k o No. 1 • April 2010 o l t Changing of the Guards: Iran’s Supreme u Leader Struggles to Control Military O By Ali Alfoneh n Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini controlled the Islamic Revolutionary r Guards Corps (IRGC) by assigning personal representatives and commissars to IRGC units and offices. Initially, e the system was dysfunctional because of multiple commissars and parallel control structures with overlapping t responsibilities, but at the beginning of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rule, the commissars consolidated their positions and exerted enough power to help stymie political reforms. Today, the system is again weak, and, increas- s ingly, the commissars act more as spokesmen for the guards than as agents overseeing the IRGC and ensuring that a the supreme leader holds power over the IRGC. This change undermines Khamenei’s authority over the IRGC and has allowed the IRGC greater autonomy to the detriment of outsiders who would engage the regime. E On February 15, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary lapping responsibilities that often allowed the e Rodham Clinton made headlines with a com- IRGC to expand its power in ways that sometimes l ment that the IRGC was slowly taking over Iran. ran contrary to the supreme leader’s interests. d “We see that the government of Iran, the supreme Although the commissar system was dysfunc- leader, the president, the parliament is being sup- tional when he took over as supreme leader, d planted and that Iran is moving toward a military Khamenei managed to restore control over the i dictatorship,” Clinton told the U.S.-Islamic commissariat in the first years of his rule. Since World Forum in Qatar.1 In effect, she recognized a 2005, however, Hojjat al-Eslam Ali Saidi, the M phenomenon that began years before. From the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC, IRGC’s initial days as an ideological army and has increasingly put his stamp on the guards by the regime’s Praetorian Guards, the IRGC has promoting the vision of the radical ayatollah become an economic and, increasingly, political Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi. A look at powerhouse. The leaders of the revolution—first Khomeini and, since 1989, Khamenei—have Key points in this Outlook: used a system of political commissars in which midranking clergymen served as the eyes and • The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is slowly taking over Iran. ears of the civilian leadership within the ranks of the IRGC to subject the IRGC to the civilian • While commissars should represent the supreme leader to the IRGC, today it seems leadership’s control. they are speaking for the IRGC instead of The system has not always worked smoothly, overseeing the guards and ensuring the and, even under Khomeini, it sometimes broke supreme leader’s power. down because of parallel commissariats with over- • This has given the IRGC more autonomy within the country, a change that may hin- Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow der outsiders’ efforts to engage the regime. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2 - Mesbah-Yazdi’s past depicts him as something of a politi- Islamic Revolution, Khomeini’s shadow government.6 In cal opportunist. According to some sources, Mesbah-Yazdi the Islamic Republic, real power does not often follow the was a member of the Hojjatiyeh secret society, which official structure; official organization charts are irrelevant. actively opposed the 1979 revolution and argued that an Unwilling to support anyone who would entrust Iran’s Islamic government should not be established until the elected officials with military power, Khomeini decided emergence of the Shi’a Messiah Mahdi, or the Hidden Lahouti Eshkevari must go. Three weeks after hardline Imam (often called the Imam of the Era in Persian- students seized the U.S. embassy in 1979, Khomeini language sources).2 To this end, Hojjatiyeh even cooper- announced that Lahouti Eshkevari “was sick and had a ated with the shah-era National Intelligence and Security heart condition”—an informal dismissal—and for a time Organization.3 After the revolution, and especially since Khomeini had no commissar formally representing him Khomeini’s death, however, Mesbah-Yazdi emerged as one in the IRGC.7 Lahouti Eshkevari did not get the hint and of the most radical proponents of Khomeini’s ideology, continued to align himself with the formal government and he works to mobilize support within the ranks of the structure, at this time under President Abol-Hassan IRGC in his bid for succeeding Khamenei. Mesbah-Yazdi Bani-Sadr, rather than Khomeini’s informal structure. not only accepts, but also encourages the IRGC’s interfer- In response, Khomeini had Lahouti Eshkevari arrested ence in the political process. By giving Mesbah-Yazdi and and, on October 28, 1981, executed.8 the IRGC commanders too much prominence and power, Khamenei may have undermined his own long-term interests for the sake of the short-term gain of containing Increased intervention of the commissars in more pragmatic or reformist factions. Increased interven- the day-to-day politics of the Islamic Republic tion of the commissars in the day-to-day politics of the Islamic Republic and greater ideological affinity between and greater ideological affinity between the the commissars and the guardsmen whom they were sup- commissars and the guardsmen may posed to control may culminate in a situation in which the IRGC can overrule even Khamenei. culminate in a situation in which the IRGC can overrule even Khamenei. The Commissars under Khomeini During the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini struggled Still, Khomeini strived to maintain balance within the to control the armed militias that eventually became IRGC. The Statute of the Guards codified the IRGC’s the IRGC. Aware that survival of his regime depended powers and subordinated the organization to the supreme on effective coordination between his leadership and leader, as opposed to the United States where the presi- the militias, Khomeini dispatched representatives— dent is commander-in-chief.9 Because Khomeini could effectively commissars—to the armed groups. Upon the not personally involve himself in the IRGC’s daily affairs, unification of the four main pro-Khomeini militias on however, he appointed a new representative to succeed September 16, 1979, Khomeini appointed firebrand Lahouti Eshkevari and to preside over a vast commissariat preacher Ayatollah Hassan Lahouti Eshkevari to be his to whom the IRGC commanders at each organizational representative to the newly organized IRGC.4 (See the level and each branch of the IRGC had to report. The appendix for a chronological list of the representatives Statute of the Guards divides the commissariat into of the leader to the IRGC.) supervisory and political bureaus.10 Because the roles of Lahouti Eshkevari was an effective commissar and the bureaus overlap, however, the commissars exist in a managed to appoint his personal representatives at all state of permanent competition. In effect, the theoretical levels of the IRGC,5 but his tenure ended soon after he level of oversight undermines the commissars’ ability to tried to subordinate the IRGC to the interim government maintain civilian control effectively. IRGC commanders of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; hardline clerics, along are theoretically required to report to the supreme leader’s with their allies in the IRGC—Mohsen Rafiqdoust, representatives, but the commanders are often able to Mohammad Gharazi, Marziyeh Hadid-Chi Dabbagh, get their way by playing competing commissars against Mohsen Rezai, and Abbas Douzdouzani—demanded that each other. Although in theory the commissars have the IRGC should instead report to the Council of the vast power, for example, to appoint or dismiss leading - 3 - commanders, in reality, IRGC commanders can exploit mission to Pakistan.16 This did not end the feud with divisions between commissars and among the broader Mahallati, however. When Faker intervened in opera- civilian leadership to ensure they keep their positions. tional issues, IRGC commanders threatened to resign, leading to Faker’s dismissal and Taheri Khorramabadi’s 17 Khomeini’s representative had to be reinstatement. Khomeini may have tried to manage the problem, but he was unable to solve it. At the same time, strong enough to command authority Taheri Khorramabadi’s dismissal and reinstatement 18 among the guardsmen, but not so strong demonstrated the growing power of rank-and-file guards. Simultaneously, the rivalry made it easier for guards to that he would become a rival to the pass the blame whenever military operations in the 19 revolutionary leadership in Tehran. ongoing war with Iraq failed. Mahallati grew so con- cerned about the rivalry and opposition to him within the body of the IRGC that he told Rafsanjani, then After the Lahouti Eshkevari affair, Khomeini was speaker of the Parliament, he was concerned about his understandibly cautious in his appointments to the IRGC. own security,20 a fear perhaps validated when Mahallati His representative had to be strong enough to command died in a suspicious plane crash in 1986.21 Following authority among the guardsmen, but not so strong that Mahallati’s death, Khomeini declined to appoint a he would become a rival to the revolutionary leader- replacement, perhaps suspecting IRGC involvement in ship in Tehran. Following Lahouri Eshkevari’s dismissal, the crash, although the official press blamed it on Iraqi Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khamenei both fighter jets.22 Khomeini’s relative passivity suggests that he served briefly as Khomeini’s representatives to the IRGC recognized some elements in the IRGC had gone rogue on their way to higher office.11 Khomeini then appointed and, if pushed, could react violently against his close Hojjat al-Eslam Fazlollah Mehdizadeh Mahallati who, allies, if not against Khomeini himself.