The President and Fellows of Harvard College Peter's Dragoons: How the Russians Won at Poltava Author(s): Donald Ostrowski Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1/4, POLTAVA 1709: THE BATTLE AND THE MYTH (2009-2010), pp. 81-106 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756498 . Accessed: 19/04/2013 04:27 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and The President and Fellows of Harvard College are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Harvard Ukrainian Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:27:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Peter's Dragoons: How the Russians Won at Poltava Donald Ostrowski T he conventional portrayal ofthe militaryreforms of Peter I (1682- 1725)depicts his inheritinga woefully out-of-date army and bringingit up to Europeanstandards of the time. In theprocess, according to thisconventional portrayal,Peter reorganized the militaryand rationalizedthe recruitment process,which before had been haphazardand resultedin undermannedregi- ments.Accordingly, an importantstep was to disbandin 1698 the rebellious strel'tsy, who are seen as a throwbackto theold Muscovitearmy. The battles of Narva (1700) and Poltava (1709) are considered,by those who hold the conventionalview, as theprogress markers of the reform process. The Battleof Narvapurportedly came beforePeter's updating reforms had a chanceto take hold;thus, resulting in a humiliatingloss againsta Europeanarmy. By 1709, however,the Europeanizingreforms of the militarysupposedly had timeto takeeffect, and theRussian army won a significantvictory that finally placed Russiain theranks of European great powers.1 As deeplyembedded in thehistoriography and durableas thisconventional portrayalhas been,it is notcorroborated by the evidence. The Europeanization ofthe Russian army had beengoing on moreor less continuously since the early 1650s.Peter's supposed "dissolution of thestrel'tsy" in 1698-99 involvedthe executionof 799 membersof two strel'tsy regiments for leaving their assigned postin VelikieLuki and marchingto Moscow to demandback payand to see theirwives and families.2Many of the 49 regimentsof strel'tsythat existed in 1698 alreadyhad Europeancommand structures, and over the nexttwo decades mostwere gradually transformed into infantry regiments, but a few remainedas garrisontroops until the 1730s.3 Some researcherswho are aware ofthe extentto whichthe Russianarmy had been Europeanizedby the time Petercame to power have looked forother explanations for the victoryof theRussian forces at Poltava.Carol B. Stevens,for one, remarkedthat "given currentresearch, it seems certain that Peter's self-consciously 'Europeanizing' reformsneither completely transformed the Russianarmy, nor were those This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:27:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 82 OSTROWSKI reformsalone responsiblefor that army's victories over Sweden up to and includingPoltava (1709)" Instead,she creditedthose victories to "theskillful use ofdiplomacy to improvethe battle conditions for his militaryforces and the successfulcombination of new tacticsand organizationfrom northern Europewith experience and knowledgefrom the southeastern part of the Euro- Ottomanzone."4 Nicholas A. Dorrellcharacterized as "perhapsflawed" the conventional"view of the Russian army at this time. [as] thisold fashionedand rawarmy [that] was transformedinto an experienced,modern fighting force thatwon at Poltavaduring the course of the war."5 He proposed,instead, that amongthe Russians"there was a growingrealisation that Western methods werenot alwaysappropriate or indeedsuccessful [because] [a]11 armies that foughtthe Swedes usingWestern methods had majorproblems coping with themand usuallylost!" While acknowledgingthat the Russianarmy "had a deep knowledgeof the Swedish methods of warfare and howto defeat"them, Dorrellproposed that "during the period 1701 to 1706the Russians gradually turnedaway from the Western methods they were using at thestart of the war to a homeproduced system that was designedto fitthe nature of the Russian army,the area itwould fight in and to cope withthe challenge of the Swedish methodsof fighting."6 Much in Steven'sand Dorrell'sassessments are valid. The Russiancom- mandwas awareof Ottoman military strategy and tactics,and had acquireda profoundknowledge of Swedish methods of war in generaland themethods ofCharles XII (1697-1718)in particular.The Russiansalso made use ofsteppe methodsof warfare in following a "scorched earth" policy to hinderthe Swedish advancein 1708-9. But the majordifference between the Russianarmy that besiegedthe fortress at Narvain 1700and theRussian army at Poltavain 1709 was thelarge number of dragoon regiments that Peter ordered to be recruited and trained.These regimentsproved a matchfor the Swedishdragoon and cavalryregiments on whichCharles XII relied.I hypothesizethat they allowed the Russians'superiority in infantrynumbers and artilleryto prevailat Pol- tava as theycould not at Narva. To be sure,in December1708, Peter issued an administrativemilitary decree reorganizingthe countryinto eight large gubernias,7as well as requiringthe recruitment of one male forevery twenty householdsin thecountryside, but neitherof these had anydirect impact on the Russians'victory at Poltava.Instead, the fast-movingdragoon regiments and mountedinfantry (Peter's "flying corps") were well suitedto the open easternEuropean terrain and could be used to harrythe Swedishadvance, entergaps in theenemy line in battle,and close gapsin theRussian line before theSwedish army could takeadvantage of them. In 1991,Russell E Weigley,who has beendescribed as "thedean of American militaryhistory,"8 wrote an analyticalnarrative of European battles from 1631 to 1815.9In his book,Weigley stated that battles were sought "to securedeci- This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:27:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions peter's dragoons 83 sionsin war...with a quicknessand dispatchthat would keep the costs of war reasonablyproportionate to the purposesattained."10 According to Weigley, battleswere not decisivein determiningpolitical or militaryoutcomes. Even whena battlewas tacticallydecisive, it was neverstrategically or politicallyso. JohnChilds criticized Weigley for not providing a definitionof what he meant by "decisive."11But Weigleydid providesuch a definition:"If in a successful battlethe enemy army could be substantiallydestroyed. ..then the whole course ofa war mightbe resolvedin a singleday, and warsthereby might be won at relativelylow costs,by avoidingthe prolongedexpenditure of resourcesand lives." Nonetheless,in Weigley's estimation,this era was "an age of prolonged, indecisivewars, wars sufficientlyinterminable that again and again the toll in lives,not to mentionthe costs in materialresources, rose grotesquelyout of proportionto anythingtheir authors could hope to gain fromthem."12 As such,he challengedthe premiseof von Clausewitzthat "war is merelythe continuationof policyby othermeans."13 Weigley wrote that "the chronic indecisivenessof war from the seventeenth through the early nineteenth cen- turies,wars chronicinability to attainthe ends desired...made warfarenot a worthyinstrument of policy but an expressionof the bankruptcy of policy."14 He describedthe serious limitations on armiesat thetime. These limitations, in thewords of Allan R. Millett,were "the lack ofa professionalofficer corps, logisticalscarcity and poor planning,the pitiful condition of European roads and maps,ordnance of dubious effectiveness, the immobilityof infantry and the erraticuse of cavalry(especially in the exploitationphase of battle),and muddledpolitical direction and coalitioncooperation."15 In hisbook Weigley also proposedfour "further themes": (1) military"[o]ffi- cershipcame increasinglyto be based on standardsof educationand social responsibility"(xiii); (2) the"difficulties ofcommand, control, and communi- cationin earlymodern war did muchto reducestill further the potentialfor battleto achieveits strategic purposes, the destruction of the enemy and the rapidwinning of wars" (xiv); (3) battlesfought mainly with infantry during "theage of battles"were usuallytactically indecisive, and "a mobilecombat arm"(namely, "an effectivecavalry") was needed ifany tactical decisiveness wereto be achieved(xiv-xv, 263); and (4) "limitationsupon the violenceof war throughthe restraintsof internationallaw and custom"such that"the principleof noncombatantimmunity within the war conventionhad by the earlytwentieth century largely come to protectthe lives and eventhe private propertyof noncombatants from the violence of war, by confining legitimate violenceto combatantswho could possess some capacity to protectthemselves and to retaliate"(xv). Among the battles Weigley described is Poltava.But his descriptionof that battle focused on theinfantry and on Charles'sinability