12/2/77 [2] Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 12/2/77 [2]; Container 53 To See Complete Finding Aid: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf •,. - ~. ? ' , .. WITHDRAWAL SHE,ET (PR.ESIDEiNTIAL U,BRAFUEM· FORM OF DOCUMENT · cqRRESP.ONDENTS Ofl TITlE ·, memo From Press. to The President~· ('15. pp.) re·:·M-X .12/2/77'' ,. 'Vl/att. Weapons System . - 0 r 'I .I . .. :~~~ ~( ~~ 3.!1ftc. 0 '~ t,< ·'" FILE LOCATION .• , . Carter Pr.esidential Papers- Statf .. Offices,. O;f~iG:e·. of. the Sta;ff ·sec.-· Pres. H'and.... writing File 12·/2,/77. [2l BOX: 62 ·.• 1" RESTRICTION CODES (A)· Closed by Executive Order 12356'governing access.to national security information. f. (~) Closed by statute or by the ager:~cy which originated the doct~ment. · (C) piosed jn accordance with restrictions contain'ed in the donor:s deed of gift. · ~ " ,, / . NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDQ A'DMINISTRA TJON.. · '· o',' ;N'A. F·dR,M 1429 ··<e+ss> • .....' n~d ~~t-ii~I r,los ? LAM,c..J. ~ 4-~d /O/,/ EXECUTWE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20500 INFOEMA.TION Becember 2, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT --- FROM: FRANK PRESS lf' SUBJECT: M-X Weapons System .As you requested, I have been get.ting more involved in some of the military technology issues.. I discussed this with Zbig, and he suggested that a vulnerability analysis of the M-X and cruise missile_systems would be useful. Subsequently, I convened·a panel of university and industrial exper·ts for this purpose. I have attached the Executive Summary of the panel's report on the M-X and will send you a separate memorandum concerning our cruise missile analysis next week. The panel examined the comparative vulnerability of the trench-based M.,-X system to the silo-based Minuteman and came up with several interesting conclusions: The threat to Minuteman is not so imminent or certain that commitment to an alternative system must be mad'e in FY 1979. Minuteman will remain a significant survivable component of the US deterrent throughout most of the 1980s until the Soviets succeed in developing and deploying warheads of greatly improved accuracy. Due to its complexity, small area of deployment, and technical aspects of the trench design., the M-X trench system has potential vulnerabilities which require further \ assessment and considerable uncerta1nty remains in assessments of its survivability. In addition to novel basing systems, other less costly options for enhancing survivability of Minuteman including \ relatively simple defensive measures should be more fully explored. On the basis of these conclusions, commitment to full-scale development of the M--X trench mobile system as proposed in the FY 1979 defense budget request ($260 M) appears premature. I ·- ... 2 recognize that there may be overriding political consider.ations, such as the impac·t on the domestic SALT debate and international perceptions of US resolve, which in your Judgment could necessitate support for the Defense proposal. However, on the technical merits of the issue, I would recommend that you defer full-scale development and subs·tantially reduce funding for M-X in the FY 1979 budget, at least down to the level of effort provided in FY 1978 (about $150M). The Panel also noted that a decision to develop a ne~ missile can and should be made on considerations that are separable from those of maintaining ICBM survivability. These include the impact on cris·is stability, concerns about aging of the M·inuteman force, .targe.ting requirements and political perceptions. The panel confined itself to vulnerability analysis for its initial effort, but if you think it would be useful, we will examine this broader issue as well. .,0'!!! Gl '"'I"US .., CD 0 C/) (/) (i) ~ .., Q) < ~ ............, o·-· -· 0 0 0 ::J"C "'0'< E;~ 'COc. Q) ~ a> (/) SECRE'f'- . ·.. ~ .• Report of the OSTP Vulnerability Panel on The M-X Missile System EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. The proposed M-X weapons system includes a missile which is larger, more accurate and carries more warheads than Minuteman III, and a mobile basing system to make the missile more survivable. The proposed M-X funding plan for FY 79 allocates about $200 M to missile development. This can be viewed as a conunitment to the development of a substantially more capable missile. A decision to develop a new missile can and should be. made on considerations that are for the most part separable from those of providing a new basing system to maintain ICBM survivability. II. The vulnerability of Minuteman has properly been a matter of continuing concern, and it is not too soon to pursue alternatives to Minuteman silo-basing. However, the threat to the Minuteman is not so imminen,t or certain that cotmllitment to the development of a specific al.ternative system must be made now. III. Minuteman will remain a significant survivable component of the US deterrent throughout most of the 1980s, that is, until the Soviets succeed in developing and deploying an adequate number of warheads of greatly improved accuracy Such accuracy can be achieved either in a new generation of Sovie,t missiles, or by an upgrade in .accuracy beyond that now projected in Soviet sys;tems presently deployed. We are basing this conclusion on evaluation of the destructive interaction among attacking warheads (i.e., fratricide), which makes two-on-one attacks very difficult for purposes other than to increase system launch reliability. SECRET 2 IV. Conceptually, the trench-based M-X system has advantages in survivability over Minuteman III against attacks of very high accuracy. However, an assessment of its survivability can only be demonstrated through calculation and certain· limited tes,ts. Considering the complexity of the system, considerable uncertainty will remain in such assessments. Surviv?bility of the M-X relies on secrecy of location of the missile. If by technical or intelligence means the attacker can de.termine, even approximately, the location of the missile within the trench, the the M;...X system survivability would be severely compromised. Whereas the vulnerability of Minuteman is particularly sensitive to achievement of high accuracies, as noted above., the M-X is vulnerable to attack by large numbers of less accurate Rvs·. M-X is based on a much .smaller land area than is Minuteman. Therefore, the M-X trench-based system is considerably more susceptible to "pin-down" under protracted nuclear missile attack than is Minuteman III. The vulne·rability of M-X to pin-down, in combination with a possible shoot-look-shoot attack on M-X requires further assessment. V. In addition to. novel basing systems, less costly options, such as defensive measures, for enhancing survivability of existing Minuteman silos should be more fully explored, recognizing that the de.fended area. need be only a few hundred meters across, thereby ailowing the use o.f relatively simple protection measures. VULNERABILITY I>ANEL MEMBERS Sol Buchsbaum * Bell Laboratories John Deutch M.I.T . ** . Richard Garwin IBM Marvin Goldberger Princeton University John Marcum OSTP W. K. Panofsky Stanford Linear Accele~ator Center Jack Ruina M. I. T. Bud Wheelon Hughes Aircraft * Chair:man ** Now with Department of Energy THE OSTP VULNERABILITY Pfu."lEL' S fu.'JALYSIS OF THE ~I-X SYSTEH I. Gener~l Consideration for Follo-:;-o:-:-: Land-Based S~1 ·s~2::. The .Sc•'Jiet Union a:;;:;:;ears to be de'rslJping ano-::!',er ge::era tion of land-based missiles beyond tio·se no·.·, depl oysd. If this :1e•:.' ge:.eration leads to substantially improved accurac;'/ ::.::d is deplo~red e:·:t;:::c,sively, the survivability of the I.'linu-::enan force. would :,e threatened. ::Ii:~uter:J.an survivability woald also be threatened b;:." asigni:ficav-:. upgracis in accuracy in systems presently deployed ( SS-17, 18 and 19) "!:'eyond . that ',_ now proJected. As a counter to this perceived threat, as· o:1ell as to increase US hard-target strike capability, the US Air Force presently is focusing its efforts on the :M-X program as a follow-on to the ::Jinuteman. The M-X contemplates both a new missile with increased throvl-\':eight, increased accuracy and increased number of warheads, together with a new type of a mobile basing system. Consideration of alternate basing schemes continues to be intertwined with the need :for a missile of highly improved performance. We believe this is unfortunate and, in fact, cou....Ylterproductive. The questions of a new generation of missiles of enhanced performance and of alternate basing systems are technically separable at the present stage of the program. On the one hand, tne present Minuteman silos could accommodate cold-launched missile systems •:lith new payloads of throw-weight larger by as much as a factor of 4 than that of Minuteman III (i.e., larger than the SS-19 throw-weight). Conversely, the alternate basing sys·tems designed to decrease vulnerability against Soviet attack could be developed (and at lower cost) to accorrunodate l\11\tl-III or other missiles considerably smaller than those under consideration for ::VI-X. Development and deployment of a ne•.-: missile system delivering greatly increased throw-weight and explosive.yield, irrespective ,of its basing, would greatly enhance the perception of a hard silo counterf'orce threat against the opponent and therefore raises ::!ajor issues. lunong these are: (a) adequacy of the nuclear stock;lile ar~d possible nee.d for reactivation of production facilities for special nuclee.r materials; (b) problems of 4 .. fiECRE!. strategic instabili t:.' induced by Soviet perception of vulnerabili ~"'./ of their hard silos '.7hic!: ::!Urr~!ltly· conts.i::; a:bo'-.1"': 75 perr.~ent '.:If their (c) the ri.s:: of ir:creased ecll:1ter"l~ d2..::-:age should such a high-yield missile force be usei even again2t counterforce ~argets; (d) SALT considera tion.3.; and (e) the high cost of the new missile.