SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE PROBLEM WITH PARAMILITARIES Asia Report N°140 – 23 October 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. PARAMILITARISM IN THAILAND.......................................................................... 2 III. RANGERS....................................................................................................................... 4 A. EXPANSION OF RANGERS IN THE SOUTH................................................................................5 B. TA SEH SHOOTINGS AND ISLAMIC SCHOOL RAID................................................................9 C. THE KILLING OF YAKARIYA PA’OHMANI .............................................................................10 D. ALLEGED RAPE IN PATAE AND THE PATTANI PROTESTS......................................................10 1. The Patae case..........................................................................................................11 2. Patani protests..........................................................................................................12 IV. THE VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS.................................................................. 14 V. VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AND SELF DEFENCE VOLUNTEERS ................ 15 A. WEAPONS THEFTS ...............................................................................................................16 B. KERN BANG LANG SHOOTINGS.............................................................................................17 VI. VILLAGE AND TOWN PROTECTION VOLUNTEERS ...................................... 18 VII. INFORMAL BUDDHIST MILITIAS ........................................................................ 19 VIII. MILITIAS AND COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN SABA YOI................................... 21 A. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN YAHA ...........................................................................................21 B. BUDDHIST SELF-DEFENCE GROUP ESTABLISHED.................................................................21 C. THE ATTACK ON ISLAHUDDIN ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL ...............................................22 1. Protests blaming rangers..........................................................................................22 2. Buddhist counter-protest..........................................................................................23 D. BOMB AT THE BUDDHIST MARKET......................................................................................23 E. SHOOTINGS OUTSIDE KOLOMUDO MOSQUE ........................................................................24 IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THAILAND .............................................................................................................26 B. MAP OF THAILAND’S SOUTHERN PROVINCES......................................................................27 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................28 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ....................................29 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................32 Asia Report N°140 23 October 2007 SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE PROBLEM WITH PARAMILITARIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Thailand’s increasing reliance on paramilitary forces and propagandists. Insurgents are also believed to have carried civilian militias is hindering efforts to tackle the insurgency out attacks dressed in ranger uniforms, in order to whip up in its majority Muslim southern provinces. A bewildering anti-state sentiment. array of paramilitary organisations works alongside and often in parallel to the regular military and police. There The interior ministry has its own paramilitary force, the are advantages to using irregular forces. They are quicker Or Sor (Volunteer Defence Corps). Known to be fiercely and cheaper to train and deploy and tend to have more loyal to its ministry bosses, though less problematic than flexible command structures. Locally recruited volunteers the rangers, it is widely viewed as the armed enforcer of have better local knowledge than troops brought in from the ministry’s district officers. outside. But they are also inadequately trained and The largest armed force in the South – after a massive equipped, confuse already difficult command and control expansion in 2004-2005 – is a civilian militia, the Village arrangements and appear in some cases to make communal Defence Volunteers (Chor Ror Bor). Though senior tensions worse. While paramilitaries are likely to continue government and military officials have questioned their to be deployed in the South, the government should move effectiveness, the Chor Ror Bor still constitute the main toward consolidating security arrangements and, in the form of security in most villages. Poorly trained, isolated longer term, concentrate on improving its regular security and vulnerable, they are often unable to protect themselves forces. and their weapons, let alone their communities. Militants Paramilitary organisations and village militias have played have stolen the guns of hundreds since 2004. Some Chor significant roles in policing and counter-insurgency Ror Bor have also turned their guns on fellow villagers throughout Thai history, particularly against communist when local security incidents have gone beyond control. and separatist guerrillas during the 1970s and 1980s. Over Yet a plan was announced in July 2007 to recruit an the last decade, these forces have taken on new roles, from additional 7,000 by the end of 2009. controlling refugee camps on the border with Myanmar/ Despite the evident problems with existing village militias, Burma to prosecuting the “war on drugs” in 2003. But the the Royal Aide-de-Camp department, under Queen Sirikit’s most significant expansion has been for the suppression direction, established a parallel volunteer scheme, the of separatist violence in the South. Village Protection Force (Or Ror Bor) in September 2004. The army has tripled the strength of the paramilitary Its volunteers receive ten- to fifteen-days military training, “ranger” force (Thahan Phran) in the South since violence an improvement on the Chor Ror Bor’s three days, but surged in 2004, despite its well-deserved reputation hardly adequate for confrontations with well-armed and for brutality and corruption. It has made some reforms, organised militants. Unlike the Chor Ror Bor militia, whose particularly in screening recruits, since the 1980s and on make-up broadly reflects the demographic balance of the whole is a more professional force than twenty years the region, the Or Ror Bor is almost exclusively Buddhist, ago, but serious problems with discipline and human often stationed in temple compounds and tasked with rights abuses remain. protecting Buddhist communities. The military’s key rationale for recruiting new ranger The Buddhist minority in the South feels increasingly units in the South was to create a local force familiar with threatened. Muslim militants have attempted to drive the terrain, language and culture. In practice, however, Buddhists from several areas. Officials, civilians and even no more than 30 per cent of new recruits are local Malay monks have been targeted in gruesome killings apparently Muslims. The overwhelming majority of southern Muslims designed to provoke retaliation. Many Buddhists, frustrated continue to fear and mistrust the rangers. Several suspected with the government’s failure to provide adequate extrajudicial killings in 2007 have confirmed their protection, are taking matters into their own hands. Private suspicions and played into the hands of militant militias are being established throughout the South, with varying degrees of official sanction and support. Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries Crisis Group Asia Report N°140, 23 October 2007 Page ii The proliferation of poorly trained, loosely supervised work to phase out, disarm and disband the various militias in a volatile conflict in which civilians are the village militias, whose impact on security is main victims confuses command and control arrangements, negligible; weakens accountability and heightens the risk of wider communal violence. However, the inability of the regular tighten controls on guns and gun licenses; army to cope with the security threat posed by the Muslim prevent the operation of private sectarian militias, separatist militants suggests that Thailand will continue to whose emergence is an extremely worrying trend, use paramilitaries for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, and bring their sponsors within the government the government should: and security forces into line; and review the effectiveness of each paramilitary and militia force as the first step toward consolidating shift emphasis over time and concentrate on security arrangements; improving the professionalism and strength of its regular military and police rather than arming provide additional military and humanitarian law untrained and jumpy civilians. training and supervision to the Thahan Phran Jakarta/Brussels, 23 October 2007 “rangers”, to improve discipline and curb abuses; Asia Report N°140 23 October