T045-10 port CuaEstra 145Btz 6/4/10 08:35 Pgina 1 C M Y CM MY CY CMY K Composicin MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA CUADERNOS de 145-B ESTRATEGIA SPANISH INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LISBON TREATY April 2010 CATÁLOGO GENERAL DE PUBLICACIONES OFICIALES http://www.060.es Edita: NIPO: 076-10-097-5 (edición en papel) NIPO: 076-10-098-0 (edición en línea) ISBN: 978-84-9781-573-4 Depósito Legal: M-14594-2010 Imprime: Imprenta del Ministerio de Defensa Tirada: 700 ejemplares Fecha de edición: abril 2010 DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEFENCE RELATIONS Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Working Group no 5/09 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LISBON TREATY The ideas contained here in are the responsability of the authors and not necessarily reflect the opinion of the IEEE, which has sponsored this publication. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION By Enrique Mora Benavente Chapter I EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY By Félix Arteaga Martín Chapter II THE NEW LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY By María de la O Urrea Corres Chapter III CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES By Leonardo Sánchez Peláez Chapter IV MILITARY CAPABILITIES By José Enrique de Ayala Marín Chapter V TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS By Jordi Marsal Muntala Chapter VI EUROPEAN UNION-RUSSIA RELATIONS, THE «EASTERN PARTNERSHIP», THE FUTURE OF THE OSCE, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) By Francisco José Ruiz González RECOMMENDATIONS By Enrique Mora Benavente COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING GROUP INDEX INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION ENRIQU E MORA BE NAV E NT E THE EUROPEAN UNION, A GLOBAL ACTOR? During the final months of 2009, under the Swedish Presidency, the European Union Member States engaged in a particularly intense de- bate on an issue which featured on the agenda of the meetings under the heading «Europe as a global actor». The debate took place at in- formal ministerial gatherings and other more technical meetings. It did not reach public attention, as it was a purely internal reflection that was more budgetary than political. The discussions were based on a series of hypotheses that were understood to be accepted by all the countries and sought to answer a set of questions. I wish to concentrate on the first part, the shared basic assumptions. It is important to realise that the ultimate aim of this exercise was to reflect on the budget the European Union allocates to external action. The financial perspectives are adopted for six-year periods and therefore it is not unusual to find mismatches between forecasts and needs that progressively arise. If there is anything that characterises the world fol- lowing the fall of the Berlin wall it is the speed of change a speed with which a budgetary system as enormously slow and complex as that of the European Union is ill equipped to keep pace. The debate proposed by the Presidency was aimed at attempting to identify necessary chang- es in the expense lines in order to boost the effectiveness of the Union’s external action. Few debates could be closer to reality than the one on income and expenditure. It does not lend itself to grand declarations of intent or of philosophical principles. That is why I am mentioning it in this introduction. It can provide a very useful focus for the policy to which the present Cuaderno de Estrategia is devoted. — 11 — Introduction The first of the shared basic assumptions is found in the title itself. It stemmed from an apparently undisputable statement: the European Union, as such, is an actor in international relations. And not only this it is also global in scope. Its prominence and influence are not limited to its geographical area taken in its broadest sense, but extend to the farthest corner of the planet. Not so long ago an assertion of this kind would have triggered not only a few raised brows but a swarm of protests, denials and motions for rejection. It still triggers some, but as we shall see and several of the contributing authors examine in detail, it is more a problem of terminology and preconceived ideas than one of substance. A second point of departure in the exercise launched by the Presi- dency was a set of reasons —once again, not considered controversial— why the Union should strive to be more effective as a global actor. It is worth listing some of these reasons and subsequently reflecting on them. A word of warning before reading them: they are drafted by a Presidency which has never concealed its «pragmatic» vision of the building of Eu- rope, far removed from any «federalist» flight of fancy. The interests of the Member States —economic, environmental and security— have never been so closely linked as they are now to those of the rest of the world, and this trend will only grow stronger. We must therefore maximise the ability of the EU, on the one hand, to exercise in- fluence on a truly global scale and, on the other, to multiply the individual interests of the Member States. We must all exploit our belonging to a large and capable regional bloc. The EU is firmly placed to contribute to the development of interna- tional peace and security, having at its disposal for this purpose a unique range of instruments of action. The Union is often perceived as an effec- tive intermediary with the possibility of playing a credible and construc- tive role in situations of instability and conflict. Our objective should be the establishment of an effective international system headed by the United Nations. A more effective EU can become a credible and useful partner to the UN and other multinational organisa- tions. In a world of complex threats and challenges, internal and external security are increasingly interrelated. External efforts have a major and long-term impact on internal security. Together with this, Community policies and first— and third-pillar decisions are having more and more — 12 — Enrique Mora Benavente influence on the foreign-policy interests of the Member States. For ex- ample, European policy on climate change will be a determining factor in relations with China, while immigration policies have a major impact on northern Africa and the Sahel region. Added to these reflections were others which were more specific and therefore less relevant to what this book sets out to underline: the idea that nowadays all the European Union Member States consider, without the slightest reservation in principle, that the Union as an in- ternational actor is distinct and different from the twenty-seven actors who make it up. However, that all the Member States regard the Union as an actor in its own right does not mean to say that they share the same concept of what this means. On the contrary, there are various different concepts perhaps not twenty-seven, but certainly a number of diverse ideas that coexist within the Union. The topics of debate transcribed above give a fairly close idea of one of these concepts—that of the Swedish Presidency, the author of the re- flection document. Let us take the first element. The point of departure is the state, not the Union. The concern is national interest —whether eco- nomic, environmental or security— not a hypothetical common interest. One concludes from this premise that the Union can be useful in helping us maximise our individual capacity to influence. And the last sentence starkly reveals the underlying idea: «We must all exploit our belonging to a large and capable regional bloc» (the italics are mine). Rarely will read- ers find a more succinct and more precise expression of the utilitarianism concept of the building of Europe. The fourth element elaborates on this approach. Once again, the main concern is the security of the state considered individually. In this case, it is a broad concept of security which includes not only traditional exter- nal threats but also how they affect internal security. And once again the reflection on the influence of Union action on this security, in this case indirectly. It is a quite a particular reflection: the Union acts on policies within its powers (the first and, to a lesser extent, the third pillar) and this action arouses international reactions, from third states and international organisations, which can affect my security as a Member State. Once again the approach is radically localist, and from this viewpoint, from a seamless perspective of national interests, one arrives at the conclusion that this is how the Union should act. — 13 — Introduction The other two elements illustrate the more widespread conception of the objectives the Union should pursue in its action in the world: to work to promote international peace and security. That is all very well, of course. What does not seem so reasonable is it that it should be only that. This conception, despite its evident altruism and elevation view- point, is deeply reductionist. There is something that does not tally if the Union’s sole strategic objective is the same as that of many non-govern- mental organisations. Though to many this is a commonplace beyond all doubt. It is highly revealing that it should appear in the document we are examining—after all, it is an internal document intended to fuel a debate, not for public consumption. We may draw at least three conclusions from these elements dis- cussed: a) First, that even the most limiting vision of the European project con- siders the Union, as such, to be an international actor. b) Second, that it has goals to meet and interests to defend.