PEACEWORKS Displacement and the Vulnerability to Mobilize for Violence EVIDENCE FROM AFGHANISTAN By Sadaf Lakhani and Rahmatullah Amiri NO. 155 | JANUARY 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 155 | JANUARY 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines whether displaced persons in Afghanistan are more vulnerable to radicalization and mobilization to violence than groups that have not experienced VIOLENT EXTREMISM displacement. Fieldwork—which included surveys and interviews conducted in eight Afghan provinces throughout 2018—was carried out by The Liaison Office (TLO), a research and peacebuilding organization based in Kabul. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Sadaf Lakhani is CEO of Cognitiks, a company that assists organizations in fragile states integrate data science into their decision-making processes. Before this, she spent eighteen years working on development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts for the World Bank, USIP, and other organizations. Rahmatullah Amiri is a senior researcher and analyst with TLO, where he works on sociopolitical issues, peacebuilding and reconcilia- tion, countering violent extremism, and humanitarian access. Cover photo: Internally displaced Afghan men line up to receive winter relief assistance at a refugee camp in Kabul in January 2017. (Photo by Omar Sobhani/Reuters) The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 155. First published 2020. ISBN: 978-1-60127-789-3 Making Peace Possible Contents Introduction and Methodology 3 Findings 9 Analysis 23 Recommendations 28 USIP.ORG 1 Summary A perception shared broadly both within and outside Afghanistan is that dis- placed persons are vulnerable to radicalization and mobilization to violence. To assess the validity of this perception, this study—based on extensive surveys and interviews involving more than 1,400 respondents across eight Afghan provinc- es—compared groups of displaced and nondisplaced persons on an array of socioeconomic factors that the literature suggests lead to greater vulnerability to radicalization. The results did not support this general perception. Attitudes toward the Taliban and toward the use of violence against civilians did not vary greatly between dis- placed and nondisplaced groups in any given province. Yet the attitudes of any one group might vary significantly from province to province (for example, be- tween displaced populations in Balkh and those in Nangarhar), underscoring the need for well-targeted, locale-specific interventions. The study also found that displaced persons were more likely than returnees or host community Afghans to have been approached directly for recruitment by the Taliban, but it did not find that displaced persons were more sympathetic toward the Taliban or toward the use of violence against civilians. The perception of vulnerability of displaced persons to joining armed nonstate groups was not matched by actual sympathy for the Taliban. One exception to these findings is notable: returnees who had left and sub- sequently returned to Afghanistan more than five years before the time of this study were most likely to express sympathy for the Taliban. A deeper and focused understanding of this specific wave of returnees may reveal characteris- tics that make returnees vulnerable to Taliban messaging. Regardless of displacement status, many respondents who expressed sympathy for the Taliban did so out of a belief that the Taliban could provide security and dispute resolution. Rather than agreeing with the Taliban’s ideology, respondents expressed a willingness to put up with the negative aspects of Taliban authority, including violence toward civilians, simply to benefit from the security and pro- tection afforded by the Taliban. The recommendations emphasize significantly improved government provision of security and rule of law to dissuade alignment of displaced persons with the Taliban or other armed groups. 2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155 Displaced Afghan men gather in the Tangi Wazir area of eastern Nangarhar Province, where ISIS militants had set houses on fire, in December 2017. (Photo by Mauricio Lima/New York Times) Introduction and Methodology Ascertaining whether Forced displacement currently affects a record 70.8 million people worldwide and a relationship exists is among the most pressing humanitarian and development challenges today. The between displacement impacts of forced displacement are disproportionately felt in developing and con- and vulnerability flict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, where seven to eight million people, or to recruitment to one-fifth of the population, are displaced.1 Though natural disasters are one cause of violence—and, if displacement, the greatest part of forced displacement in Afghanistan today is the so, the details of result of violent conflict.2 the dynamics of the relationship—is A large body of literature exists on both displacement and violent extremism, but crucial to the success there are few in-depth studies on the intersection of the two. This gap, combined with of efforts to counter several high-profile attacks in Western Europe in which migrants—often displaced violent extremism in persons—were implicated, has led to assumptions that displacement and migration Afghanistan. constitute a particular security and stabilization threat and that displaced persons are at greater risk of radicalization or recruitment to violence than the general population.3 Because of the scale of displacement in Afghanistan, ascertaining in the first place whether a relationship exists between displacement and vulnerability to recruitment to violence, and, if so, the details of the dynamics of the relationship, is crucial to the success of efforts to counter violent extremism in the country. USIP.ORG 3 The number of conflict-related internal displacements in Afghanistan grew from 297,000 in 2009 to more than 2.5 million by the end of 2018—an eightfold increase. At the same time, countering violent extremism evalu- DEFINITIONS OF DISPLACED OR ations and lessons learned have enabled practitioners NONDISPLACED GROUPS to better understand vulnerabilities (and resiliencies) Forced displacement is a significant phenomenon among defined subgroups or communities, with the in Afghanistan as a result of the country’s protracted goal of better tailoring programming and targeting history of conflict and regime change. In this report the support. Understanding the specific vulnerabilities of following terms are used: different displaced groups compared with those who have not experienced displacement helps inform poli- Refugees and returnees. Refugees are those who have cies and programs to assist displaced persons. left homes because of persecution or violence and have crossed an international border in search of safety.5 The goal of this study was to explore the nexus of dis- Currently about 6 million Afghans have fled the country, placement in a conflict-affected situation and vulnerability including 2.4 million registered refugees and an esti- to radicalization, and to derive recommendations for mated 2.7 to 3.4 million undocumented Afghans in Iran government and nongovernmental organizations. The and Pakistan. These figures make Afghanistan the sec- study examined factors related to radicalization that had ond-largest source of refugees in the world, after Syria.6 been identified in other studies; and compared displaced and nondisplaced individuals. It also looked at differenc- Returnees are persons who have either returned to es among different displaced populations—internally Afghanistan from outside the country or returned to their displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees. original area in Afghanistan after internal displacement to a different region. More than 820,000 Afghans returned Afghanistan's conflict dynamics are complex. They to the country in 2018 from Iran and Pakistan alone, the include protracted displacement, urban displacement, vast majority of whom were undocumented; fewer than returnees arriving in different waves for different rea- 20,000 were documented refugees returning.7 UN agen- sons, differences between groups of IDPs coming from cies do their best to ensure that returns are voluntary. different ethnic groups and different areas of origin, “Spontaneous returns” indicate that people have been and displacement because of individuals’ association coerced into returning to Afghanistan, usually because with or support for (or lack thereof) the government or of actions on the part of the host country’s government.8 one or another violent extremist group. The displaced The conditions surrounding forced returns can add to the may also have experienced multiple displacements, vulnerabilities to radicalization that returnees face. and often have been both a refugee and a returnee, as well as internally displaced.4 Drawing generaliza- On returning to Afghanistan, it is common for return- tions about vulnerability to radicalization based solely ees to become internally displaced as they search for on individuals’ categorization as “displaced” is insuffi- secure places to live and work. For the