An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model

An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model

AN ESSAY ON THE DESIRE-BASED REASONS MODEL By Attila Tanyi A Doctoral Dissertation Submitted to the Central European University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Central European University Department of Political Science November 2006 © 2006 ATTILA TANYI All Rights Reserved. Attila Tanyi, THESIS, Page 2 ABSTRACT This dissertation aims to contribute to the discussion about the viability of what is sometimes labeled as the classical theory of practical reason: the Desire-Based Reasons Model (the Model). The line of argumentation employed is negative in character. Its aim is to not to construct a novel theory of practical reason, but to examine and criticize the Model from different angles. To do so, we need first a detailed presentation of the Model; this is the task of Chapter I. Since the Model offers us an account of normative reasons, the chapter focuses on the clarification of this notion. The strategy employed is comparative: I discern the notion by contrasting it with the notion of motivating reason. The framework thus arrived at helps me to distinguish three versions of the Model against which I argue in proceeding chapters. Chapter II is the first step on that road. It attacks the second and third version of the Model through their naturalist underpinnings. My aim is to show that the Model understood in this way is unable to account for the normativity of reason-claims. To this end, I employ a recent argument by Derek Parfit that points to a problem with the naturalist account of normativity. Parfit’s claim is this: naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. Although Parfit intends his objection to refute naturalism per se, my analysis shows that naturalists might be able to avoid his criticism in case they can vindicate the reduction proposed. However, by developing an argument borrowed from Connie Rosati, I show that this is exactly what advocates of the Model are unable to do. Chapter III takes up another line of argument against the second and third versions of the Model. The approach I consider questions the idea that the reason-relation must contain reference to the agent’s desires. There are several ways to do this, but I focus on the attempt that in my view promises the most: the idea of reason-based desires. On this view, since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the chapter I defend both premises against potential counter-examples. Furthermore, in the course of doing so, I also consider and reject the so far neglected first version of the Model. Chapter IV turns back to the second and third version of the Model and investigates their motivational defense. The defense infers the Model from two premises: the Internalism Requirement (IR) and the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM). In the chapter I attack the latter by focusing on its three corollary theses. These are: desires must (a) have real psychological existence and be present when action takes place, I call this the Existence Criterion (EC); must (b) constitute, together with a suitable instrumental belief, the agent’s motivating reason, which I label the Motivational Criterion (MC); and (c) must be independently intelligible from beliefs, which gets the title of the Intelligibility Criterion (IC). In the course of discussing the path that leads to my preferred solution, I argue that the EC makes sense as a requirement, whereas rejection of the IC would take us too far from the scope and elements of the HTM. Analysis of further objections, however, shows that the MC is not met because the role it attributes to desires makes it impossible for them to serve as motivators. A version of Jonathan Dancy’s pure cognitivism is true: it is beliefs about the object of the desire together with corresponding normative beliefs that constitute the agent’s motivating reason. I call the resulting theory the Cognitivist Theory of Motivation (CTM) and devote the remainder of the chapter to its elaboration and defense. Attila Tanyi, THESIS, Page 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have accumulated many debts in the course of writing this thesis. My greatest thanks go to my supervisor at CEU, Professor János Kis who has patiently provided me with support and inspiration through the years of my doctoral research. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Krister Bykvist, fellow of Jesus College who supervised my research at the University of Oxford in the academic year 2002/2003. His friendly and encouraging guidance helped further clarify the positions defended in my thesis. My gratitude is even greater given that he was willing to read and discuss my work after I left Oxford, even though it was no longer his duty to do so. The thesis would not have been possible without the excellent academic environment of the Political Science and Philosophy Departments of the Central European University, at whose doctoral seminars I have presented my work. I would like to thank all the participants in these seminars. I specifically thank Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos, Gergely Bognár, Serhiy Pukas and András Miklós for their comments and the stimulating discussion we had on the thesis as well as on my thinking in general. In its different versions almost all parts of the dissertation benefited from the comments of several people. Although the list I provide here is certainly not exhaustive, I hope to make best use of my memory. Jonathan Dancy and Joseph Raz read several drafts of Chapter I, while Ferenc Huoranszki and Anders Strand helped me focus my argument in the chapter. My discussion with John Skorupski at a summer school in the Netherlands about his work and related matters also influenced my thinking in this chapter. Some of the comments also appear in Appendix I, which originally formed part of the chapter. Chapter II was presented at several conferences and seminars, most notably at the ECAP 5 conference in Lisbon, Portugal and the ‘Ethical Naturalism’ conference in the University of Durham. I thank audiences at both places: some of the comments and objections appear in my discussion. An important part of Chapter III concerning the role of pleasure would not have been possible without the generous help of Leonard D. Katz who took the effort of trying to explain his position to me. I take this occasion to thank him for his patient correspondence about these matters. Chapter IV also bears the influence of several people. Fred Schueler read an early draft, whereas later versions were commented on by Greg Bognár, Eric Brown, Daniel Friedrich and Edmund Henden. The chapter was also presented at the Political Science Department’s Annual Doctoral Conference. I thank Laura Andronache who served as my commentator on this occasion. Finally, Appendix II owes a lot to my correspondence with William FitzPatrick whose work on Korsgaard’s constructivist theory influenced heavily my discussion. My special thanks go to all those institutions that funded my research in the past seven years. First and foremost, I thank the Central European University for all the financial and logistical support. I also thank the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office for providing the Chevening Scholarship for my research at Oxford University, the Research Council of Norway that in cooperation with the Hungarian Scholarship Board funded my stay at the University of Oslo, and the EUSSIRF grant that helped me use the facilities of the European University Institute in Florence. I also want to express my gratitude to the coordinators of my program, Éva and Kriszta who provided me with help whenever I needed it. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their assistance and encouragement throughout the writing of this thesis. Attila Tanyi, THESIS, Page 4 ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................4 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................7 CHAPTER I: REASONS AND THE MODEL .............................................................................12 I. Motivating versus normative reasons..........................................................................12 1.1.1. Two types of motivating reason: first difference .........................................................13 1.1.2. Two types of motivating reason: second difference.....................................................17 1.1.3. Motivating versus normative reasons...........................................................................20 II. Normative reasons ...........................................................................................................23 1.2.1. The structure of normative reason................................................................................23 1.2.2. Mental states as normative reasons: desires.................................................................25 1.2.2. Mental states as normative reasons: beliefs .................................................................31 III. The Model...........................................................................................................................40 1.3.1. First version..................................................................................................................41

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