Mediterranean PaPer SerieS 2010 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST NARRW O ING GaPS IN TRANSatLantiC PerSPeCtiVe RobERTo ALIboNI Istituto Affari Internazionali © 2010 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 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In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. About the Mediterranean Policy Program The Mediterranean Policy Program promotes transatlantic analysis and dialogue on issues affecting Southern Europe, North Africa, the Levant, and the Mediterranean basin. Priority areas include: understanding trends in Mediterranean societies; exploring opportunities for south-south cooperation and integration; research on key functional issues affecting Mediter- ranean security and development; and strengthening the North American policy debate on the region and transatlantic cooperation on Mediterranean strategy. About Istituto Affari Internazionali The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economics, and international security. A non-profit organization, the IAI aims to disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences, and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities, and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks. More specifically, the main research sectors are European institutions and policies, Italian foreign policy, trends in the global economy and internationalization processes in Italy, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, defense economy and policy, and transatlantic relations. The IAI puts out an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), a series of research papers (Quaderni IAI) and an Italian foreign policy yearbook (La Politica Estera dell’Italia). Cover photo: Alexandria harbor. The Mediterranean and the Middle East Narrowing Gaps in Transatlantic Perspective Mediterranean Paper Series March 2010 Roberto Aliboni1 Istituto Affari Internazionali Executive Summary . 2 Introduction . 4 The Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict . 5 The Euro-Mediterranean Perspective . 17 Conclusion . 26 1 Robert Aliboni is vice president of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Program. Executive Summary To tackle the difficult legacy of the Bush The second part of the paper considers Euro– administration in the Middle East, the Obama Mediterranean relations and, more generally, administration set out a flexible strategy, whereby EU policies toward the area. These policies it would not follow any particular sequence, but have failed to set up a framework of political would work on the various outstanding crises in cooperation to contribute to the solution of the parallel. In this perspective, the Israeli-Palestinian Israeli–Palestinian conflict. On the contrary, EU issue acquires a somehow central and independent policy has fallen hostage to the conflict, and this role with respect to other regional crises. The has prevented Mediterranean political cooperation administration launched an important diplomatic from developing. On the other hand, the European initiative in the spring of 2009 with the intent to Union has failed to include Turkey among its make Israel and the Palestinians resume talks in members so as to provide the country with a the fall and come to an agreement. However, this secure mainstay with respect to the Middle East. initiative did not succeed. The first part of the While a timely redirection of EU policy toward paper discusses the reasons why it failed and the Turkey seems improbable, the paper argues that options left to the administration. It pinpoints the launching of the Union for the Mediterranean the convergences and divergences with respect (UfM) could be helpful for both European and to the available options between the new U.S. transatlantic policy aims, on condition that it is administration, the European countries and the EU, aptly reformed. and Turkey. In conclusion, the paper maintains that the The paper points out that keeping up the present transatlantic perspective on the Mediterranean and truce and possibly turning it into a cease-fire, the Middle East can hardly be homogeneous, as it while aiming to re-establish the conditions for a is inherently affected by the differences in focus political dialogue in the longer term by means of a and interests of the transatlantic stakeholders. In confidential diplomacy, may be the most realistic particular, there is an asymmetry in the relationship approach. It is also an option that can both take between the United States and the EU/Europe advantage of transatlantic bonds and promote stemming from the fact that, for the United States, them. The paper stresses, however that whatever Mediterranean cohesion is not seen as essential option the United States picks and whatever the to resolving problems in the Middle East, At the policies it decides to implement, both Europe’s same time, EU support for stability in the Middle and Turkey’s strategic convergence with respect East is important yet not decisive for the United to the whole region will be influenced by the level States. American action to solve the Israeli- of priority the United States is willing and able to Palestinian conflict is clearly decisive for the EU attribute to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Low in the Mediterranean. Within the transatlantic priority will generate loyal yet passive support from circle, Turkey seems bent on a more independent Europe for the United States’ overall engagement path than Europe. On the whole, even with these toward the Middle East. Yet, it might collide with differences and asymmetries, the outlook for Turkish national interests and increase emerging transatlantic cooperation in the Mediterranean differences with Ankara throughout the region. and the Middle East is positive. In this broad In this sense, Obama’s policy toward the Israeli– perspective, this analysis points to a number of Palestinian conflict may affect the coherence— more specific recommendations: especially in the case of Turkey—and the quality— in the case of Europe—of transatlantic bonds. 2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States • The United States should for some (even a previous policy. To that end, while contributing long) time abstain from taking initiatives to a solution to the conflict in the wider directed toward achieving a final settlement of transatlantic framework, it should sideline the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Conversely, it UfM political dimension and emphasize the should engage in policies aimed at keeping and technical-economic dimension, making the reinforcing the existing truce and preventing UfM work as an opportunity for cooperation violence from erupting again. both in inter-Mediterranean and global relations. This would provide an opportunity • The United States should invite its allies to join for transatlantic cooperation as well as in increased cooperation and to agree with contribute to making the Mediterranean area them upon joint or converging policies to keep more cohesive and, should it be necessary, the truce and prevent violence. There should more prepared to support a new Israeli- be an understanding on the division of labor by Palestinian process. which the allies pursue objectives and explore solutions that the United States is not, for the • The EU should make efforts to include Turkey, time being, prepared to explore. but also rethink its overall approach to the issue. While a strategic EU-Turkey partnership • This policy should be conceived of and would in any case be a second-best solution, implemented in a transatlantic perspective, the ongoing accession relationship may with as many actions as possible undertaken in prove even worse than that, if the EU-Turkey the framework of the Alliance