Philosophy of Science and "The" Scientific Jim Griesemer, an assistant professor of philosophy at the Univ. of Califomia, Davis, CA 95616, did his undergraduatework in ge- netics at the Univ. of Califomia at Berkeley. There he became in- Method terested in the foundations evolutionary theory, going on to a master's in biology and a Ph.D. in the Committee on Conceptual Foundations of Science of the Univ. of Chicago. He has worked on the development of exhibits at the Museum of Science and In- dustry in Chicago, and is currently doing researchin the founda- tions of multi-level selection theory, representations of scientific Jim Griesemer reasoning, and the institutional history of biology. Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/abt/article-pdf/47/4/211/86196/4448021.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 The Argument od will be fundamentally changed, and indeed, the perception that there ever was a definitive Philosophy of science addresses two central ques- conception of scientific method is a myth stem- tions: (1) what is the structure of a scientific theory?, ming from an ahistorical, nondevelopmental and (2) what are the processes of growth or change view of philosophy of science. of science over time? The gulf between philosophical 3. One should therefore be circumspect in teach- treatments of these two questions is one of the great ing "the" scientific method or wielding "the" ironies of a discipline which prides itself on system- scientific method in argument against propo- aticity, comprehensiveness, and coherence. Separate nents of opposing scientific views. traditions have emerged since the 1960s to deal with There is a pernicious consilience, or false co- the two questions, rendering the gulf between them herence or robustness, about this myth of the scien- nearly institutionalized; the inheritors of logical em- tific method which stems from the fact that it has piricism, the formalists, analyze the structure of the- two rather different sources of support. One source ories in formal terms which promote an ahistorical, is the traditional emphasis philosophers of science asocial analysis of scientific change. The new histor- have placed on formalist accounts of theory struc- ical movement, heralded by Kuhn, but prefigured ture. The logician's deductive standard for scientific by others, explains the patterns of growth and explanation and rationality, and the attendant view change in science with socio-historicalmodels of sci- of theories as sets of axioms and rules in a formal entific work, leaving the structure of the products of language, leads to the idea that there is only one pos- science unanalyzed entirely or only inchoately spec- sible scientific method because there is only one ified and incommensurable with the analyses of the standard of logical deduction to all and only valid formalists. conclusions [see Suppe (1977) for a detailed account As this gap has become recognized as the sort of of the history of these ideas; Nagel (1961) and foundational problem which can lead either to the Hempel (1965) give important statements of the subdivision of the field into a formalist program and view]. "The" scientific method is, accordingly, the a socio-historicalprogram, or to a grand unification, testing of universal statements offered as scientific philosophy of science has entered a period of tumult laws by comparing deductive consequences of laws and transition. In this essay I wish to draw a lesson with statements of observational facts about the from these observations which has not been widely world. Karl Popper (1965) calls it the method of appreciated outside history, philosophy, and so- "conjecturesand refutations." ciology of science that has particularrelevance to sci- The other main source of the myth of the scientific ence educators. The argument I wish to make is as method comes from a historical view of science, con- follows: ditioned by philosophical treatments (by both phi- 1. A clearer conception of scientific method is rec- losophers and scientists), which fails to recognize ognized on both sides as a central element of any diversity of goals, interests, or motives among any possible reconciliationbetween the two tra- the people who do science that might influence their ditions in philosophy of science. methods. This view is a species of "essentialism" 2. Regardless of the outcome (philosophy of sci- applied to science, i.e., that there is a timeless es- ence split into two or more disciplines or grand sence of science which captures the important fea- unification), our conception of scientific meth- tures, all others being mere distraction [see Hull PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 211 (1975, 1983) for extensive criticism of essentialism in The FormalistConception of history and philosophy of science]. Science seeks Explanationand ScientificChange "the" truth about the world, and the rational scien- The deductive-nomological model of explanation tist pursues "the" best method for attaining truth. (see Hempel 1965, 1966) epitomizes the best and This conception of science led Popper (1959, p. 15) worst of the formalist approach. Explanations are to argue that "The central problem of epistemology deductive arguments, on this view, with the conclu- has always been and still is the problem of the sion being the "explanandum" and the premises growth of knowledge. And thegrowth of knowledgecan consisting of sentences stating general laws and be studiedbest by studyingthe growthof scientificknowl- spe- cial rules (see Hempel 1966, Ch. 5 for a brief intro- edge."This presumably follows from the assumption duction). The explanandum sentence is that if anyone gains knowledge, it's the scientists, so typically supposed to describe an event or state of The we should study them in order to develop a para- affairs. chief virtue of this "covering-law model" (where the digm description of the growth of knowledge. laws deductively "cover" the explanandum) is the The turmoil in philosophy of science today stems, rigor with which deductive inferences can be made. in part, from a move away from essentialist thinking Only true conclusions can follow from (Hull 1975, 1983; Toulmin 1967, 1971, 1972) which deductively true premises, so it appears very powerful to consid- has, in turn, been motivated by increased considera- Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/abt/article-pdf/47/4/211/86196/4448021.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 er as a form of deductive inference. tion of biology as a subject of philosophical study. explanation Several sorts of when Biology is much less easily pigeon-holed by formalist difficulty arise, however, this analysis is applied to scientific practice. First, approaches than physics has been in the past. Biolo- of formal gists would be hard pressed to find much biological the technical difficulties analysis of scien- tific theories expressed in natural insight in Woodger's (1937) attempt to axiomatize bi- language are for- midable. A comparison of the text of Darwin's ology, though Mary Williams' efforts (1970) are of (1859) On the Origin with more interest precisely because they show how far a of Species Mary Williams' (1970) axiom system sobers one to the reform of our concept of deduction is required to re- immensity of the task. since theories are main within the outlines of formalism. On the one Second, viewed as linguistic structures sets of hand biology is much less highly mathematized than (i.e., sentences), deep problems of epistemology arise in linking scientific theories physics, so it is more difficult to see how to proceed to the world. sentences can be from ax- with formal analysis. On the other hand, much of Only derived what are the criteria the existing historical scholarship on biology has de- ioms, so by which we judge that a particularexplanandum veloped in the same period as the philosophical de- sentence corresponds to an event or state of affairs in the velopments under discussion, so there is a reduced world? Logic is on this word-world relation. tendency toward the kind of linear story-telling silent of which has added to the false sense of correctness of Third, the singular goal deductive inference, to that truth will essentialist analyses of physics. guarantee only emerge from scientific In the remainder of this essay I will discuss se- arguments with true premises, elevates truth and to an lected features of the two traditions, draw some im- explanation excessively exalted height. Deduc- tive to plications for our understanding of scientific meth- logic provides no machinery analyze the crea- tion, or dissemination, or reception of scientific od, and describe some new directions for research ideas. Popper (1959, p. 31) addresses this which emphasize the importance of the pedagogical problem a hard line limitations of "the" scientific method. Because phi- by drawing between the process of scien- tific discovery on the one hand and losophy of science research is becoming (1) more the process of scientific justification on the other, delegating the pluralistic in its conception of method and simul- former process to the sciences taneously more cautious in generalizing from one special and retaining only the hard nut with some for domain of science to others, and (2) more centrally promise deductive in his He concerned to base answers to bothtraditional philo- analysis program. writes, sophical questions about science on a broad account The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a of scientific method, educators should discuss ques- theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it hap- tions of method with historical and philosophical pens that a new idea occurs to a man-whether it is a sensitivity. Students who learn that "the" scientific musical theme, a dramaticconflict, or a scientific the- method is a myth will be less inclined to view sci- ory-may be of great interest to empirical psychol- ence as a cookbook procedure and more able to re- ogy; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scien- flect on the complexity and excitement of scientific tificknowledge.