University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2018 Actually Embodied Emotions Jordan Christopher Victor Taylor University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons, and the Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Jordan Christopher Victor, "Actually Embodied Emotions" (2018). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3192. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3192 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3192 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Actually Embodied Emotions Abstract This dissertation offers a theory of emotion called the primitivist theory. Emotions are defined as bodily caused affective states. It derives key principles from William James’s feeling theory of emotion, which states that emotions are felt experiences of bodily changes triggered by sensory stimuli (James, 1884; James, 1890). However, James’s theory is commonly misinterpreted, leading to its dismissal by contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Chapter 1 therefore analyzes James’s theory and compares it against contemporary treatments. It demonstrates that a rehabilitated Jamesian theory promises to benefit contemporary emotion research. Chapter 2 investigates James’s legacy, as numerous alterations of his theory have influenced the field of emotion research over the past fifty years, including so-called neo-Jamesian theories. This chapter argues that all these variations of the Jamesian theory assume that emotions require mental causes, whether in the form of evaluative judgments or perceptual contents. But this demand is not present in James’s theory. Nor, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, is this assumption necessary or even preferable for a fecund theory that explains human and non-human emotions. Thus, Chapter 3 offers the details of the primitivist theory of emotion: emotions are affective states that contribute to perceptual states by affectively representing relationships between the sensed environment and the sensing organism. Rather than relying on prior perceptual contents as triggers, emotions operate concurrently with, and as influencers of, exteroception. The information they carry can be conceptualized according to the theory of affordances proposed by ecological psychologist James J. Gibson (1979): emotions inform emoters of their potential responses to ecological concerns. Chapter 4 then explains how the primitivist theory is compatible with uniquely human emotion episodes, namely instances in which we identify and conceptualize our emotional experiences according to introspective and contextual cues. It argues that one resource available for categorizing our emotional episodes is a felt bodily map: different emotion concepts correspond with patterns of increased or decreased activity across the body. Finally, Chapter 5 situates the primitivist theory within the debate about natural kinds in psychology. While emotion constitutes a natural kind, discrete emotions do not. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Philosophy First Advisor Gary Hatfield Keywords Affect, Consciousness, Embodiment, Emotion, Perception, Phenomenality Subject Categories Philosophy | Philosophy of Science | Psychology This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3192 ACTUALLY EMBODIED EMOTIONS Jordan C. V. Taylor A DISSERTATION in Philosophy Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulllment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy òýÔ Supervisor of Dissertation ________________________ Gary Hateld Adam Seybert Professor in Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Graduate Group Chairperson ________________________ Errol Lord Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Dissertation Committee Karen Detlefsen, Professor of Philosophy and Education, University of Pennsylvania Lisa Miracchi, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Michael Weisberg, Professor and Chair of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania ACTUALLY EMBODIED EMOTIONS COPYRIGHT òýÔ Jordan Christopher Victor Taylor is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike ç.ý License To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/ç.ý/us/ iii For my family, old and new Of four legs or two Acknowledgments ere are far too many people deserving of my gratitude to name them all here, so I’ll restrict my list of names to those who have directly and signicantly impacted my thinking regarding this project. Gary Hateld, my advisor and my reason for applying to Penn in the rst place, has been wonderful. Without his guidance and insights I would have been lost. Each of my other committee members has also proven an invaluable source of wisdom. ank you to Karen Detlefsen, Lisa Miracchi, and Michael Weisberg for keeping me chal- lenged and motivated through your comments and discussions. Deena Skolnick Weisberg and Emily Hopkins, my long-time colleagues in Penn’s Cog- nition & Development Lab, helped me understand what goes on behind the scenes in exper- imental psychology. In collaborating with them I learned much about experimental designs and statistical analysis. Similarly, my knowledge of the concepts and methods of neuro- science was greatly enhanced by Martha Farah and Russell Epstein, two masters in their eld who were instrumental in making neuroscience education accessible to students across the disciplines. Such knowledge enabled me to engage with scientic scholarship throughout my dissertation. e philosophy department here at Penn boasts a very strong student population. I’m privileged to count myself among them. I must give particular thanks to Ben Baker, Devin Sanchez Curry, Louise Daoust, and Nabeel Hamid, my fellow members of the current iv v (òýÔò–òýÔ) iteration of the Hat Squad (a name rst bestowed upon Gary Hateld’s stu- dents by former member Larry Shapiro). Other students in the department who deserve my thanks for their consistent critical input include Marie Barnett, Justin Bernstein, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, Lindsey Fiorelli, Dylan Manson, and Brian Reese. I’m fortunate to have had opportunities to present ideas and research from my disser- tation at some excellent conferences and colloquia. At these events I’ve beneted from dis- cussions with numerous scholars including Lisa Feldman Barrett, Randy Cornelius, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Heleen Pott, Jenefer Robinson, Andrea Scarantino, and Alex Skolnick. John Sutton and Paul Griths also deserves thanks for spurring my interest in the topic of emo- tion and the philosophy of science prior to my arrival at Penn. Finally, thank you to my family, especially Devon for your unwavering support and en- thusiasm. It’s tough work being a full-time academic; it must be tougher being married to one. And thank you to Toby for providing me with all sorts of anecdotal evidence and motivation to pursue this project. is dissertation is very much about how to understand you—but you’ll never read it, because you’re a dog. vi ABSTRACT ACTUALLY EMBODIED EMOTIONS Jordan C. V. Taylor Gary Hateld is dissertation oers a theory of emotion called the primitivist theory. Emotions are de- ned as bodily caused aective states. It derives key principles from William James’s feeling theory of emotion, which states that emotions are felt experiences of bodily changes trig- gered by sensory stimuli (James, Ô¥, ÔÀý). However, James’s theory is commonly misin- terpreted, leading to its dismissal by contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Chap- ter Ô therefore analyzes James’s theory and compares it against contemporary treatments. It demonstrates that a rehabilitated Jamesian theory promises to benet contemporary emo- tion research. Chapter ò investigates James’s legacy, as numerous alterations of his theory have inuenced the eld of emotion research over the past y years, including so-called neo-Jamesian theories. is chapter argues that all these variations of the Jamesian theory assume that emotions require mental causes, whether in the form of evaluative judgments or perceptual contents. But this demand is not present in James’s theory. Nor, as Chapter ç demonstrates, is this assumption necessary or even preferable for a fecund theory that ex- plains human and non-human emotions. us, Chapter ç oers the details of the primitivist theory of emotion: emotions are aective states that contribute to perceptual states by aec- tively representing relationships between the sensed environment and the sensing organism. vii Rather than relying on prior perceptual contents as triggers, emotions operate concurrently with, and as inuencers of, exteroception. e information they carry can be conceptualized according to the theory of aordances proposed by ecological psychologist James J. Gibson (ÔÀÞÀ): emotions inform emoters of their potential responses to ecological concerns. Chap- ter ¥ then explains how the primitivist theory is compatible with uniquely human emotion episodes, namely instances in which we identify and conceptualize our emotional experi- ences according to introspective and contextual cues. It argues that one resource available for categorizing our emotional episodes is a felt bodily map: dierent emotion concepts cor- respond with patterns of increased or decreased activity