University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1975 The iN xon appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals : the impact of the law and order issue on the rights of the accused. Jon Spencer Gottschall University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Gottschall, Jon Spencer, "The iN xon appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals : the impact of the law and order issue on the rights of the accused." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1852. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1852 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE NIXON APPOINTMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: THE IMPACT OF THE LAW AND ORDER ISSUE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED A Dissertation Presented By Jon Spencer Gottschall Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August, 1975 Political Science (c) Jon Spencer Gottschall, 1976 All Rights Reserved THE NIXON APPOINTMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: THE IMP:.CT OF THE LAVJ AND ORDER ISSUE ON THr; RIGHTS OF THE iiCCUSED A Dissertation By Jon Spencer Gottschall Approved as to style and content by: Uarvey Kline, Chairman 7-iugust, 19 75 The Nixon Appointees to the United States Courts of Appeals: The Impact of the Law and Order Issue on the Rights of the Accused (August 1975) Jon S. Gottschall, B.A., Texas Technological University M.S., Texas Technological University Directed by: Dr. Sheldon Goldman The major findings of this study include the following: (1) When appeals judges were aggregated in terms of their scores on criminal procedures cases, differences were observed in the voting behavior of Nixon appointees as compared to non-Nixon Democrats and non- Nixon Republicans during fiscal 1970 to 1973. (2) Nixon appointees voted more "conservatively" than these other two judge groups. Non-Nixon Democrats were the most "liberal" group, and non-Nixon Republicans fell in between the other two groups. (3) However, when the circuit was introduced as a control, it was found that (a) the relationship between the three judge groups varied from circuit to circuit with only six circuits conforming to the hypo- thesis; (b) the composite and median scores of Nixon appointees and non- Nixon Republicans outside the South were virtually identical when only the cases of fiscal 1973 were considered; and (c) bloc analysis of individ- ual circuits revealed that Nixon appointees do not constitute monolithic and sharply "conservative" blocs in any but the District of Columbia circuit, where voting patterns of Nixon appointees were similar to voting patterns of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court. (4) Moreover, when other background characteristics were entered as controls on the appointing administration variable, the latter was found to account for only a small proportion of the observed variances ,in voting behavior among the judges of the Courts of Appeals. (5) There also appeared to be a relationship between the scores of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican Senator, where one existed. The most "conservative" Nixon appointees were recommended, for the most part, by the most conservative Republican Senator, or were the choices of the Administration in the absence of eligible Republican sponsors. This suggests that Senatorial courtesy was an obstacle to the attainment of preferred administration nominees. (6) Finally, doctrinal analysis of confession cases also indicated that Nixon appointees did not always agree on confession issues, varying in their legal positions not only from circuit to circuit but within some circuits. (7) The tentative conclusion, then, of this study is that, although the Nixon appointees did appear more "conservative" when their voting behavior was aggregated, they constituted, with the exception of the District of Columbia circuit, nothing like the cohesive "conservative" bloc of Nixon appointees which dominated criminal justice issues on the Supreme Court over roughly the same period. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is impossible to adequately thank the many people who supported me in this project. However, my greatest debt is to my •wife, Marcia, who was instrumental in the selection of the topic and in some of the revisions, and who also made many sacrifices in her own life and studies so that I could finish. I also have a great debt to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Sheldon Goldman, who guided me through many of the most difficult aspects of this study and who was always generous with his time; his encouragement and good advice sustained me not only in this project but throughout my graduate studies at the University of Massachusetts. I am also grateful Lo Lhe uLher meinbers of my committee, Jon Simpson and Loren Beth, who carefully read and criticized the manuscript. Their comments led to revisions which I believe strengthened the final draft. I would also like to thank my wife's parents. Rex and Marge Petty, my mother, Dorothy Gottschall, and my grandfather, Robert E. Dawson, who contributed moral and financial support during this period. Finally, I would like to thank my children, Deidre, Richard, and Jonathan, who endured this period. CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS INTRODUCTION Chapter I. THE NIXON CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COURT: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Earlier Campaigns Against the Court The Nixon Campaign II. THE SELECTION AND SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: EISENHOWER TO NIXON Recent Literature on the Appointment Process The Role of the American Bar Association Factors Influencing Administration Choices Background Characteristics of Appeals Court Judges: Eisenhower to Nixon III. THE IMPACT OF THE NIXON APPOINTEES TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS DURING FISCAL 1973 Analysis of Individual Circuits Aggregate Analysis Summary IV. CONFLICT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS: ATTITUDES, BACKGROUNDS AND THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN NON-UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL CASES, FISCAL 1970-73 Aggregate Analysis Circuit by Circuit Analysis Senate A.D.A. Scores and Judicial Voting Bloc Analysis Socio-Pol i tical Background Characteristics and Judicial Voting Behavior 92 Background Statements Taken After Assertion of Rights to Silence or Attorney Interrogation Without the Knowledge of Retained Attorney Failure of Police to Honor Requests tor Counsel Ambiguous or Contradictory Statements of Defendant Rights Proof of Waiver Rights of Juveniles Harris v. New York . The Impeachment Issue Circuit by Circuit Analysis Conclusions VI. CONCLUSIONS Major Findings Explanation of Findings Future Research BIBLIOGRAPHY 144 LIST OF TABLES Table Page Disposition 1. of Unanimous and Non-unanimous Rights of Criminal Defendants Cases by all Circuits Fiscal 1973 [ 2. Composite Scores for Judge Groups by Circuit 42 3. Composite Scores by Issue: District of Columbia 46 4. Composite Scores by Issue: Fifth Circuit 46 5. Composite Scores by Issue: Ninth Circuit 50 6. Composite Scores by Issue: Second Circuit 50 7. Composite Scores by Issue: Third Circuit 51 8. Composite Scores for Aggregate Judge Groups, Federal and State Cases, Fiscal 1973 53 9. Composite Scores for Aggregate Judge Groups: Confession, Search and Seizure, and "All Other Cases" Categories, Fiscal 1973 54 10. Composite Scores for Aggregate Judge Groups: Unanimous and Non-unanimous Cases: Fiscal 1973 55 11. Percentage of Judge Groups Classified as "Liberal," "Moderate," and "Conservative," Fiscal 1973 56 12. Impact of Excluding the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on Composite Judge Group Scores for Fiscal 1973: All Cases 57 13. Impact of Excluding the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on Composite Judge Group Scores for Fiscal 1973: Non- unanimous Cases 58 14. Percentages of Judge Groups in "Liberal," "Moderate, and "Conservative" Categories When Fourth and Fifth Circuits are Excluded 59 15. Comparison of Case Disposition by All Circuits: Fiscal 1973 and Fiscal 1970-73 64 16. Comparison of Composite Non-unanimous Case Score for Fiscal 1970-73 With Unanimous Case Scores for Fiscal •73 by Judge Group 65 17. Attitudinal Classification of Judges: Comparison of Classifications Based on Unanimous Cases With Classifications Based on Non-unanimous Cases Only 67 18. Percentages " of Judge Groups in "Liberal," "Moderate and "Conservative" Categories: Non-unanimous Cases, Fiscal 1970-73 ]^ 53 19. Percentages of Judge Groups in "Liberal," "Moderate," and "Conservative" Categories, Southern Circuits Excluded: Non-unanimous Cases, Fiscal 1970-73 68 20. Composite Judge Group Score by Circuit: Non- Unanimously Decided Cases, Fiscal 1970-73 70 21. Comparison of Senator A.D.A. Scores and Judicial Voting Tendencies 7] 22. Comparison of SenateA.D.A. Scores and Judicial Voting Tendencies: "Liberal" and "Moderate" Categories Combined and Six Judges Excluded 73 23. Number and Percent of Each Judge Group in "Liberal," "Moderate," and "Conservative" Voting Blocs 80 24. Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Background Variables and Judge Scores 85 25.