APRES MOI LE DELUGE : INDIVIDUALS , INCENTIVES , AND CONFLICT TERMINATION A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By John Furman Daniel, III, B.A. Washington, D.C. August 31, 2010 Copyright 2010 by John Furman Daniel, III All Rights Reserved ii APRES MOI LE DELUGE : INDIVIDUALS , INCENTIVES , AND CONFLICT TERMINATION John Furman Daniel, III, BA. Thesis Advisor: Robert Lieber, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This work analyzes the impact of a leader’s personal security on the conflict termination process and asks three questions. First, why do some states surrender when they still have latent military capabilities? Second, why do some states continue fighting when they have little if any hope of achieving their war aims? Third, why do some states fail to act as rational-utility maximizers during the conflict-termination process? To answer these questions, this work begins by examining the predictions of existing systemic, domestic, and cultural models and then proposes and tests an alternative theory based on the personal security of individual leaders. This alternative theory claims that national leaders are particularly sensitive to their private security needs and, under certain circumstances, will alter their nations’ war aims to protect their personal welfare. Building on this theory, this work proposes and tests six hypotheses for how personal security of national leaders may alter national war aims and conflict termination outcomes. To test these hypotheses, this work performs a qualitative analysis of five cases (Poland during The Russo-Polish War, France during WWII, iii Japan during WWII, Iraq during the Iran Iraq War, and Iraq during Gulf War I) and compares the actual behaviors of leaders with the theoretical predictions of the existing and alternative theories. After an analysis of these theoretical models, this work concludes with a series of policy recommendations and directions for further research. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS “Them that don't know him won't like him and them that do, Sometimes won't know how to take him. He ain't wrong, he's just different but his pride won't let him, Do things to make you think he's right.” —Waylon Jennings More thanks are due than can be expressed in a few short lines. I consider myself lucky to have had so much support and help in this project, and I will never be able to fully repay the efforts of my colleagues, friends, and family. First, I wish to thank my dissertation committee. Good men, impeccable scholars, and menschen all. Without their guidance, patience, and clear thinking, I would still be wondering in the desert of political thought. Professor Robert Lieber was everything I could ask for in a committee chair. His wisdom and experience helped guide me through this difficult process and he struck the perfect balance between taskmaster, helpful critic, and voice of encouragement. v Professor Daniel Byman was always encouraging, insightful, and took the time to provide detailed feedback. If I would have simply listened to his advice from the beginning, this would have been a much easier process. Dr. Kenneth Pollack provided early support for this project. The article he wrote with Professor Byman got me thinking seriously about leadership in international relations theory many years before I came to graduate school. Despite his busy schedule, he always took the time to meet with me and was able to make complex issues appear simple. He spoke my language and his military analysis of WWII class still ranks as the best class I have ever taken. Professor David Edelstein was my toughest, and often best, critic. I asked him to be critical and he took the time and effort to do so. He has been an excellent mentor for my teaching as well and is an excellent example to any young academic. Thank you all for your help and support on this project, especially when I was being stubborn. There are many more that helped me in this academic endeavor and deserve thanks. Professor Gerald Mara read several early versions of this work and encouraged me to seek connections between political theory and international relations theory. Dean Peter Krough encouraged me to look at the problem of leaders and followers in international politics and read and commented on several early versions of this work. Colonel Jay M. Parker was a vi friendly mentor and great teacher who also read some early versions of this work. He bonded almost instantly with me when we discovered that we were both raised on Random House’s Landmark History series. Professor Charles Lipson, my undergraduate thesis advisor and kindred spirit led me through my first major academic project and has provided guidance and encouragement ever since. Professor Steven Bloomfield provided me guest researcher status at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, a kindness that will not soon be forgotten. Joan D. Hewan and Justin Harried cheered me up every time they saw me and made the Government Department trains run on time. Thanks! I also owe a great debt to my friends. Colonel Daniel Baltrusaitis, USAF shared both wisdom and levity over our almost daily lunches and encouraged me to “aim high.” William Schlickenmaier was my comprehensive exam study partner, fellow schemer, closet David Allan Coe fan, and whiskey connoisseur. Elizabeth “Liz” Grimm was a source of support and humor and organized study groups, impromptu pub nights, and potlucks like no other. Paul Musgrave started as my peer mentee but has taught me plenty about international relations and has let me crash on his couch and empty his liquor cabinet more times than he had to. Yu-Ming Liou always amazed me with his vii willingness to entertain a truly diverse range of thoughts and in all of these debates has been quick with a biting retort or a side-splittingly hilarious hypothetical alternative. Samuel Lamar Bray Esq. was my war-gaming buddy, spiritual advisor, and consigliere. Robert “Asshole Bob” McKenzie, Esq. was my wartime consigliere , flight instructor, and bachelor party planner. Harold G. Cash is my second father and smoking buddy. He earned his PhD with honors from the school of hard knocks. Twister Murchison reminds me of the need to have fun with life and that, “the only person cooler than Han Solo is Harrison Ford.” U Jin Wong is wise beyond his (many) years and always had an ability to pick my spirits up and fix my prose. Seth Walter Petersen was my first friend in the Government Department and has the character to call me out when necessary, the strength to take down traffic barrels, or have one more cigar, bag of chips, or good laugh. Elliott Byron Fullmer is my dynamic foil, fellow baseball nut, and most trusted friend. Brian A. Smith is my co-author, older brother, partner in crime, and armature psychologist. He did everything I asked of him and more yet somehow managed to smile after the fact. An extra special thanks is in order for my family. I have been blessed by my parents, step-parents, and siblings who have loved me and supported me unconditionally. They have gone with me to more museums, battlefields, and viii bookstores than can be counted and have encouraged my interests no matter how odd (why wouldn’t a four-year old want to read about blitzkrieg or stay up late to watch Victory at Sea on A&E?). Dad, thanks for teaching me to always be honest, love your family, and take a stand for what you think is right. Mom, thanks for inspiring my creativity, nurturing my often neglected softer side, and teaching me the importance of things like cleaning my room, working hard, and serving others. Finally, and most especially, thank you to my wife and best friend, Christina. You know me better than anybody and despite my many flaws, you love me anyway. You make my life better one day at a time. You are my everything, my one true love, truly my raison d'etre. I can only hope to repay you in love. Again, thank you to everyone who has helped me. Without your labors and loves none of this would have been possible. Any errors, omissions, or flaws are mine alone. ix To Christina, my raison d'etre x TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ III ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... V TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... XI LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. XV LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. XVI CHAPTER 1: A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1 1.1 An Introduction to War Termination .......................................................... 8 1.2 Guidance from Existing Theories ............................................................... 15 1.2.1 System-Level Theory ....................................................................... 15 1.2.2 State-Level Theory ........................................................................... 19 1.2.3 Cultural Theory ................................................................................ 22 1.3 A Theory of Leaders’ Motivations During Conflict