EYES WIDE SHUT STRENGTHENING OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA: GOALS, INSTRUMENTS, AND EFFECTS STUDY OF THE CENTER FOR EURO–ATLANTIC STUDIES MAY 2016 The study was created within the project “Reform of the security sector in Serbia and Integration”, which was supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund CONTENT 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 16 2. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS ............................................................... 20 2.1. VERY BRIEFLY THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER AND ITS LIBERAL UNDERSTANDING......... 23 2.2. RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING OF SOFT POWER .................................................................... 24 3. CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY ARE REALIZED....................................................................................................................... 28 3.1. THE MAIN METHODS OF OPERATION OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA .................... 35 3.1.1. RUSSIAN POLICY OF COMPATRIOTS ............................................................................ 36 3.1.2. RUSSIAN COMPATRIOT ORGANIZATIONS IN SERBIA .................................................. 38 3.1.3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN SERBIA ................................................................................................. 44 3.1.4. COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE POSITION OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN SERBIA ............... 46 3.2. REWRITING HISTORY AND CREATING AND SPREADING THE SELF–FULFILLING NARRATIVE OF UNDOUBTEDLY GOOD TRADITIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND RUSSIA IN THE FUTURE ...................................................................................................................................... 47 3.2.1. SERBIAN–RUSSIAN RELATIONS 19th to 21st century: MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS AND STEREOTYPES AGAINST RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST AND PRESENT .................... 48 3.3. NOTHING IS TRUE AND EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE – MEDIA MANIPULATION AND PROPAGANDA AS A MODE OF OPERATION OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA .................. 56 3.4. INSISTING ON POLICIES OF ACQUIRED IDENTITIES ............................................................ 65 3.5. STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ...... 69 3.6. INSISTING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC TIES AND RUSSIAN MARKET POTENTIAL FOR SERBIA, WHILE IGNORING REAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA AND SERBIA ... 72 3.6.1. RUSSIAN MARKET – CHANCE FOR SERBIA OR MYTH .................................................. 73 4. NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK – NEW INSTRUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN SOFT POWER .................. 81 4.1. PRO–KREMLIN ASSOCIATIONS OF CITIZENS AND STUDENTS ORGANIZATIONS ................ 81 4.2. RUSSIAN FOUNDATIONS ACTING IN SERBIA ...................................................................... 96 4.3. PRO-KREMLIN STRUCTURES THAT PARTICIPATED IN ELECTIONS IN SERBIA ..................... 99 4.4. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SERBIAN AND RUSSIAN POLITICAL PARTIES.................................................................................................................................... 104 5. EFFECTS OF THE STRENGTHENING OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA ............................. 109 5.1. GENERAL INCREASE IN THE POSITIVE PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA AND PRO-KREMLIN MOOD ................................................................................................................................................. 111 5.2. IMPACT ON YOUNG PEOPLE ............................................................................................ 114 5.2.1. PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: EU, RUSSIA, US: IMAGES AND PREFERENCES OF THE CITIZENS OF SERBIA AGES 18 TO 35 – IPSOS, FEBRUARY 2016 ........................................... 114 5.3. HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: PUTINIZATION OF SERBIA 2012–2016 ...................................... 128 5.3.1. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE STRENGTHENING OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER AND THE PUTINIZATION OF SERBIA TAKE PLACE ................................................................................................................................... 129 5.3.2. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT FROM THE 1990S TO THE ARRIVAL OF ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ TO POWER ..................................................................... 132 5.3.3. THE RETURN TO POWER OF OTHER PROMINENT FIGURES OF MILOŠEVIĆ’S REGIME: 2012–2016 ........................................................................................................................... 139 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 170 7. EXHIBITS: TABLE OF PRO–KREMLIN STRUCTURES THAT OPERATE IN SERBIA WITH BASIC PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THEIR LEGAL STATUS ..................................................... 1 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR EURO–ATLANTIC STUDIES ...................................................................... 1 An integral version of this study was published on 9 May 2016, on the anniversary of the victory over fascism in World War II. CEAS dedicates it to the legendary musician, US Army Major, Glenn Miller. His work and life story are valuable examples of the true power of attracting values, policies, and methods that we advocate for ourselves. 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For the stability of the entire region, it is important that the problems in Macedonia are resolved as soon as possible. I hope that the ideas of "Ukrainisation" of that area will fail, because nobody in the Balkans needs that. Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian Prime Minister, 16 April 2016 I will strongly oppose any attempt at destabilization in Serbia, the scenarios from Macedonia and Ukraine. Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian Prime Minister, 26 April 2016 The primary goal of this study is to present to the Serbian public new, undemocratic trends in Kremlin activities, realized through the use of Russian soft power in Serbia. Rather than resistance, the Kremlin has found the doors of Serbian authorities wide open. Similar methods of operation by the Kremlin can be seen in EU member states, as well as in the more distant neighbors of the Russian Federation. The objectives and effects of Kremlin activity, as well as manners of preventing and remedying them have been topics of discussion in the West and elsewhere over the past several years. In contrast to this, in Serbia, which is, due to various circumstances, very fertile ground for Kremlin activities, this topic has not been given adequate attention, even among democratically-minded individuals and structures. This study in whole, or at least its main conclusions and recommendations, were written with the intention of being read by those in the political West, who are involved in Serbia, the Western Balkans, and Eastern Europe. Many of these actors are also falling into the trap of the increasingly successful and self–fulfilling narrative of “traditionally good Serbian– Russian relations,” and using that basis of understanding to assess the processes of stabilization, democratization, and European integration with regards to Serbia. The more the official Belgrade government flirts with the Kremlin, the more the political West lowers its standards in the hopes of attracting Serbia into its orbit. The increasingly autocratic official Belgrade government has been intentionally abusing this pacification and lack of adequate response from the West. This leaves the doors wide open to the growing influence of the Kremlin’s soft power, which shares several goals with the growing autocracy in Belgrade. Throughout this study are several examples that confirm this thesis. The term soft power, or the use of the power of attraction in the fertile ground that the Kremlin has found in Serbia, will not be used in quotation marks in this study. Generally, the increased interest of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, parallels Russian preparations to respond to developments with Euromaidan in Kiev, the war in eastern Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea. In previous studies, the Center for Euro–Atlantic Studies (CEAS) described Russian activity in Serbia, primarily through forms of hard power. The aim of this study, therefore, is to present various levels of international relations in which Moscow is undoubtedly an indispensable player in solving pressing global and regional problems, and on that basis to encourage debate on whether Russia is a necessary or advantageous partner. Our intention is to analyze the objectives, methods, and effects of Russian soft power in Serbia, and to some extent, the Western Balkans, and based on these findings, to assess whether they are in line with the public interests of the state of Serbia, those being, stabilization, democratization, economic prosperity, and Euro–Atlantic integration. We further determined that the April 2016 parliamentary elections in Serbia, which were announced during the research for this study, could serve as an additional, relevant parameter in the presentation of the study’s conclusions and recommendations. For this reason, the final publication of the study was delayed. Through the research, we mapped 109 organizations that promote different aspects of Serbian–Russian relations, which are not necessarily harmful to Serbia in themselves.