Notes A Brief Introduction 1 Examples are the Correlates of War (CoW) project that was founded in 1963 by a political scientist at the University of Michigan and that has immensely fostered quantitative research into the causes of war (see http://www.corre- latesofwar.org/); the International Conflict Research (ICR) group, based at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich (ETHZ) and the Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), that conducts research on international and domestic conflict and mainly relies on statistics and com- putational methods for its analyses (see http://www.icr.ethz.ch/); or the European Network of Conflict Research (ENCoRe) at ETHZ that aims at pre- paring researchers and policy makers for future conflicts by coordinating and accelerating ‘the construction and maintenance of conflict datasets with the help of an integrated online portal that allows researchers and policy makers to analyze and predict the outbreak and course of conflict processes around the world’ (see http://www.encore.ethz.ch/index, 14.1.2014). The majority of contributions in influential journals such as the Journal of Peace Research and the Journal of Conflict Resolution rely on such quantitative data and analyses. 1 The Emerging Cultural Turn in Peace Research 1 For a comprehensive overview of transitional justice see, for example, Kritz (1995). See also Daly and Sarkin (2007), Kayser-Whande and Schell-Faucon (2008), Merwe (2003), Minow (1998), and Rigby (2001). 2 See Fischer and Ropers (2004: 11), Galtung (2001), and Huyse (2008: 2–3). The problematic nature of the term ‘reconciliation’ and its elements and instruments are discussed by, among others, Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004: 28–29), Bloomfield (2003b, 2006), Huyse (2003b), Lederach (1995, 1997), and Pankhurst (1999). 3 Given the vagueness and unspecificity of the word ‘traditional’ and ‘tradi- tion’, some authors suggest using a different terminology instead, such as ‘community justice’, ‘informal systems’, ‘customary law’, or ‘local justice sys- tems’ (Huyse 2008: 8, Mearns 2002: 8, 11). Since all these terms themselves involve terminological inaccuracies – what, for instance, is ‘a community’ and what is ‘the local’ – I intentionally continue using the term ‘traditional’ and the enduring discourses related to it. In the course of this work, however, I use some of the other terms interchangeably. 4 For more examples where traditional mechanisms have been integrated into broader justice-seeking structures after massive violence in various countries in Africa, see, for example, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA (2006), Gibbs (1997: 232), Ocen (2007), and Tom (2006). 209 210 Notes 5 For the most salient features of traditional justice systems, see Stevens (2001). Despite these common features, there are also significant socioculturally determined differences in how the various mechanisms deal with the past, how they try to restore the victims, and whether or not offenders need to be identified and sanctioned. 6 Various authors have criticized the original terminology and have suggested the use of more neutral terms such as ‘construction’ instead of ‘invention’ (Jolly & Thomas 1992: 243, Linnekin 1992: 249). In 1993, Ranger (1993: 82) himself revisited the debate and argued that he would now prefer the term ‘imagined’ to ‘invented’ since it lays much more stress upon ideas, images, and symbols – so central to traditions and identity – which ‘invention’ does not. 7 For Northern Uganda, for example, see Baines (2007: 98, 107); for Bougainville, see Boege (2006); for Indonesia, see Clark and Stephens (2011: 1–2). 2 Decentralization, Revitalization, and Reconciliation in Indonesia 1 This is only a brief outline, as a rich literature exists on the history of decen- tralization, the legislation and decentralization process, and revival move- ments throughout Indonesia (see e.g. Aspinall & Fealy 2003, Davidson & Henley 2007, Hadiz 2010, Holtzappel & Ramstedt 2009, Kivimäki, Jacobsen, & Kartasasmita 2002, H. Schulte Nordholt & Klinken 2007). 2 Most national laws and government regulations are by now available on the Indonesian government website (Law Regulations): http://www.indonesia. go.id/en/law-regulations. 3 Rosaldo (2003: 6) rightly criticizes Benedict Anderson’s notion of the Indonesian nation as an imagined community, as he fails to notice that the minorities in the peripheries have not been invited to take part in this imagi- nation process. 4 This is only a very cursory historical introduction to the area. For more in-depth accounts see, for example, Andaya (1993), Chauvel (1990), Fraassen (1972), and Knaap (1987). 5 Due to immigration and conflict dynamics and the difficulties of data surveys under such conditions, there were huge fluctuations in the population statis- tics of Maluku Province over the last years. Whereas in 2000 approximately 44% out of a population of 1.2 million were Muslim and 56% Christian, 2003 government statistics claim that approximately 65% were Muslim and 35% Christian out of 1.27 million, and 2008 statistics report 50% were Muslim and 50% Christian out of 1.44 million (Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Maluku 2000, 2003, Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Maluku & Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah 2010). In Indonesia as a whole, Muslims constitute some 87% of the population. 6 Data provided in the annual provincial government statistics and by the pro- vincial government (Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Maluku 2000, 2005/2006, Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Maluku & Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah 2010, Pemerintah Provinsi Maluku 2010). See also Pieris (2004). 7 By March 2011, village perdas had only been passed for the districts of Central Maluku and Ambon City. Only drafts existed for other districts in Maluku Notes 211 Province (e.g. for Seram Bagian Barat, Seram Bagian Timur, Maluku Tenggara, and Maluku Tenggara Barat) or no efforts had been taken yet to sketch such regulations. This is in stark contrast to other provinces such as West Sumatra, where the Provincial Regulation on Nagari (village) Government came into effect in 2000 and district regulations were finalized in 2001 (F. v. Benda- Beckmann & K. v. Benda-Beckmann 2007b: 226–227). 8 For examples that illustrate that prevailing confusion, the continuous argu- ments over jurisdiction, and the disputes about areas of competence between regional governments and local actors, see Bräuchler (2014b: 71–73). 9 This is a reference to the Saniri Tiga Batang Air, a structure meant to govern the regions of the three rivers Eti, Tala, and Sapalewa in West Seram in the past, which is also subject to current revival for peace initiatives. 3 Conflict and Peacebuilding in Maluku 1 This outline of the Moluccan conflict is based on parts of chapter 3 in Bräuchler (2013), but has been shortened, updated, and revised. As the background to the conflict and how it took place differed widely from one Moluccan region to the next (North, Central, and Southeast Maluku), here I will mainly con- centrate on Central Maluku and Ambon City. 2 I am well aware that such a short note cannot do justice to the much broader phenomenon of war economies. However, its exploration would go beyond the scope of this book. In her book Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Centuryy (2004), Carolyn Nordstrom goes beyond the local level of war economy and throws light on the interna- tional profiteering going on in the shadows of African wars. 3 Ambon is the name both of the capital city of Maluku (Kota Ambon) and of the island (Pulau Ambon) where the eponymous city is located. 4 The PDS is one level below martial law and places the police directly under the person commanding the PDS, the then governor of Maluku, Saleh Latuconsina. 5 For an overview of the various factors, see Bertrand (2002), Brown, Wilson, and Hadi (2005), Goss (2004). For a list of references, see Bräuchler (2013: 90, fn 25). 6 The reason is that usually an entire village joined a religion. Back in colonial days, to avoid conflict, villages with populations of mixed religions, such as Tial (Pulau Ambon) and Sirisori (Saparua), had been divided into a Christian and a Muslim village respectively, that were then called Tial Serani and Tial Islam or Sirisori Kristen and Sirisori Islam (Kraemer 1927: 82). 7 See e.g. Ajawaila (2000b), Bartels (2003), Lee (1997), Manuhutu (2000), Pariela (2005: 187), Pattiselanno (1999), Taylor (2001). On the impact of Muslim immigration on the Christian–Muslim relations in Ambon, see also Mearns (1999). As part of state-supported transmigration programs between 1969 and 1999, 97, 422 people emigrated to Maluku, more than half of them to Central Maluku. Given a total population of two million, this amounts to almost 5%. The majority came from Buton and Java and was Muslim. There are no figures on spontaneous migration. Estimates range from 50,000 to 200,000 (Regional Office of the Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Settlers Province of Moluccas, http://www.websitesrcg.com/ambon/transmig.htm, 22.7.2002 212 Notes and 13.1.2012). While in 1930 about 60% of the Moluccan population was Christian, prior to the unrest the proportion had fallen to only 40%. In 2008, it had risen again to almost 50% (see also chapter 2, note 5). 8 Provokatorr is a more commonly used term in the Suharto era to describe those whom the authorities believed to be behind a conflict triggered in a society that is regarded ‘as a pressure cooker in which the pressure of amok, rage and frustration builds up until it erupts in violence’ (Panggabean 2006: 220). 9 For a critique of the program, see Amirrachman (2012). For an initiative by local academics that resulted in a publication on Central Moluccan cultural values to be used in local-content curriculum (muatan lokal), see Putuhena et al. (2009). In 2007, the mayor of Ambon City, Jop Papilaya, asked each adat village on Ambon to write down its history.