University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2004 Test of detente: Soviet-American relations and the Yom Kippur War David Zierler The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Zierler, David, "Test of detente: Soviet-American relations and the Yom Kippur War" (2004). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5190. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5190 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. * *Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. 8/98 THE TEST OF DETENTE: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR by David Zierler B.S. New York University, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2004 Approved by: Chairman Dean, Graduate School 5"- iV o 4 Date UMI Number: EP40654 Alt rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI* ' ’ Dissertation WWisMn§ ' UMI EP40654 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQ uest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Zierler, David. M.A. 2004 History The Test of Detente: Soviet-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War (232 pp.) Director: Paul Gordon Lauren, Ph.D. By the early 1970s, the detente, or relaxation of tensions, between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached its apex, heralded by the summits of 1972 and 1973. The shared impetus for detente was strong. Moscow’s achievement of nuclear parity during the 1960s effectively neutralized the American nuclear deterrent. Both countries agreed that the confrontational tactics of the earlier Cold War period could serve neither the interests of world peace, nor the objectives of either superpower in its drive for global supremacy. Additionally, the leaders of each country found great political value in detente, which explains why neither superpower held to a strict interpretation of the agreements each nation signed at the summits. As the first major Cold War proxy conflict to follow the detente period, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, fought between Israel (supported by the United States) and Egypt and Syria (supported by the Soviet Union), put detente to “the test.” Israel’s crushing victory in the June War of 1967, which resulted in the capture of surrounding Arab territories, polarized the Arab-Israeli conflict along Cold War lines. The Soviet Union attempted to consolidate its position as patron of its Arab clients through massive military support. American foreign policy moved to “freeze” Arab radicalization by guaranteeing Israeli hegemony until both sides would agree to negotiations under United States auspices. The Arabs’ success in the first days of the Yom Kippur War caused a revolution in Israel’s defense posture, and Washington’s Middle East policy. W ith Israel badly battered, and Egypt planted in the Sinai and eager to shed its dependence on Moscow, the stage was thus set for Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, which resulted ultimately in a final peace between the two arch-enemies. This major American victory had detente to thank, as Kissinger took advantage of the wide diplomatic latitude created by relaxed superpower tensions. The nuclearcrisis at the end of the war demonstrated both the limits and the ultimate success of detente: neither superpower proved willing to abandon passively its Cold War policies, yet each shared a fundamental belief in the inadmissability of nuclear war. CONTENTS ABSTRACT . CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION II. DETENTE: GLOBAL PEACE, LOCAL CONFLICT III. SELF-INTEREST IN A CLIENT- STATE RELATIONSHIP: SOVIET-EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS THROUGH THE YOM KIPPUR WAR IV. THE CHALLENGE OF AN “UNBREAKABLE” BOND: AMERICAN-ISRAELI AFFAIRS THROUGH THE YOM KIPPUR W AR V. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVIETS: KISSINGER’S STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO MANAGING THE EGYPTIAN- ISRAELI CONFLICT, OCTOBER 19 73-JANUARY 1974 VI. CONCLUSION . BIBLIOGRAPHY To Aviva Akselrad Acknowledgments This project was anything but a solo effort, and I would like to thank the many people who devoted their time, wisdom, advice, and patience to my work. I could not have asked for a finer thesis committee. Dr. Paul Lauren and Dr. Michael Mayer saw this project from beginning to end. I spent more hours in their offices than their busy schedules should have permitted, and the professional, academic, and “life” skills I learned from them will stay with me for the rest of my life. Dr. Forest Grieves opened to me the murky world of political science, and I hope to show him one day that I am capable of making an argument in five pages or less. The Department of History boasts an unbelievably talented faculty, and I have benefitted greatly from seminars and classes taught by Dr. Mehrdad Kia, Dr. Frederick Skinner, Dr. Harry Fritz, and Dr. Janet Klein. Diane Rapp provided major administrative help, and her wonderful personality is the focal point of the department. I am lucky to be surrounded by an excellent group of fellow graduate students. I would like to thank Allison Fromm and Rachel Swartz for all of their insightful comments, and it has been a pleasure to survive graduate school alongside John Kilgour, Lee Behrens, Alan Roe, Nic Mink, Annie Lamar, Zoe Ann Stoltz, Jon Wlasiuk, and Sam Bernofsky. My (newly doubled) family has been completely supportive of my academic endeavors, and I can only repay them by coming back to the East Coast. I would like to thank my father, Norman Zierler, in particular, for teaching me to love books, and for showing me what it means to be a scholar. Finally, I want to thank my fiance, Aviva Akselrad. Her advice - scholarly and secretarial - was crucial for every stage of this two-year project. She has an uncanny ability to keep me both grounded and full of energy. In many ways, this thesis has two authors. Chapter I Introduction The Yom Kippur War occupies a special place in the bloody landscape of Cold War proxy conflicts. If the intensity of war could be measured as a ratio of firepower divided into the duration over which it was expended, then Israel’s two-front battle against Syria and Egypt in October of 1973 claims the dubious distinction as the most intense conflict of the Cold War system. Unlike so many other sub-theater wars that invariably pitted American arms versus Soviet arms with guerilla-oriented tactics, the Yom Kippur War was fought in the European (even “old fashioned”) tradition of open confrontation between massive land armies. The tank war in the Sinai front alone rivaled the greatest battles between the Nazi and Soviet armies of World War II. But this Arab-Israeli confrontation came with some Cold War accouterments that were unknown to the Great Power rivalries in the European theater. The Yom Kippur War provided an environment where some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world could be tested in battlefield conditions. Neither superpower was prepared to allow its rival to project a more impressive show of force. This explains, in part, why the fourth Arab-Israeli war saw the largest weapons airlift in the history of conflict. But superpower “flexing” was only a symptom of the larger political ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By 1973, the northern tier of the Middle East had become split along bi­ polar Cold War lines. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had vied for political dominance in the Middle East since the end of World War II. Its oil riches and geo-strategic centrality would be important in the global competition. 1 Moscow had sought, since 1955, to increase its prestige in the area by presenting itself to the Arabs as a fellow socialist, anti-Zionist, big brother of sorts. If the Arabs wanted to challenge Israel - or even threaten its existence - they would need Soviet weapons to do so. The Arab-Soviet relationship, however, was a marriage of mutual convenience, nothing more. For all of the inter-Arab rivalries in the postwar era, the Arab world found unity in anti- Communism at least as much as in anti-Zionism. The Soviets, for their part, claimed to support the Arabs on anti-imperialist grounds, although the reality of their motives rested on simple power politics. In Egypt, Moscow saw both its greatest coup with the 1955 weapons deal to Gamal Nasser, and its ignominious fall after the Yom Kippur War, when Anwar Sadat extricated Egypt’s dependence on Soviet weapons by restoring diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States never wanted to be the exclusive supporter of Israel that it had become by 1973.