Notes PREFACE Nuclear Strategies and Belief-Systems in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1988). 2 Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). 1 WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN SOVIET THREAT AND AMERICAN GURANTEE NATO document MC 48 (FINAL) of 22 November 1954: 'The most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next few years', § 6 (see Preface on sources). 2 For the switch from a mainly political and ideological to a military threat perception in 1950, see Robert Jervis: 'The impact of the Korean War on the Cold War', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563-92; and for the European perspective, see Beatrice Heuser: 'NSC 68 and the Soviet threat', Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991), pp. 17-40. 3 Beatrice Heuser: Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-1953 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 125-34, and Appendix C. 4 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, in NATO Office ofInformation: NATO Handbook (Brussels: 1989), p. 14. 5 With the exception of the Neth(:rlands, see Jan Willem Honig: Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands (New York: Praeger, 1993), passim. 6 See Beatrice Heuser: Nuclear Strategies and Belief-Systems: Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1998). 7 See for example Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed.): The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat (London: Pinter, 1990). 8 NATO MC 14 of 20 March 1950, § 7. 9 NSC 68, Section VIII. 3, printed in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis: Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 416. 10 NHP Bonn, Document No. 153, 'Aufgabenstellung und Arbeit der Defense Planning Working Group', 3 May 1965. 11 Compare this with for example NATO MC 48/2(Final Decision) of 23 May 1957, § 3. 12 See Beatrice Heuser: 'Stalin as Hitler's Successor: Western Interpreta­ tions of the Soviet Threat', in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds): Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62 (London: Macmillan, 1992). 173 174 Notes 13 NATO MC 14 of 20 March 1950, § 7; see also NSC 162/2, 'Basic National Security Policy', of 30 October 1953, in Foreign Relations of the Unites States [henceforth FRUS] 1952-54 Vol. 11, p. 579. 14 NATO MC 14 of 20 March 1950, § 9. 15 Washington, US National Archives [henceforth NA], CCS 471. 6 USSR (11-8-49) Sec. 2, Joint Intelligence Committee Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS 208111, 13 February 1950. 16 Text in full in Alan Macmillan and John Baylis: A Reassessment of the British Global Strategy Paper of 1952 International Politics Research Papers No. 13 (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, Department of Inter­ national Politics, 1993), pp. 58-89, and in excerpts in John Baylis: Ambi­ guity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 405-14. 17 Macmillan and Baylis: Reassessment, pp. 45-51. 18 FRUS 1952-4 Vol. 11., p. 581. 19 FRUS 1952-4 Vol. 11., p. 587. 20 NATO C-M(56)138(Final) of 13 December 1956, § 2. 21 NATO MC 14/1 (FINAL) of9 December 1952; NATO MC 48 (FINAL) of 22 November 1954, pp. 5f., 9f., 16. 22 NATO C-M(55)133(Revised) of 8 December 1955, § 2. 23 Sir Anthony Eden: The Memoirs Vol. III Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 554. Macmillan claims to have been convinced that 'the Amer­ icans could not have failed to take part' in a general nuclear war which 'must have' resulted from a Soviet nuclear attack on Britain; Harold Macmillan: Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 165 - but see private British views on this discussed in Chapter 3. Concerning France, the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer remem­ bered that the message of Bulganin's 'ultimatum' was given to the head of the French government, Guy Mollet, during a dinner attended by Ade­ nauer, and Mollet immediately had instructions sent to his ambassador in Washington to ask 'about the status of the American security guarantee'. The ambassador was supposedly told by Herbert Hoover Jr. in the State Department that, in this context, the American guarantee did not apply; Franz Josef Strauss: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), p. 107f. Ade­ nauer himself and his government took Bulganin's statement so seriously that it was debated in Bonn whether the German Chancellor should indeed travel to Paris on his scheduled visit; see Wilhelm G. Grewe: Riickblenden: Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt/Main: Propyliien, 1979), pp. 281-4. 24 NHP Bonn, Document No. 153, 'Aufgabenstellung und Arbeit der Defense Planning Working Group', 3 May 1965, my translation. 25 For a good synthesis, see Jiirg von Kalckreuth: 'Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der NATO', Wehrkunde Vol. 18 No. 6 (June 1969); p. 289, 291. 26 Her Majesty's Government [henceforth HMG]: 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967' (London: HMSO, 1967), Cmnd. 3203, §§ 11-12. 27 HMG: 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1968' (London: HMSO, ·1968), Cmnd. 3540, § 8. 28 NATO DPC/D(67)23 'Guidance to the NATO Military Authorities' (11 May 1967), §§ 8, 9, 11, 14. Notes 175 29 See for example King's College, Liddell Hart Archives, Sandrart Papers, 'Einfuehrung Generalleutnant v. Sandrart anlaesslich Podiumsdiskussion Kirchentag am 9 June 1983'. 30 NATO MC 14/3 (Final) of 16 January 1967, pp. 3, 9. 31 Schroder: 'Wie Westeuropa zu verteidigen ist', Politische Meinung Vol. 13 No~ 4 (1968), p. 14; 'Weissbuch 1969 zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bun­ desregierung', Bulletin No. 25 (28 February 1969), p. 211. Compare this with the threat assessment by NATO and the West German military before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example Wolf Graf von Baudissin: 'NATO Strategie im Zeichen der Friedenserhaltung', Europa­ Archiv [henceforth EA] Vol. 23 No. 17 (1968), p. 637. 32 General Grafvon Kielmansegg: 'Warnings must be heeded', Survival Vol. 10 No. 11 (November 1968), originally printed in Die Welt (24 August 1968); see also the FRG's Government's endorsement of this reasoning in Federal Ministry of Defence: Defence White Book (1969) Georg Graf von Baudissin: 'Europrusche Sicherheit: Kriterien und Anforderungen', EA Vol. 24 No. I (1969), p. 14f; Walther Leisler Kiep: 'Grundlagen der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik', Wehrkunde Vol. 18 No. 2 (February 1969), p. 54f. 33 Denis Healey: The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989; this edition Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 309. 34 HMG: 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1969', Cmnd. 3927 (London: HMSO, February 1969), §§ er8. 35 HMG: 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1970', Cmnd. 4290 (London: HMSO, February 1970), § 18. 36 HMG: 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983' Cmnd. 8951 (London: HMSO, 1983), § 103. 37 See for example 'National Security Strategy of the United States', signed by Ronald Reagan, (Washington: the White House, January 1987), p. er7. 38 For Warsaw Pact exercises from the late 1970s until the late 1980s, see Beatrice Heuser: 'Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine: Findings in the East German Archives', Comparative Strategy Vol. 12 No. 4 (1993). 39 Appendix in Baylis: Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 405-15, here p. 410. 40 Baylis: Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 144, 167,210. 41 'PHASE 1 - D-Day to the stabilization of initial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation of the Allied air offensive. PHASE 2 - Stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to the initiation of major offensive operations by the Allies. PHASE 3 - Major offensive operations by the Allies. PHASE 4 - Final achievement of Allied war objectives.' NATO MC 14/1 (FINAL) of 9 December 1952. 42 NATO MC 48 (FINAL) of 22 November 1954. 43 The definitions of 'strategic' and 'tactical' vary. One British definition employed was to call 'tactical nuclear weapons' those 'used against the enemy in the battle area', and 'strategic nuclear weapons' those 'used against his homeland to destroy his will and ability to wage war'. United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Kew [henceforth PRO], FO 3711 161240, SC(61)33 of28 August 1961, para. 1. Battlefield nuclear weapons were the first to be overtaken by evolutions in technology and political 176 Notes considerations, for instance PRO, DEFE 5/126, COS(62)163 of 17 April 1962, p. 3f. In the 1980s, West Gennan officials tended to comment bitterly that a tactical nuclear weapon was one which was targeted at Gennany. 44 Robert Wampler: 'Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948-1957' (MS Ph.D. Harvard University, 1991), Vol. Ill, p. 938f. 45 NATO MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision) of 23 May 1957. 46 See the British Global Strategy Paper 1952 in Baylis: Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 405-14. 47 Harold MacmiIlan: Tides of Fortune: Memoirs. 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 622. 48 Johannes Steinhoff and Reiner Pommerin: Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepu­ blik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ara Adenauer-Kennedy (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1992), p. 26. 49 NATO MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), § 9. 50 NATO MC 1412 (Revised) (Final Decision), §§ 19-20. 51 Summary by the BMVg, 'Sprechzettel fUr Sitzung des Bundesverteidi­ gungs-Rats am 25.3.1958, hier: Unterrichtung iiber Document MC 70 (Entwurf)', NHP Bonn Doe. 23 of 20 March 1958 (emphasis in the original). 52 PRO, DEFE 5/100, Annex to COS(60)57 of 8 March 1960, pp. 2·-3. 53 Ibid. 54 PRO, DE FE 5/109, COS(60)351 of 6 December 1960. 55 PRO, DEFE 4/134, COS(61)13th Mtg., 21 February 1961, Item 2: a discussion of JlC(61)4(Final): 'Soviet Strategy in the opening phase of global war up to the end of 1965', see comments in (c).