The Friends Of Evil: When NGOs support genocidaires Tom Ndahiro 2013 2 Contents 1 Refugees’ Camps under the Military 7 1.1 Road map . 8 1.2 Taking the lead . 9 1.3 Strategic decisions . 10 2 The FAR’s Vision for the Future 17 2.1 Scenarios for the return of refugees . 18 3 Refugees in captivity 27 4 The RDR or disguised genocidaires 33 5 How to wage continued genocide and terrorism 55 6 When racial hatred is fashionable 63 7 Complicity between the NGOs and the genocidaires 75 8 Rwandan civil society in exile–villains posturing as victims 89 9 Other initiatives of Rwandans living in Exile 101 10 Fast moves from European NGOs to rehabilitate felons 127 11 A Club of Lovers of Hatred 139 12 Carrero, a Mockery to the Nobel Peace Prize 147 13 Indifference to the demons of race 159 14 Final Appeal and Conclusion 167 3 4 CONTENTS Foreword “Friends of Evil” will be a troubling surprise for anyone who believes — as most probably do in North America and Europe -– that the 1994 Rwanda genocide is a thing of the past and a lesson learned for the international community. The book is based on extensive new research and documentation which will be a revelation even to Rwanda experts. The first part shows how in 1994-95 the “Hutu Power” perpetrators of the genocide, allowed by the international community to regroup in eastern Congo, reorganized themselves behind a new organization called the RDR, and developed their military and political strategy to return to power in Rwanda. Genocide denial was a central element of that strategy, as was the goal of gaining reentry into Rwandan political life. The second part shows the extraordinary degree to which Western “civil society,” and particularly several NGOs in Europe, have been complicit in this genocidal strategy. But perhaps all this should not be a surprise at all. The attitude of Europe and North America toward Rwanda during the preparation and implementation of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis ranged from the active complicity of French authorities and media to the passivity and feckless “humanitarianism” elsewhere. This attitude stemmed from indifference, ignorance and no doubt an element of racist arrogance. These are deep-rooted and stubborn habits, easy to revert to once Western establishments processed the shock of 1994 through hand-wringing regret and partial admissions of guilt. It is hard for genocide perpetrators to face up to their crimes. It is also hard for their abettors and the bystanders to move beyond whatever arguments or narratives serve to lessen their responsibility. This helps explain the tolerance and the space given to exponents of Hutu Power ideology and genocide denial in Europe and North America since 1994, by governments, media, human rights organizations and NGOs. But is does not make it acceptable. This book is both an education and an appeal for Europe and North America to do better: to put an end to impunity, and to confront the racist ideology that still threatens to sabotage the emergence of a new and peaceful Rwanda. The scores of known Rwandan perpetrators in Europe (especially France) and North America need to be tried or extradited to Rwanda. Their armed forces in eastern Congo need to be definitively defeated. Their ideological sympathizers and supporters need to be silenced. Holocaust denial is not tolerated in Europe and North America, but denial of the genocide of the Tutsis is. This is morally wrong. It is also strategically wrong. The future of Germany is assured. The future of Rwanda is still at stake. 5 6 CONTENTS Richard Johnson Chapter 1 Refugees’ Camps under the Military The pre-genocide government army (FAR) were very instrumental in the plan- ning and execution of the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. Apart from prepar- ing the killing machinery before the death of president Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, it was the army which instated the “interim government” that would supervise the genocide. Judging from the range of testimonies by the survivors, witnesses and perpetrators of this odious crime, every major massacre of Tutsis was committed with the involvement of the military, since they were the ones to provide arms and supervise their use. After the defeat of their government, as will be shown in this chapter, the military remained in charge of the political landscape across the borders in Zaire. On September 29, 1994, Major-General Augustin Bizimungu sent to Bukavu a “Highly Confidential” meeting report to “His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda (Theodore Sindikubwabo) and “The Honourable Prime Minister” (Jean Kambanda). The report was about a seven day meeting of senior officers in the Rwandan Armed Forces High Command, held in Goma from on September 2-8, 1994.1 The content of this report, demonstrates clearly that the origin and the actual foundation of the now quite wide-spread Rwandan genocide ideology, genocide denial, and double genocide theories is to be found within the circles of the army High Command. What was planned, before April 1994 and in September 1994, is very apparent today. In this retreat, with a view to achieving return to Rwanda, the RAF “delved into the analysis of the reasons for their defeat so as to propose strategies for a political or military solution to the Rwandan problem”.2 The first reason given was a “lack of a common political and military perspective in operational plans.” They said the conduct of operations was often influenced by politicians, rather than the army. That was the reason why they were determined not to make the 1Prosecution Exhibit n° P457B tendered in court on 12 December 2006, in case n° ICTR- 98-41-T.The original text which is in French was a 49 page document (plus source). I used the English text, as a translated version by the ICTR. With court references WS06-339 (E) KO04-1476-K004-152. 2K0370577. 7 8 CHAPTER 1. REFUGEES’ CAMPS UNDER THE MILITARY same mistakes again. The RAF decided they would firmly control the political- military organization that would become the RDR. The high command decried “naive faith in the Arusha Peace Accords,” which they said were a creation of “RPF henchmen, and half-heartedness in the imple- mentation of the said Accords which led to the acceptance of the RPF in Kigali without control.”3 In the document the FAR blamed almost everybody, starting with what they termed as ‘UNAMIR’s complicity with RPF’, the ‘involvement of foreign countries in the conflict: Uganda, Belgium, USA, Burundi and Tanzania’, ‘the sudden change of mind on the part of France, which was their main and only sure military partner’ and ‘UN’s military and diplomatic embargo against Rwanda followed by a misdirection of unofficial supply channels to avoid the embargo.’ They admitted having internal problems including poor organization, a lack of personnel and lack of leadership. “Lack of a national defence policy and lack of structures that are suited to all the echelons of command led to ineffi- ciency in the conduct of the operations.” (. ) “The ideological training of our men was not guaranteed despite internal political contradictions.” There were logistical problems including “a glaring shortage of senior staff at all levels. it was NOT possible to have soldiers with adequate qualifications for the posts of command and execution” and a “lack of reserves linked to the planning of recruitment. it was not possible to move from the temporary defensive state to offensive operations.” Another thing was “Weakness of some senior officers and loss of the Rwandan Armed Forces leaders on 6 April 1994, which caused some hesitation in decision-making and a succession struggle, while RPF continued to benefit from the initiative.” And, “Erosion of discipline at all levels without a corresponding system of sanctions.” Finally, the RAF again blamed their internal division on an external force, claiming there was a “presence of RPF allies within the Government and the Rwandan Armed Forces.”4 1.1 Road map Opening the meeting, the chairman, Gen. Bizimungu, said the army had entered Zairian territory with all the country’s institutions. He said the purpose of their meeting was “to assess the political and military situation in order to reflect on how to identify and explain the root causes of our present situation and to devise a common strategy on how to resolve the problems facing our soldiers in particular and the people of Rwanda in general.” Indeed this meeting was to change the course of events. Bizimungu said it was a “must” to do some “serious self-evaluation and a thorough analysis of the situation as a whole so as to use the lessons learned in future undertakings.” One thing he felt was obvious was that “the people and the Army felt “humiliated” by the situation and were “flagrant in the eyes of the foreigners”. The army, he said, faced several difficulties: the lack of housing, food, and medicine well as dispersal of military rank and file and decision- makers. The RAF’s Chief said the Armed Forces were “no longer functioning.” 3K0370600. 4K0370600. 1.2. TAKING THE LEAD 9 Explaining this, he said the officers and other officials in the administration acted more as individuals and not collectively. Among other things, he said, there was a problem of “the embargo imposed on our country; domestic politics and regionalism; the RPF army made up of Ugandan Army elements with the support of its sponsors; the international community’s poor understanding of the Rwandan problem; the complicity of UNAMIR and that of other powers, etc. ” There was a need to have “operatives in Rwanda” and to provide the mil- itary personnel in refugee camps with training and ideology.