Media and Gridlock Daniel F. Stone1 9th Media Economics Workshop - New Economic School October 2011 1Oregon State University I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses Gridlock in U.S. appears to have increased in recent years I Anecdotal evidence: minority party tried to block major new policy proposals (social security, health care reform, jobs bill?) I Term `gridlock' only coined after 1980 elections I Binder (1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80s and 90s (term coined in 80s) I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses I Previous lit: media and electoral competition; platform formation; actions of winners once in office (Prat and Str¨omberg, WP, 2011) I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether losing party obstructs or not I Main result: strategic obstructionism makes effect of less informative media even worse I Not only bad policy more likely proposed, but good policy more likely blocked I examine the relation between media and strategic obstructionism I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether losing party obstructs or not I Main result: strategic obstructionism makes effect of less informative media even worse I Not only bad policy more likely proposed, but good policy more likely blocked I examine the relation between media and strategic obstructionism I Previous lit: media and electoral competition; platform formation; actions of winners once in office (Prat and Str¨omberg, WP, 2011) I Main result: strategic obstructionism makes effect of less informative media even worse I Not only bad policy more likely proposed, but good policy more likely blocked I examine the relation between media and strategic obstructionism I Previous lit: media and electoral competition; platform formation; actions of winners once in office (Prat and Str¨omberg, WP, 2011) I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether losing party obstructs or not I examine the relation between media and strategic obstructionism I Previous lit: media and electoral competition; platform formation; actions of winners once in office (Prat and Str¨omberg, WP, 2011) I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether losing party obstructs or not I Main result: strategic obstructionism makes effect of less informative media even worse I Not only bad policy more likely proposed, but good policy more likely blocked I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I Or as providing alternative explanation I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? I (Politicans only acting more polarized - Other related literature I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I Or as providing alternative explanation I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? I (Politicans only acting more polarized - Other related literature I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I Or as providing alternative explanation I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? I (Politicans only acting more polarized - Other related literature I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? I (Politicans only acting more polarized - Other related literature I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I Or as providing alternative explanation I (Politicans only acting more polarized - Other related literature I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I Or as providing alternative explanation I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? Other related literature I Political science literature focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e. ideology dispersion - as gridlock cause I My paper: can interpret as highlighting necessary role of uninformative media I Or as providing alternative explanation I In fact, maybe alternative explanation for stylized fact of party polarization? I (Politicans only acting more polarized - I Two political parties, a majority and minority I Majority proposes policy, X I Either efficient, E, or partisan and deadweight loss, D (X 2 fD; Eg) I Minority then takes action Y I Either accept (A) or block (B)(Y 2 fA; Bg) I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by filibuster I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous) I If (X ; Y ) = (D; A), then α benefit to majority, α cost to minority, and social loss I If (X ; Y ) = (E; A), then 0 benefit (cost) to majority (minority), social gain I Status quo (B) payoff 0 for all The model I Majority proposes policy, X I Either efficient, E, or partisan and deadweight loss, D (X 2 fD; Eg) I Minority then takes action Y I Either accept (A) or block (B)(Y 2 fA; Bg) I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by filibuster I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous) I If (X ; Y ) = (D; A), then α benefit to majority, α cost to minority, and social loss I If (X ; Y ) = (E; A), then 0 benefit (cost) to majority (minority), social gain I Status quo (B) payoff 0 for all The model I Two political parties, a majority and minority I Either efficient, E, or partisan and deadweight loss, D (X 2 fD; Eg) I Minority then takes action Y I Either accept (A) or block (B)(Y 2 fA; Bg) I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by filibuster I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous) I If (X ; Y ) = (D; A), then α benefit to majority, α cost to minority, and social loss I If (X ; Y ) = (E; A), then 0 benefit (cost) to majority (minority), social gain I Status quo (B) payoff 0 for all The model I Two political parties, a majority and minority I Majority proposes policy, X I Minority then takes action Y I Either accept (A) or block (B)(Y 2 fA; Bg) I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by filibuster I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous) I If (X ; Y ) = (D; A), then α benefit to majority, α cost to minority, and social loss I If (X ; Y ) = (E; A), then 0 benefit (cost) to majority (minority), social gain I Status quo (B) payoff 0 for all The model I Two political parties, a majority and minority I Majority proposes policy, X I Either efficient, E, or partisan and deadweight loss, D (X 2 fD; Eg) I Either accept (A) or block (B)(Y 2 fA; Bg) I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by filibuster I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous) I If (X ; Y ) = (D; A), then α benefit to majority, α cost to minority, and social loss I If (X ; Y ) = (E; A), then 0 benefit (cost) to majority (minority), social gain I Status quo (B) payoff 0 for all The model I Two political parties, a majority and minority I Majority proposes policy, X I Either efficient, E, or partisan and deadweight loss,