THE STRUgglE FOR POliTICAL REPRESENTATION LABOUR CANdidATES AND THE LIBERAL PARTY, 1868 – 85 In November 1868 a leading article in The Bee-Hive, a weekly trade unionist journal, declared that ‘there is a vast amount of rottenness in the ranks of the Liberal Party which must be rooted out before the working men can expect to be treated fair and honourably in their efforts to enter the House of Commons’.1 The call for direct labour representation – understood here as the election of working-class men to parliament to represent the labour interest as Liberal MPs rather than independently – had enjoyed a broad range of support during the reform agitations illiam Gladstone, However, in the decade follow- that followed the along with several ing the 1867 Reform Act – which establishment of the Wprominent Liberal enfranchised ‘registered and resi- MPs, such as Henry Fawcett and dential’ male householders, giving Reform League in Peter Alfred Taylor, had spoken in the vote to 30 per cent of work- support of working-class parlia- ing men – the labour movement February 1865. James mentary representation, while the struggled to secure the return of Owen explores what working-class radicals in whom the their own representatives. For management of the Reform League many labour activists, at the heart happens between 1968 was vested were zealous advocates of this struggle was the unwill- for the labour movement having its ingness of the managers of local and 1885. own voice inside the Commons.2 Liberal Associations to select a 14 Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 THE STRUgglE FOR POliTICAL REPRESENTATION LABOUR CANdidATES AND THE LIBERAL PARTY, 1868 – 85 working-class man as their par- Labour candidates and the involvement in local Liberal organ- liamentary candidate.3 According Liberal Party: the 1868 general isation at this time was patchy and to one frustrated working-class election limited: there was evidence of it political campaigner, ‘if an angel Soon after the 1867 Reform Act in Rochdale and Stockport in the from heaven came down … unless was passed, the general council of 1850s and to a certain extent in Bir- he had the imprimatur of the Lib- the Reform League called for joint mingham, Leeds and Manchester in eral Association, he was unfit for action with trade unions to secure the 1860s, but these were the excep- office’. 4 This created a legacy of the return of ‘a number of work- tions.10 Popular Liberal organisa- bitterness, which manifested itself ing men proportionate to the other tion was woeful in the majority of in a number of working-class, interests and classes at present English boroughs, and at the 1868 self-styled ‘labour’ candidates represented in Parliament’.6 This general election many Liberal asso- opposing the official Liberal can- proved to be a highly problematic ciations were established simply didate at parliamentary elections. undertaking. Firstly, the Reform on an ad hoc basis. Unsurprisingly, This article examines how both League’s London headquarters those who held the purse strings sides behaved in these elections had little influence over local con- of the local associations were loath and considers what these contests stituency branches, many of which to back a working-class candidate can tell us about the nature of the had already lapsed due to inactiv- who would not be able to sustain changing relationship between ity following the passing of the himself financially if elected, and the labour movement and the Lib- Second Reform Act.7 Money was the mangers of the association, who eral Party in the third-quarter of also a major obstacle: in 1868 the zealously defended provincial inde- the nineteenth century; a period League’s finances were in a parlous pendence, looked unkindly on not which witnessed the rise of mass state.8 In the summer of 1868 How- only Reform League agents who politics and the apex of popular ell had negotiated a secret financial wished to intervene, but also the Liberalism. agreement on behalf of the Reform efforts of Glyn, who encouraged, There is an important reason to League with the Liberal chief whip, largely in vain, local party manag- look again at these contests. The George Glyn, whereby a sum of ers to embrace the new electoral current scholarly emphasis is that £1,000, supplied by the wealthy Lib- opportunities presented by the Sec- the progression from Gladstonian eral manufacturer Samuel Morley, ond Reform Act.11 Liberalism and Victorian radi- could be used to promote the estab- Only two working-class candi- calism to the embryonic Labour lishment of working-class political dates backed by the Reform League Party of the early twentieth cen- organisations that would support made it to the polls at the 1868 gen- tury was a straightforward, lin- Liberal candidates. But this pact, eral election: George Howell at ear one.5 Yet, this interpretation, and the money that underpinned it, Aylesbury and William Randal which has become something of an existed only to advance Liberal can- Cremer at Warwick. Both seats orthodoxy, overstates the conflu- didates against vulnerable sitting were double-member boroughs ence of the labour movement and Conservatives; not a penny would where only one official Liberal had Liberalism during this period. As be used to oppose a Liberal.9 been brought forward, but neither discussed below, the relationship Ultimately, the decision to bring Left: How Punch man secured the endorsement of the between the two could be tense forward a working-class candi- saw the entry local Liberal association. At Ayles- and troubled, and it could change date in the Liberal interest rested of working- bury, the Liberal candidate, Nath- depending on the political context with the managers of the local Lib- class MPs to aniel Mayer de Rothschild, was a or the locality. eral associations. Working-class Parliament local landowner who effectively Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 15 THE STRUgglE FOR POliTICAL REPRESENTATION: LABOUR CANdidATES AND THE liBERAL PARTY, 1868–85 held the purse strings of local Lib- to aggressively challenge organ- assertive rhetoric was not matched eralism. Rothschild had no wish to ised Liberalism. After failing to by organisational strength. The give either financial or vocal sup- secure the Liberal nomination, leaders of the LRL were unable to port to a trade unionist who was which went to Sir Sydney Water- secure any pledge from the Trades an outsider to the agricultural bor- low, a city banker, Odger persisted, Union Congress (TUC) in support ough.12 Glyn, in a letter to Glad- offering as an independent can- of labour representation in parlia- stone, lamented Howell’s decision didate in the labour interest.18 He ment. This failure reflected cultural to stand, writing that ‘he has unfor- stood on a solid, advanced Liberal divisions within the trade union tunately chosen the wrong place. platform, but he was implacably movement regarding the centrali- … A stranger cannot win there’.13 opposed to the moderates who ran sation of its finances. The TUC At Warwick, the president of the the Southwark Liberal Associa- frequently debated the merits of a local Reform Association wanted tion. The tension here was that the national electoral fund for parlia- full control of the Liberal nomina- obstructionist leaders of local Lib- mentary candidates, to which all tion, and effectively disabled Cre- eralism did not reflect the direc- affiliated unions would contribute, mer’s candidature by refusing to tion in which Odger felt the Liberal but, while the London-based trade provide any financial assistance.14 Party should be heading, particu- unionists behind the LRL champi- Both Howell and Cremer finished larly in regards to direct labour oned this approach, there was con- bottom of their respective polls, representation. Under the guid- sistent opposition from elsewhere, comfortably defeated by a Liberal ance of his agent, the experienced especially from delegates of the and Conservative candidate who political operator James Acland, Durham and Northumbrian min- outspent them by a ratio of three to Odger successfully courted the ers, who felt that a centralised fund one.15 Significantly, neither How- support of neighbouring Liberal would undermine their regional ell nor Cremer, in their campaign and working-men’s associations. autonomy.20 The League’s finances speeches, attacked the national Generous donations from Liberal were therefore constantly in a pre- Liberal Party. Both promised une- sympathisers also helped him to carious state and in 1873, its sec- quivocal support to Gladstone.16 avoid a nefarious attempt to derail retary, Henry Broadhurst, began But their candidatures did represent his campaign when the returning to solicit subscriptions from Lib- an important protest against the officer demanded that Odger pay eral MPs favourable to their cause, neutralisation of their chosen bor- £200 to cover his share of expenses which was hardly indicative of a ough’s voice following the decision and refused to release tickets for serious plan to go their own way.21 of the local party not to endorse a Odger’s supporters to the elec- second Liberal. tions hustings until he did so. It was The return Sir Sydney Waterlow’s intransi- Labour candidates and the gence, however, that proved fatal. of the coun- Liberal Party: the 1874 general The Labour Representation Although Odger received 4,382 try’s first two election League votes, Waterlow, who retired hours The return of the country’s first A series of electoral contests in the before polling closed, gained just working- two working-class MPs at the following five years witnessed a under 2,951, allowing the Conserv- 1874 general election underlined subtle but important shift in how ative candidate to be returned with class MPs the importance of financial sta- the labour movement articulated 4,686 votes.