No. 34 | March 2018 AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES The Maghreb’s Fragile Edges BY ANOUAR BOUKHARS HIGHLIGHTS • The social and economic marginalization of communities in the periphery of each country of the Maghreb is an ongoing source of instability in the region. • Security forces must distinguish between the threats posed by militants and ordinary citizens expressing grievances. A heavy-handed response is likely to backfire, deepening distrust of central governments while fueling militancy. • Economic integration of peripheral communities is a priority. Such initiatives must deliver at the local level, however. Otherwise, perceptions of corruption and exploitation will reinforce perceived grievances. Nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings, tempers in the out- Governmental response has been parochial with an overem- lying regions of the Maghreb are on the boil. Scarred by a phasis on heavy-handed security approaches that often end history of states’ neglect, with poverty rates often more than up further polarizing communities and worsening youth triple that of urban areas, these frontiers of discontent are disillusionment. At a time when governments are playing being transformed into incubators of instability. Bitterness, catch up against a continually shifting terror threat—and rage, and frustration directed at governments perceived as with the menace of returning Maghrebi fighters from Iraq, riddled with abuses and corruption represent a combusti- Syria, and Libya—the disconnect between the state and its ble mix that was brewed decades ago, leading to the cur- marginalized regions threatens to pull these countries into a rent hothouse of discord and tumult. Into the vacuum of vicious cycle of violence and state repression. Breaking this credible state institutions and amid illicit cross-border flows spiral requires governments in the region to rethink their of people and goods, including arms and drugs, militancy approach to their peripheral regions. and jihadist recruitment are starting to take root, especial- ly among restless youth. The center of gravity for this toxic The transnational nature of security threats in the region cocktail is the Maghreb’s marginalized border areas—from also underscores the necessity for governments to develop Morocco’s restless northern Rif region to the farthest reaches their intelligence sharing and border security cooperation. of the troubled southern regions of Algeria and Tunisia. Unfortunately, shared threats have been compounded by Africa Security Brief No. 34 1 Countries of the Maghreb Region POPULATION DENSITY Algiers Annaba 2 Tunis (number of inhabitants per km ) Tangier Al Hoceima Tétouan Oran Sousse less than 10 Mt. Chaambi Mt. Semmama Rabat Oujda 10 to 50 Casablanca Saïdia Jerada TUNISIA Ben Guerdane 50 to 100 Ghardaïa Tripoli Marrakesh Tataouine 100 to 300 Benghazi Agadir Béchar Ouargla Dehiba Misrata more than 300 MOROCCO Gadamis Tindouf ALGERIA In Amenas LIBYA Western Sahara Bordj Badji Mokhtar Tamanrasset MAURITANIA MALI NIGER Nouakchott CHAD Note: Population densities are shown for illustration purposes and should not be relied upon for accuracy. enduring interstate rivalries and closed borders. Since the Algeria’s oil and gas industry represents roughly 35 percent mid-seventies, Morocco and Algeria have remained trapped of GDP and 75 percent of government revenue. This strate- in a zero-sum world. Their acrimonious rivalry over re- gic economic sector is largely based in the south, which en- gional dominance and bitter feud over the Western Sahara compasses more than 80 percent of the national territory but have blocked progress on many of the burning issues that less than 9 percent of the population. This region, accord- bedevil the Maghreb and Sahel. Whatever regional cooper- ingly, looms large in Algeria’s security calculations. Yet, de- ation agreements there are tend to be limited and ad hoc. spite its strategic vitality, the south is often trivialized as a The challenge today is to broaden and make concrete these space of folkloric fascination and exotic, sometimes sinister, opportunities for cross-border cooperation. goings-on. The media tends to reinforce this narrative by in- flating the stereotypes of Saharan communities as truculent ALGERIA BUFFETED tribes of dubious loyalty to the state.1 For decades, an illusion of relative tranquility pervaded Algeria’s vast peripheral regions. This provided an eerie For Saharan communities, this prevalent discourse smacks counterpoint to the intermittent agitation that animated of racial prejudice and a deliberate intention to justify the densely populated spaces in the country’s north. The their political and socioeconomic exclusion. It is not the ter- Algerian south was suddenly catapulted to the forefront of rain, climate, or presumed inherent laziness, lack of skills, public consciousness and national security concerns with and dubious nationalist credentials of the people of the the unprecedented terrorist targeting of Algeria’s energy infrastructure in 2013 at the In Amenas gas facility near the Anouar Boukhars is a nonresident scholar in the Carnegie southeastern border with Libya. Forty workers were killed Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program and hundreds held hostage. and associate professor of international relations at McDan- iel College in Westminster, Maryland. 2 Africa Center for Strategic Studies Sahara that make them poor or engage in illicit flows at Al- fer to Libya to be sold to elements of al Qaeda in the Islamic geria’s southern border with Mali and Libya. Rather, from Maghreb (AQIM) demonstrates the interconnectedness be- the perspective of these communities, it is the neglect and tween grievances, criminality, and jihad. pauperization of a rich region that has retarded its devel- opment and made it heavily dependent on smuggling and Mounting sectarian and ethnic tensions, worsened by eco- contraband as sources of daily subsistence. nomic upheavals, have compounded troubles in Algeria’s south. The lethal intercommunal clashes that erupted in August 2013 in the border town of Bordj Badji Mokhtar ex- for Saharan communities, posed deep rifts between the Tuareg Idnan and Arab Bera- this prevalent discourse biche communities. Never before had the area seen such an escalation of violence, which started when a young Tuareg, accused of theft, was murdered in an apparent vendetta.5 “smacks of racial prejudice The region of Ghardaïa was also engulfed in waves of dead- and a deliberate intention ly violence between the Chaamba Arabs present in most of to justify their political and the Algerian south and the Mozabite Berbers of the Muslim Ibadi sect, an insular group with its own system of values, socioeconomic exclusion codes of conduct, and rules.6 The cause of the violence was attributed to disputes over resources, land, and migration. The government’s laissez-faire approach to informal cross-border trade also contributed to making contraband Unfortunately for Algeria, the vast south is not the only a dominant economic activity in the south.2 This was a cal- border region exposed to internal and external shocks. Sim- culated strategy designed to tame the vast southern fron- ilar threats are mirrored along the Tunisian, Malian, and tier, as contraband trade provided a lifeline to populations Libyan borders. Government tolerance of contraband and deprived of the financial benefits of their region’s natural smuggling of commodities has provided terrorists and oth- resource endowments. The debut of terror groups and crim- er criminal actors opportunities to exploit these informal inal organizations in the Sahara in the early 2000s revealed cross-border routes. Algerian militants, for example, have the potential pitfalls of this strategy, however. Regional ter- used the limited oversight to build a safe haven in Mount 7 rorist networks and criminal organizations perfected the Chaambi, Tunisia—a few miles from the Algerian border. modes of operations, routes, and delivery methods that were first used by smugglers of innocuous commodities like Paradoxically, the only respite for Algeria can be found petrol, cooking oil, corn flour, and powdered milk, and then, at its closed frontier with Morocco. In recent years, get- in the 1990s, by traffickers of cigarettes and weapons. ting across the border has become quite difficult as both countries have tightened their control of smuggling routes The shortcoming of Algeria’s lax management of its bor- and goods. In 2013, Algeria started digging trenches along derlands came after 2011. The Arab uprisings were a major its border with Morocco to deter smuggling of fuel. Not catalyst in the awakening and politicization of the south. to be outdone, Morocco reacted a year later by building Protests against social exclusion, high unemployment, and a 150-km-long security fence to strengthen its defenses environmental depredation have mushroomed across the against the flow of human smuggling and possible infiltra- Algerian Sahara since that time.3 tion of terrorists from Algeria. Algeria accuses Morocco of flooding it with cannabis while Morocco complains about Unfortunately, political disgruntlement and frustration the flow from Algeria of African migrants and recreational with injustices are not always channeled into social mobi- drugs, namely amphetamine pills (Rivotril or Qarqobi in lization and nonviolent protests.4 Some, especially disaf- Moroccan colloquial Arabic).8 fected youth, gravitate toward the