philosophy @LISBON International eJournal Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa n. 9 | 2019 ISSN 2182-4371 www.philosophyatlisbon.org CURRENT ISSUE N.9 | 2019 Table of Contents Carlos João Correia Editorial ......................................................................................................................................... v Sara Coelho/Alexandre Mendonça A Case of Philosophical Experimentation upon mild cognitive impairment’s Time Perception: testing Bergson and Aristotle on Time and Memory ................................................................................... 1 José Pacheco Da Compaixão como Virtude: considerações a partir dos pensares de Montaigne e de Espinosa ....... 19 Inês Reis O Conceito de Tempo em Hannah Arendt: análise das obras “The Human Condition” e “The Life of the Mind” ....................................................................................................................................... 33 Carlos Machado Ascensão e Crise do Espaço Público em Hannah Arendt ................................................................ 71 David Iria The Ethics behind Welfare Economics: a philosophical critique ........................................................ 105 José Manuel Marques The Contribution of the Concept of the Will in Schopenhauer and Wagner to the Film: Excalibur by John Boorman ................................................................................................................................. 139 Sara Fernandes Cognitive Neuroenhancement: health, cultural and legal issues .......................................................... 151 João Miranda Theological and Ontological Minimalism ......................................................................................... 171 iii Editorial This issue of philosophy@LISBON presents a wide range of themes. However, it can be sustained that the vast majority of articles cross the research areas of the History of Philosophy and Praxis. In this way, authors such as Aristotle, Montaigne, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Bergson and Hannah Arendt are analysed. The first paper, which examines the conception of time in Aristotle and Bergson, falls within the scope of cognitive sciences and experimental philosophy; for his part, the article on Montaigne and Spinoza, scrutinizes them in the light of the ethical principle of compassion; the article on Schopenhauer has as its aim to evaluate a cinematographic work, also showing the importance of Wagner's music and mythology; the two articles on Hannah Arendt explore, first, the question of time, while the second set the contours of the political category of "public space" according to the German philosopher. Beyond these essays, we wish to underline the existence of three more articles. The first is in one of the most important fields of the humanities: political economy. The second is in the relation between two areas of knowledge, i.e. cognitive science, on the one hand, and practical ethics on the other. Finally, this number concludes with an article on the status of religious and theological propositions. The next issue of the journal is thematic and will analyse the main problems of Philosophy of Music. The deadline for submission of articles is set for October 15th, 2019. The submission rules are on the website of the journal http://www.philosophyatlisbon.org. Lisbon, May 29th 2019 Carlos João Correia v A Case of Philosophical Experimentation upon mild cognitive impairment’s Time Perception Testing Bergson and Aristotle on Time and Memory Sara Coelho, IMM, Universidade de Lisboa Alexandre de Mendonça, IMM, Universidade de Lisboa Abstract The interactions between the domains of philosophy and science have be- come more and more common nowadays, leading to advances in both felds. Recently, works on time perception in patients with mild cognitive impairment using an interval length protocol, a subjective passage of time task and an intertemporal choice questionnaire were published. They showed that slower passage of time judgments were related to the memory defcits exhibited by mild cognitive impairment patients, although their time estimation abilities and choices were found unimpaired in comparison with healthy age-matched con- trols. The aim of this paper is to analyse the experimental protocols followed and the results obtained in light of Bergson’s thoughts on time and memory, which may be considered as the opposite of Aristotle thinking. We will relate Bergson’s conceptions to the experimental paradigms of subjective passage of time and intertemporal choices. On the opposite, we will take Aristotle’s ideas on time perception closer to the experimental paradigm of interval length. Experimental results will help to clarify that the two rivals focused, at the end, on different aspects of time perception. In turn, the ideas of the two philosophers will provide hints to further scientifc research on time percep- tion and memory. Keywords: Aristotle * Bergson * Time * Memory * Choices * Mild Cognitive Impairment philosophy@lisbon, 9, 1-17. Lisboa: CFUL. 2 Sara Coelho/Alexandre Mendonça What I wanted is a philosophy which would submit to the control of science and which in turn could enable science to progress. A truly intuitive philoso- phy would realize the union so greatly desired of metaphysics and science. [Bergson 1934] Introduction According to Bergson, for the sake of knowledge progression, scien- ce and philosophy are able to test one another or, in other words, of mutual verifcation. Although different in object and method (science cares about the study of the brain using scientifc methodology and philosophy investigates mind through philosophical intuition), they share in common the human experience. For instance, when inves- tigating time perception, scientists may wonder about the neurop- sychological functions or brain structures involved in the experience of time whereas philosophers may question how time appears to human mind. In the best-case scenario, for Bergson, the results of scientifc research should match with philosophical intuitions, otherwise rectif- cation is needed in science, in philosophy or in both, because scienti- fc procedures or philosophical reasoning may be mistaken (Bergson 1934; Gunther 1987). This proposal resembles the contemporary mo- vements of intersection between philosophy and neuroscience, more specifcally, neurophenomenology, which profts from philosophical ideas to point out new directions to science (Gallagher 2003); experi- mental philosophy (taken in a broader sense1), which employs experi- mental procedures to test philosophical hypotheses (Rose and Danks 2013); and particularly neurophilosophy, where the empirical data is used to enlighten philosophical questions (Churchland 1986). Notwi- thstanding, Bergson does not advocate a reductionist perspective as the neurophilosopher Patricia Churchland, since he argues that the two knowledge domains complement each other and that philosophy penetrates in realms not accessible by science (Bergson 1934). Unli- 1. According to Rose and Danks, we must distinguish between a narrower sense and a broader sense of experimental philosophy. The broader sense deals with more than investigating people’s intuitions underlying philosophical topics, that is, the way we usually think. It concerns the testing of ideas through experimental tasks. The two thinkers give the example of Helmholtz, whose experiments on perception were explicitly intended to test many of Kant’s claims about the nature and the origin of cat- egories. Therefore, they concluded that experimental philosophy broadly understood is “an instance of a long tradition of philosophical naturalism conjoined with an active research in cognitive science” (Rose and Danks 2013). A Case of Philosophical Experimentation upon Mild Cognitive Impairment 3 ke Churchland, for Bergson, mind concepts as duration cannot be nei- ther fully explained by science nor represented into brain or cerebral processes. Recently, it was investigated time perception and its consequences in patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) using an interval length task, a passage of time judgments protocol and an intertemporal choi- ce questionnaire2 (Coelho et al. 2016a; Coelho et al. 2016b). Mild cog- nitive impairment patients suffer from memory defcits but have their general cognitive function preserved (Petersen et al. 1999). Therefo- re, it is a group of particular interest to examine the relation between temporal experience and memory. Memory has long ago been con- nected with time perception in the philosophical realm (Bardon 2013), but also in science several studies associated time perception with short-term and long-term memory (Graf and Grodin 2006; Kinsbourne and Hicks 1990; Mimura, Kinsbourne and O’Conner 2000; Schmitter- -Edgecombe and Rueda 2008). Recently, by employing the interval length judgments task previously mentioned, it was evaluated time estimation and time production abili- ties in patients with MCI (Coelho et al. 2016a) based on the hypothe- sis that their internal clock is damaged. The internal clock hypothesis was conceived by science to explain the factors that infuence time perception (Grodin 2010). It assumes the presence of an oscillatory pacemaker that is constantly emitting pulses and processes infor- mation along three stages. When asked to estimate time intervals, a person should count the pulses and save them into an accumulator for later comparison with the memory of pulses counted in the past. As the