JX 1428 RUSSIA B 72-107 F UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1960-1970: A SHORT CHRONOLOGY WITH INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY I S. y lCV *V /7F LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA BARBARA / K i o c - 2 7l 1972 W DEPT. GOVT. PUBLICATIONS V4/ ,r. BARBARA MIHALCHENKO Foreign Affairs Analyst / I. Foreign Affairs Division May 2, 1972 ' TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Summary ------------------------------------------ 1 I. Conflict and Crisis, 1960-1964 ----------------------- 2 II. On the Threshold of the Era of Negotiations, 4 1965-1970 ----------------------------------------- III. Chronology ------------------------------------------- 6 1 UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1960-1970: A SHORT CHRONOLOGY WITH INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY* S7AYARY The decade of the 1960's can be viewed as a transitional period in the over-all Soviet-American relationship. The fear of mutual destruction through nuclear war, reinforced by crisis conflicts, imposed restraint on the use of force and averted direct military clashes between the two superpowers. Furthermore, it led to negotiations designed to limit the escalation of strategic weapons. Because of the complexity of Soviet-American relations in regard to the Vietnam War and the Middle East these areas of conflict have only been briefly mentioned in this chronology. The reader is referred to the following sources for information on these issues: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. (6th Revised Edition) 91st Congress. 2d Session. June 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 455 p. Mark, Clyde R. The West and the Soviet Union in the Middle East : A Chronology of Events Since World War II. June 2, 1971. Sl p. Multilith 71-148 F. (CRS Foreign Affairs Division) . A Summary of Events in the Middle East Since June 1967. January 30, 1970. 6 p. Multilith 70-36 FA. (LRS/FAD) -. Summary of Events in the Middle East in 1970. February 4, 1971. 17 p. Multilith 71-47 F. (CRS/FAD) Whelan, Joseph. The. Soviet Union and the Middle East : A Survey and Analysis. November 26, .1967. 101 p. Multilith F 271. (LRS/FAD) . The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, 1970: A Brief Survey of Russia's Role in the Middle East and the Implications for the United States. July 13, 1970. 77 p. Multilith 70-181. (LRS/FAD) CRS-1 CRS-2 Although there was an improved Soviet-American relationship during the 1960's, each nation also continued to act according to its interests and the policies which served these interests best. At times these ran counter to the other's policies and interests. Clearly, the conflict of interests was not eliminated, yet the increased use of negotiations resulted in an expansion of cooperation and accommodation. I. Conflict and Crisis, 1960-1964 The first half of the 1960's was a period of competition, especially in the escalation and sophistication of the arms race. The increased nuclear capability of each nation, although achieving a certain strategic stabilization, restricted rather than enlarged the capability of each to affect minor, localized conflicts and added new inhibitions to the use of force. The early 1960's were years of crisis. The U-2 incident of 1960 and Khrushchev's attack on the United States wrecked the Paris Summit Conference and subsequently forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union. At this time many observers predicted an exacerbation of the cold war spirit in Soviet diplomacy despite Khrushchev's insistence that Soviet policy would continue to follow the line of peaceful coexistence. The relaxation of tensions following the inauguration of President John Kennedy was shortlived. In 1961 Khrushchev renewed pressure. As in previous conflicts over the city, the Berlin crisis evolved into a political stalemate. The positions and objectives of the contending powers, both stated and unstated, and the proposals for resolving the problem, CRS-3 remained fundamentally unchanged. The only new factor introduced was the Soviet action in sealing off the West Berlin border and building the Berlin Wall. The latter has remained as a symbol of East-West hos iity. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was felt by many to be tie issue which brought the two superpowers closest to nuclear confrontation. This crisis was generated by the Soviet decision to emplace medium-range missiles in Cuba for the purpose of radically altering the balance of power in Russia's favor with one dramatic move. However,,once the Kremlin was fully aware of American power and determination to keep Soviet missiles out of Cuba, Premier Khrushchev withdrew rather than risk nuclear war. The humiliation suffered in the Kremlin by the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba may well have contributed ultimately to Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964. Following the missile crisis, both nations appeared to comprehend fully the dangers of direct confrontations and came to realize that they would have to enter into an era of bilateral as well as multilateral negotiations. Consequently, efforts turned towards cooperation. Treaties regarding nuclear weapons were seriously negotiated, cultural and scientific agreements were implemented, and in 1964 a Consular Convention was signed. However, after President Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and Premier Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964, the somewhat precarious relationship of restraint found itself subjected to the strains of a dual change of leadership. CRS-4 II. On the Threshold of the Era of Negotiations, 1965-1970 The new Kremlin leaders appeared to be more conservative in their viows and conduct than thoir flamboyant prodocossor and genorally pro- jected a low-keyed impression of international ambitions. Nevertheless, although Sino-Soviet tensions reinforced this conservatism the Kremlin strove to extend its influence and power in the Mediterranean, Europe and Southeast Asia. Although the Johnson Administration continued with Kennedy policy initiatives, the U.S.'s entry into the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union's support of Hanoi with military equipment and supplies em- bittered the relations between the two superpowers and temporarily prevented fruitful negotiations, even in areas of mutual interest. At the end of the decade Vietnam remained a serious issue in Soviet-American.relations, but despite it some important agreements were concluded. Sino-Soviet tensions coupled with liberalization trends in Eastern Europe forced a reversal in Soviet policies in regard to inter-bloc affairs. The 1968 invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia temporarily shattered the hopes of the Soviet Union's becoming a more cooperative member of the community of nations, stalled the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation ation Treaty, and postponed the possibility of a European Security Conference and a mutual balanced reduction of forces in Europe. The Soviet Union attempted to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" which declared that sovereignty and independence of Communist states are limited by the general interests of the socialist community; should any one member of the community endanger its own socialist/communist progress, the other members CRS-5 will be affected as well. Consequently, it is the duty and obligation of the other states to halt the threat to the socialist order, even by means of direct military intervention if necessary. The Doctrine clearly spelled out the Soviet Union's policies regarding its strategic position in Europe, and temporarily revived the mood of the cold war. However, once the initial shock of the Czech crisis subsided, a certain diplomatic stability was once again achieved. The Nuclear Non-Prolif eration Treaty was ratified, talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT) were begun and Soviet-American cooperation in many fields was expanded. An agreement regarding relations between Bonn and Moscow was negotiated. The Bonn-Moscow Pact of August 12, 1970, a direct result of German initiatives for peaceful coexistence with the East, was considered by some as a step towards reconciliation in a divided Europe, which might in the future lead to the resolution of old problems which had been a complicating factor in Soviet-American relations. CRS-6 i III. Chronology 1960 January 17: The White House announced that President Eisenhower would visit the Soviet Union from June 10-19. January 27: Soviet-American lend-lease debt negotiations begun in Washington on January 11 were broken off by the United States after Soviet Ambassador Menshikov demanded that they be broadened to include trade agreements and long-term credits. January 29: A delegation of five Soviet republic premiers and seven oblast (provincial) chairmen arrived in the United States for a 24-day visit, returning the visit by American Governors to the Soviet Union in 1959. February 10: The Soviet Union paid the United States $1,100,000 to settle World War II maritime claims totaling $8,S00,000. March 15: The first full-scale East-West disarmament conference convened in Geneva after two and one-half years suspension. May 5: Premier Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had shot down an American plane over the USSR. May 9: Secretary of State Herter admitted that the plane shot down in the USSR was an American U-2 aircraft and acknowledged that a program of aerial surveillance was necessary to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and enable them to maintain effective defenses. May 16: Khrushchev wrecked the U.S.-USSR summit conference in Paris in a bitter attack on President Eisenhower and the United States over the U-2 incident. At the opening session of the Paris summit conference, Premier Khrushchev delivered an hour long attack on the United States. He insisted on three conditions for the continuation of the conference: (1) the U.S. had to call off surveillance flights over the Soviet Union; (2) the U.S. had to apologize for the past acts of aggression; (3) and punish those responsible.