06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page iii SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA JOHN PRADOS Ivan R. Dee Chicago 2006 06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page vii Contents Foreword ix Major Figures in the Book xiii Acronyms Used in the Book xxvii 1 The Gamut of Secret Operations 3 2 Cold War Crucible 28 3 The Secret Warriors 42 4 “The Kind of Experience We Need” 58 5 Covert Legions 78 6 Bitter Fruits 97 7 Adventures in Asia 124 8 “Acceptable Norms of Human Conduct Do Not Apply” 145 9 Archipelago 162 10 The War for the Roof of the World 184 11 “Another Black Hole of Calcutta” 204 12 The Bay of Pigs: Failure at Playa Girón 236 13 Cold War and Counterrevolution 273 14 The Secret War Against Castro 298 15 War in Southeast Asia 337 16 Global Reach 366 17 The Southern Cone 396 18 From “Rogue Elephant” to Resurrection 431 19 The Mountains of Allah 467 20 The Reagan Revolution 493 06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page viii viii Contents 21 Bill Casey’s War 507 22 Project Democracy 539 23 Full Circle 572 24 The Struggle for Control 606 25 Safe for Democracy 640 Notes 649 A Note on Sources 675 Index 679 06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page ix Foreword PUBLIC OPINION POLLS in many countries today portray the United States as the greatest threat to world peace on the globe, worse than terrorism or any other na- tion. This is an unfamiliar role for a country that has consciously articulated—and advanced—over many decades the notion that democratic values are the solution for many of the world’s ills. How strange it is that Americans, fond of the vision of the nation’s exceptionalism as seen in the image of the City on a Hill, their de- mocracy the admiration of the world, should find themselves an object of the world’s fears. The City is supposed to be a place of wonder and delight, even a state of grace. Its values are worth emulating, its freedom an example of achieve- ment for all. The Founding Fathers articulated the vision well, and at some point Ameri- can leaders translated that ideal into a mission to bring its values to the world. President Woodrow Wilson enshrined the mission into a policy to implant democ- racy and self-determination among peoples everywhere. His successors in the presidency, every one, have continued and enlarged that quest—which has led America into a variety of foreign adventures, with widely varying motives, ac- complishments, and failures. Those who fear America worry that the adventures themselves have supplanted the quest for democracy as the real content of United States policy. Critics of this policy argue that American presidents have pursued their prox- imate goals, defined in terms of U.S. power, while cloaking them in the language and trappings of universalist desire. This is not a new argument—and, one may hope, not a correct one. But at the moment millions of people in many lands be- lieve it, or something very like it. Their fears, and the extent of them, bode ill for American purpose in the world as well as for the feelings of Americans about their country and their government. One way to look at the world’s fears of America is to review U.S. actions on the world stage, where a major policy tool has been the secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created after World War II. The agency quickly became the locos of open and covert efforts that have engaged many nations 06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page x x Foreword across the globe. Because of the strict secrecy of most CIA activities, it has been exceedingly difficult for historians and other observers to evaluate them. Even to- day information about the CIA remains shrouded in misinformation, is poorly un- derstood, or has remained inaccessible to researchers. The “need to know” has been used by government bureaucrats to restrict information and knowledge to a few, even in the case of events long past. In the sixty years since the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, presidents have continually harnessed the agency in service of their foreign policy goals. Three decades ago the “problem” of the CIA appeared to be the agency’s status as a “rogue elephant”—unsupervised, tearing about the globe, acting at whim. By now it is evident that the agency and its cohorts were in fact respond- ing to presidential orders. This seems to make it much more urgent to attempt to tell the story of exactly what the CIA has accomplished. What has the agency con- tributed toward the success of larger U.S. policy goals, and the global quest for de- mocracy? Perhaps the problem is more one of the “rogue” president than it is about an out-of-control Central Intelligence Agency. The control and oversight of United States intelligence needs to be examined in specific contexts where the overseers concern themselves with covert operations. In the past the question of oversight has been viewed as one of congressional supervision of the intelligence commu- nity, but we can now see this is an inadequate approach. The truth is that White House mechanisms for control and supervision of intelligence activity predate those instituted by Congress. Each branch of government has had its own objec- tives and degree of success, or lack of it, in overseeing the CIA. Existing studies of presidential or congressional oversight ignore key facets of the problem and do not take into account the most recent developments. And CIA attempts to pursue operations beyond the limits of the oversight system highlight the need for fresh examination. The oversight question must not only be examined in much greater detail but must be reframed as a competitive process between two branches of government. Safe for Democracy does that. While it is impossible to say where oversight is headed, we can show where it has been and why it has generally not worked. This book surveys Central Intelligence Agency covert actions on four conti- nents. In the most recent version of their dictionary of terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff define a “covert operation” as one planned or conducted so as to conceal the identity of the sponsor or permit a denial of involvement. To that category the U.S. military adds the “clandestine operation,” defined as one in which emphasis “is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.” Special operations are covert or clandestine, are carried out by military forces, and may combine elements of both varieties. All these form part of our terrain of inquiry. Aside from labels based on secrecy, covert actions may also be viewed along functional lines. The several types include political action, in which the objective is to influence opinion-makers or the politics of nations; psychological warfare 06-223 (01) FM.qxd 5/9/06 8:59 PM Page xi Foreword xi and propaganda, which are tactical tools in many actions; support for military op- erations, an intermediate category between traditional covert action and military special operations—which consumes an increasing fraction of CIA effort; and paramilitary operations, which are covertly coercive. Safe for Democracy exam- ines activities along this entire spectrum. This book contributes important new detail to our understanding of many CIA operations, including those in Italy, Korea, Poland, Iran, Guatemala, Hungary, China, Tibet, the Philippines, Indonesia, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, Bolivia, the Congo, Ghana, Vietnam and Laos, Kurdistan, Chile, Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; and it provides a first-cut view of actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and other most recent activities. Whenever possible I have related all these events to specific pres- idential decisions expressed through White House control mechanisms and mod- erated by congressional oversight procedures. To prevent the work from growing completely unmanageable, the secret wars in Vietnam and Laos have been treated in less detail than is possible—they could easily consume an entire book by them- selves—and the war against terrorism has been placed to one side except where it impinges directly upon our main subjects. The conclusions of this inquiry tend to bear out the critics. American under- cover actions have resulted in upheavals and untold suffering in many nations while contributing little to Washington’s quest for democracy. Despite considerable inge- nuity, technological wizardry, operational flexibility, and an impressively compe- tent cadre of secret warriors, the results of covert operations have been consistently disappointing. Yet the very drive to maintain and use these capabilities has had con- sequences—often unforeseen—both for America’s image around the globe and for constitutional control of the United States government by its own people. Secret warriors are known to argue the unique reasons for failure in specific actions but— except in secret studies unknown to the public until now—to resist broad overall evaluation. This book, however, does not stop short. Its content is not speculation, idle rumination, mindless ideology, or uninformed criticism. The evidence gathered in these pages is broad and deep. Covert operations have been a negative factor in the American pursuit of democracy throughout the world. I have written on these matters earlier in Presidents’Secret Wars, a book pub- lished in the late 1890s, and in fact the present work began as a revision of that book.