Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Overseas Dispatch Operations in the 1990s: Effective International Actors? Garren Mulloy A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Newcastle University School of Geography, Politics and Sociology 2011 Abstract Garren Mulloy This thesis investigates Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas deployment operations (ODO) of the 1990s to evaluate whether the JSDF were effective international actors. This study fills a significant gap in extant literature concerning operational effectiveness, most studies having concentrated upon constitutionality and legality. This study places operational evaluations within the context of international actors during the vital decade of the 1990s, and within the broader context of Japanese security policies. JSDF performance is studied in four mission variants: UN peacekeeping, allied support, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations. A four-stage analytical framework is utilised, evaluating JSDF effectiveness, efficiency, and quality, comparing between missions, mission variants, and with other international actors, thereby cross-referencing evaluations and analyses. The historical development of the JSDF profoundly affected their configuration and ability to conduct operations, not least the mechanisms of civilian control, the constitution, and mediated passage of ODO-related laws. However, these factors have not prevented the development of significant JSDF ODO-capabilities, and their development is traced through the target decade, and linked to the successful completion of post-2001 operations in Iraq and East Timor. It is found that although JSDF ODO in the 1990s provided effective, quality services, operational efficiency was frequently compromised by lack of investment in key capabilities and limited scales of dispatch, despite the relative cost-effectiveness of ODO. Compared to other armed forces, JSDF capabilities developed well in the early 1990s but the Forces failed to comprehensively capitalise upon their achievements unlike a diverse range of international ODO actors. The JSDF during the 1990s thereby developed as an effective, albeit narrow-spectrum, ODO actor, highly capable and well respected, yet compromised by investment, restrictions, and culture. This operational development matched the development of security policies that increasingly attempted to link military, diplomatic, and non-traditional security elements within an emergent Japanese strategy. Contents List of Tables vii Preface viii Note on Citations and Translations ix Glossary x Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Aims and Parameters 1 2 Methodology in the Study of ODO 9 3 Theory in the Study of ODO 13 4 Evaluation Criteria 19 5 Structure 23 Chapter 2 The Emergence and Maturing of the JSDF 1 Introduction: Emergence 25 A Status 25 B Japan’s Security Status: Post-War to Cold War 29 C JSDF and Cold War Security Policy 33 D Defence Build-up Phase: Cold War and the JSDF 35 2 Maturing: JSDF Configuration and Roles 40 A Command, Control, and Intelligence 40 a JSDF Policy, Command, and Control 40 b Japanese Intelligence 45 B Fundamental Force Posture 50 a GSDF 51 b MSDF 53 c ASDF 54 i C Defence Investment 55 a GSDF 57 b MSDF 59 c ASDF 60 d ODO Strategic Capabilities 61 3 Conclusion 63 Chapter 3 Background to Japanese Deployments: PKO, ODO, and Article 9 Introduction 65 1 The Nature of Peacekeeping: History and Definitions 66 A What is PKO? a Definitions 66 b History and Basis of Peacekeeping 74 b.1 UN Charter 79 b.2 Use of Force 80 2 The Path Towards Japanese Peacekeeping A Characteristics of Japanese PKO 84 a. The Constitutional Limits 87 b. Political Development, Utility, and Mediation 90 c. Military Utility, Opportunity, and Distraction 99 d. Political and Legal Development of the IPCL 101 e. Legal Limitations 106 e.1 SDF Law 106 e.2 IPC Law 108 3 Conclusion 114 ii Chapter 4 ODO Deployments: Peacekeeping 1 Introduction to JSDF Peacekeeping 117 A ODO Mission Range 118 B UN Peace Operations 119 C Assessment of Performance 121 D Conclusion 124 2 Cambodia Introduction 124 A Mission Context 126 B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 130 C JSDF Performance 138 a Military Observers 151 D Japanese Contribution to Mission 153 E Conclusion 160 3 Mozambique Introduction 164 A Mission Context 165 B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 168 C JSDF Performance 171 D Japanese Contribution to Mission 175 E Conclusion 177 4 Golan Introduction 179 A Mission Context 180 B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 185 C JSDF Performance 189 D Japanese Contribution to Mission 197 E Conclusion 199 5 Conclusion 200 iii Chapter 5 ODO Deployments: Operations Other Than Peacekeeping Introduction 202 1 Allied Support Mission: Persian Gulf Introduction 204 A Mission Context 204 B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 205 C JSDF Performance 205 D Japanese Contribution to Mission 206 E Conclusion 206 2 Humanitarian Assistance Missions: Rwanda/Zaire and West Timor A Rwanda/Zaire Introduction 207 a Mission Context 208 b JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 209 c JSDF Performance 212 d Japanese Contribution to Mission 214 e Conclusion 218 B West Timor 218 3 Disaster Relief Missions: Honduras and Turkey A Honduras Introduction 220 a Mission Context 220 b JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics 221 c JSDF Performance 223 d Japanese Contribution to Mission 225 e Conclusion 226 B Turkey 226 4 Conclusion 227 iv Chapter 6 Evaluation of Performance Introduction 230 1 Evaluating ‘Success’ 230 A Academic Literature 231 B UN Standards 233 C Wider recognition a Domestic 237 b Foreign 238 2 Evaluation of JSDF ODO Performance: Comparison of ODO Missions Introduction 242 A Mission Context 243 B Preparation and Logistics 244 C Performance 249 D Contribution to Mission 250 E Effectiveness 251 F Efficiency 253 G Quality 259 3 Comparative Evaluation of JSDF and non-JSDF ODO A Non-Japanese Operations 260 a Operational Comparison 260 b Force Preparation Comparison 267 4 Non-JSDF Factors in Performance 271 A Institutional Support 272 B Legal Issues 275 v 5 After the 1990s: Building Upon Experience A Continuity and Improvement: 21 st Century ODO 276 B New practice 278 6 Conclusion 281 Chapter 7 Conclusion Introduction 285 1 Effective Actors? 287 2 Effective Experience 301 3 Summary of Evaluation 309 4 Implications for Studies of Japanese Security 313 A Japanese Military Tolerance 313 B Normalising and Militarising 316 C Policy Drivers: The Search for ‘Normal’ Strategy319 D Policy Drivers: The Search for Security 322 5 Opportunities for Further Research 326 Bibliography 329 Appendix One Graphs 377 Appendix Two Maps and Charts 379 Appendix Three Photographs and Illustrations 387 vi List of Tables Table 2.1 GSDF Branches 51 Table 4.1 JSDF UNPKO (units) 121 Table 5.1 RRU Staff 213 Table 5.2 Honduras Mission Staff 224 Table 6.1 ODO Daily Allowance 241 Table 6.2 IPCH ODO Disbursements 255 Table 6.3 JDA ODO Budgets 255 vii Preface For their assistance in the completion of this thesis thanks are due to a great many people. The greatest thanks must go to Professor Reinhard Drifte, Professor Emeritus, Newcastle University, not only for the advice and discipline required to complete the thesis, but also for his enthusiasm and belief from the very beginning in both the innate value of the project and my own ability to complete it. His support and enthusiasm never wavered, even when mine did, and continued even after his early retirement from Newcastle University. Without him, this thesis would not have been completed, and yet the errors of fact or analysis herein are only my own. Many people helped with preparation for the viva but particular thanks are due to Professor Hartmut Behr and Dr. Marie Lall, while Dr. Jocelyn Mawdsley and Professor Christopher W Hughes provided expert challenges and comments to improve the thesis. There have been far more people who have helped with this research than it is possible to list, but within universities, academic societies, institutions, ministries, agencies, and armed forces there are a great many people who have stood out by their unerring kindness and generosity. My efforts do not do them justice. These include many members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the degree to which they opened their offices, patiently explained and answered questions, and socialised with me has been a precious experience. Thanks must also be given to the National Institute for Defense Studies and the Research Institute for Peace and Security for their help and advice, and for colleagues at Keio University and Daito Bunka University in Japan. Such a long and involved project has also been aided by the patience of friends, and family who have understood why I was absent, absent minded, or otherwise engaged at various times during the past decade. Their kindness and patience is greatly appreciated, particularly as a number passed away during this project. viii Note on Citations and Translations Throughout this thesis, Japanese names have been written in ‘standard’ Romanised form, with family name first, with other names cited by fore-name followed by family-name format in the main text. To reduce the possibilities of confusion between Asian and other names, the form of ‘family-name, fore-name’ has been utilised in the footnotes as well as the bibliography, for all names (e.g. Tanaka, Taro and Smith, John). British spelling has been utilised, unless when quoting from texts that have used alternate spellings. Japanese standard Romanised spelling has been used for place names (e.g. Tokyo), while Japanese titles and names have been translated into English with the Japanese Romanised version italicised in brackets, e.g. “Regional Armies (Houmentai )”; “Ebata, Kensuke, Information and the State (Jouhou to kokka )”. Those Japanese terms and names not in common usage have been italicised. Where Japanese translations have been provided by the author or publisher, these have been utilised, even when not literal translations of titles.