Schmitz 25 Pruning, Plundering and Reconstructing. Work on the Constitutional Treaty 76 The German EU-Presidency’s Russia Dossier: Andreas Maurer between Rational Interests and Neighbourhood Conflicts 32 Lisbon in Berlin and Brussels— Rainer Lindner the Lisbon Strategy under the German Presidency 82 The Council Presidency and the Middle East Peter Becker Peace Process: Limited Scope for Action, Primacy of Diplomacy 38 Between Transatlantic Integration and the Muriel Asseburg Doha Round: The German Presidency as Impulse-Giver and Impartial Broker in Trade 88 The Council Presidency and EU Relations with Policy Making Latin America: Competent Management, Little Stormy-Annika Mildner Lasting Impact Jörg Husar / Günther Maihold 44 Far-reaching Decisions in Favour of an Integrated Energy and Climate Policy 95 Scope and Limitations of the Council Presidency. Susanne Dröge / Oliver Geden An Evaluation of the German Presidency in Light of the Reform Treaty 49 Asylum and Immigration Policy: Daniela Kietz / Andreas Maurer Efficient Realisation of a Modest Agenda Roderick Parkes 111 Abbreviations 112 Authors and Editors Problems and Conclusions The Potential of the Council Presidency. An Analysis of Germany’s Chairmanship of the EU, 2007 Germany acceded to the Presidency of the EU in the first semester of 2007 at a difficult time in the history of European integration. The proposed European Con- stitutional Treaty had been scuppered by two referen- dums; indeed, nine member states refused to ratify this Treaty following its signature. In such a situation, the German Presidency had to operate on the assump- tion of a considerable growth in reservations against the further integration planned in the Constitutional Treaty, as well as against the European Institutions and their policies. The Federal Government perceived this crisis as a task—namely, to recalibrate the Euro- pean project in order to meet the great challenges of the age. The authors of this study seek to do more than merely tick off the goals achieved—or not—by the EU-Presidency. The individual contributions concen- trate on the twin questions what kind of demands par- ticular situations placed on the German Presidency, and whether the Presidency efficiently and effectively matched its various functions—management of Coun- cil business, negotiation of compromises at all levels etc.—to these demands. The processes and strategies by which the Chair sought to fulfil these functions receive particular attention in this study. The individual contributions examine the resources the Chair had at its disposal, how it used them, the particular modi operandi for which it plumped, which national contextual factors defined its scope for action and which ‘external’ factors affected its capacity to meet these demands. The analysis of the tasks performed by the Presidency are thus judged against a more nuanced background taking account of divergent situations and the differ- ent scope for action which these situations offered up. The stocktaking of the German Presidency made here is broadly positive—in line with the impression given elsewhere. Almost all the contributions to this study credit the German Presidency with a solid management performance, which paved the way for numerous breakthroughs in negotiations. Contrary to the expectations of many commentators, the German Presidency proved itself an open, determined, and broadly neutral broker of compromises. In the most SWP-Berlin An Analysis of the German EU-Presidency, 2007 January 2008 5 Problems and Conclusions sensitive dossiers, the factors contributing to German sensitive area between 27 member states. At the same success included: resorting to expertise from within time, this success negated the original goal of bring- the Federal Government as well as from the country’s ing the basic questions of integration out from behind regional level; efficient management and a clear closed doors. In the case of the Berlin Declaration and setting of priorities; an array of resource—intense the Constitutional Treaty, the German Presidency bilateral consultations and informal talks; the decisive did not attempt in the first place to foster a sufficient personal commitment of the Chancellor and the degree of consensus within society; the priority re- Foreign Minister. mained to achieve consensus between democratically In its function as impulse-giver, the Presidency elected governments. The risk was clear: in repeated launched a notably large number of projects, like the referendums on the Reform Treaty, the population of uploading of those parts of the Prüm Treaty dealing one or more countries could block the implementa- with transnational criminality to the legal framework tion of the Treaty by recourse to a veto. Yet, irrespec- of the EU. At the same time, the Germans’ long-term tive of whether referendums brake the integration strategic guidance of conflict-loaded negotiations was process, the challenge of creating a new consensus in less happy. Detractors pointed out that the national European policy between governments and voters interests of the German Presidency inhibited the remains. efficient performance of this function—not least in The study closes with a glance at the changes to the migration policy. Council system conceived in the Reform Treaty. These The analysis offered here leads to the broader ques- change the contextual conditions for the work of all tion whether the German Presidency—crowned as it Presidencies from 2009. In particular, the projected was with success in the short-term and bolstered by introduction of a president of the European Council wide-ranging political and personnel resources—has and the strengthening of the Council within the in- provided a sustainable model for future presidencies. stitutional system of the EU, pose questions about the In the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy coherence of the current institutional design. Can one (CFSP) and of co-operation in the area of police and expect the future President to enjoy the same capacity criminal law it was clear that, in an EU of 27, unani- for giving impulses as an individual head of state and mous decision-making in Council has reached its government in his or her current function as Presi- limits. Germany could only achieve the necessary dent of the European Council? One need only think of consensus by undertaking a range of bilateral con- the strategic actions and commitment of the German sultations and informal talks within the framework Council President, Angela Merkel, and of the Chan- of its slick, focussed, highly-disciplined and resolute cellery in climate policy or transatlantic economic organisation of the proceedings in the working bodies co-operation, where manifold national administrative of the Council. Small and medium-sized EU states, and political resources were successfully put to use. bereft of comparable resources, would have difficul- The heads of state and government today enjoy a ties handling a similarly broad range of dossiers in as (fleeting) prominence as Council Presidents for a energetic a manner. This points to the limitations of semester, which is unlikely to be compensated for by the rotation system of the Council Chair under certain the system of 2009. Their apparent demotion suggests decision-making rules involving all 27 member states. that there will be tension between the new President Similar reservations apply to the modus operandi of and the heads of government. The latter will in future the German Chair during the negotiations over the merely be ‘normal’ members of the European Council Berlin Declaration and the Constitutional Treaty—two even under their own Presidency. issues which threw up exceptional challenges for the German Presidency, and which it approached in a manner which was intensive in terms of organisation and negotiation. Analysis of both cases poses the question whether discretionary negotiations on the basis of informational asymmetries can and should become the rule. As practiced by the Germans, such negotiations proved effective: thanks to the high de- gree of confidentiality associated with it, the process proved suitable for achieving consensus in a highly SWP-Berlin An Analysis of the German EU-Presidency, 2007 January 2008 6 1. Difficulties in the Analysis and Evaluation of the