University of North Florida UNF Digital Commons Philosophy Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy Fall 2010 Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? David E.W. Fenner University of North Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub Part of the Esthetics Commons Recommended Citation Fenner, David E.W., "Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times?" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 2. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Digital Projects. © Fall 2010 All Rights Reserved Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? David E. W. Fenner University of North Florida 1. Introduction Nick Zangwill has done more than any person recently to resuscitate aesthetic formalism.1 I say ―resuscitate‖ because formalism has not been in favor for several decades. Zangwill writes that ―Aesthetic Formalism has fallen on hard times. At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift rejection. At worse it is the object of abuse and derision.‖2 The reasons many today believe aesthetic formalism is not viable have been the subject of discussion since the pendulum swing away from New Criticism, via the work of William Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks, Clement Greenberg, André Levinson, and Heinrich Wolfflin. Most of these reasons have been discussed thoroughly, and those that I will review here that have been discussed I will spend little time reconsidering. I believe, though, that there are a few more reasons why formalism has fallen on hard times, reasons that have not been much discussed, or at least not directly. They are the subject of this article. While the history of aesthetics includes many formalists, some of a variety much less modest than the sort with whom Zangwill keeps company, I want to use as a baseline definition of formalism Zangwill‘s own. His definition of a formal aesthetic property begins with ―the intuitive idea that formal properties are those aesthetic properties that are directly perceivable or 1 Within the last few years, Nick Zangwill has revived interest in aesthetic formalism in a series of articles. One, Nick Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ Nous 33, no. 4 (1999), pp. 610-29, lays out his positive case for formalism, making use of the Kantian model of free and dependent beauty as a departure point. A second, Nick Zangwill, ―In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism,‖ Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 201 (October 2000), pp, 476-93, takes on a major position in opposition to his own, that of Kendall Walton as expressed in Kendall Walton, ―Categories of Art,‖ Philosophical Review 79 (1970), pp. 334-67. And a third, Nick Zangwill, ―Defusing Anti-Formalist Arguments,‖ British Journal of Aesthetics 40, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 376-83, offers just what the title suggests. 2 Zangwill, ―Feasible Aesthetic Formalism,‖ p. 610. Reason Papers 32 (Fall 2010): 93-106. Copyright © 2010 Reason Papers Vol. 32 that are determined by properties that are directly perceivable.‖3 He defines a formal property this way: ―Formal properties are entirely determined by narrow nonaesthetic properties, whereas non-formal aesthetic properties are partly determined by broad nonaesthetic properties.‖4 And concerning narrow nonaesthetic properties, he states that ―the word ‗narrow‘ includes both sensory properties, non-relational physical properties, and also any dispositions to provoke responses that might be thought of to be partly constitutive of aesthetic properties.‖5 Zangwill defines himself as a modest formalist and, as the immediately preceding quotation suggests, he allows as appropriate to the constitution of an object‘s aesthetic character more than a less modest formalist (like Clive Bell) would. Since my aim in this article is to shed light on why aesthetic formalism has fallen on hard times, I am obliged to keep the discussion fluid enough to account for the breadth of formalism as an historical movement in aesthetics—or more specifically, three movements in the history of aesthetics: (1) formalism of the objective Platonic-Aristotelian variety; (2) formalism focused on securing freedom for artworks from social, religious, and moral criticism, as we find in the work of Roger Fry, Stuart Hampshire, and famously advocated by Oscar Wilde; and (3) formalism focused on delineation of what properly counts as an aesthetic property. This article is not a critique of Zangwill‘s formalism. Indeed, he has made a variety of moves, consonant with being a modest formalist, to account for some apparently relational properties as relevant to an aesthetic appraisal of objects, and this results in rendering his view far less a candidate for rejection than earlier views. Let‘s begin by reviewing some of the more popular reasons for the rejection of aesthetic formalism. 2. Reason One: Cognition-Inspiring Aspects of Twentieth-Century Modern Works of Art By and large, modern art does not lend itself to formalist critique; for many works, there is little of significant value to be found in them—like Readymades, Dada, and Pop Art—when viewed from such a perspective. So to the degree to which art theory should follow art, formalism, at least as a critical approach, gives way in the twentieth century to what for my purposes I call ―contextualism.‖ ―Contextualism‖ is the view that some non-formal properties, specifically, properties that provide an appropriate context (or 3 Ibid., p. 611. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 94 Reason Papers Vol. 32 contexts) within which an object or event may be considered, are relevant to the constitution of that object‘s or event‘s aesthetic features (and so to its aesthetic merits).6 There are certainly those who advocate viewing objects such as Marcel Duchamp‘s Readymades from a formalist perspective, finding the aesthetic value of such works to lie in their formal aesthetic properties and crediting Duchamp with seeing in the ordinary aesthetic qualities more aesthetic merit than an audience more concerned with the functionality of Duchamp‘s ―finds‖ sees. Unfortunately, this perspective seems at odds with Duchamp‘s own artistic processes. Not to take anything away from his skill as a great painter, the challenge for which he has become famous is the elevation of ordinary objects to the status of works of art. If the objects he chose had hidden aesthetic depth, his challenge loses its heat. It becomes lukewarm and unworthy of the attention Duchamp (and others like Warhol and Rauschenberg) attracted. To consider a Readymade in line with Duchamp‘s artistic processes—but moreover to consider a Readymade in the context that affords it the greatest value, the greatest command of attention— is to view it not formally but rather as inspiration for cognition. 3. Reason Two: Representational Aspects of Works of Art Formalist critical approaches are, at least prima facie, unable to account adequately for the value of artworks when that value is tied to the representational content or aspects of those works.7 This is a species of a larger problem: formalism does not seem to have a place for properties of a relational nature. If we believe that a case for the aesthetic merits of an object (art or otherwise) includes reference to properties that speak to the representational relation between that object and some other, formalism does not have a place for this. The same can be said of historical relations.8 If we 6 This is discussed in David Fenner, Art in Context (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008). 7 Peter Kivy, ―Science and Aesthetic Appreciation,‖ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1991), pp. 180-95. On pp. 192 and 193, Kivy writes that ―the beauty of a scientific theory, like the overall artistic success of a realistic painting, is a function also of its representational success, which is to say, its truth. Once formalism is given up, the claim that, in theoretical sciences, the beautiful can never prevail over the true loses all appeal, if not all sense, for, of course, there never is a contest between beauty and truth in theoretical science, understood as the attempt to represent nature. It cannot represent nature beautifully, in the fullest sense, without representing it truthfully.‖ 8 I include with historical relations ―genetic‖ aspects of a work, that is, aspects connected to the artist and the context of her creation of the work. 95 Reason Papers Vol. 32 believe that the historical context of a work is relevant to a case for the aesthetic merit of that work, and aesthetic merit is evidenced on the presence of aesthetic properties, then one might claim that the aesthetic properties ―possessed‖ by the object in question transcend those ―directly perceivable or that are determined by properties that are directly perceivable.‖9 4. Reason Three: Expressive Aspects of Works of Art It is unclear that aesthetic formalism will adequately capture properties that are expressive in nature. Zangwill makes provision for this, but for other formalists, this problem is the same sort possessed by representational and historical considerations. The point regarding the rejection of formalism on the grounds that it does not capture expressive properties might be broadened. Some artists in creating their works may well mean to express perspectives on particular social issues, religious issues, or issues having to do with ethnicity, race, and gender. It is likely that objects viewed with these perspectives in mind, when these perspectives were meant to be expressed by artists through their works, will result in richer or at least deeper experiences for audience members. On many occasions, though, in the absence of knowing an artist‘s intentions (or sometimes in spite of knowing them), an audience member may inform her viewing act with a social-, religious-, ethnic-, or gender-oriented, etc.