University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1998 A defense of materialism against attacks based on qualia. J. C. Beall University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Beall, J. C., "A defense of materialism against attacks based on qualia." (1998). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2312. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2312 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM AGAINST ATTACKS BASED ON QUALIA A Dissertation Presented by JEFFREY C. BEALL Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1998 Philosophy Department © Copyright by Jeffrey Charles Beall 1998 All Rights Reserved A DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM AGAINST ATTACKS BASED ON QUALIA A Dissertation Presented by JEFFREY C. BEALL Approved as to style and content by: Lynne.ynne Baker, Chair ruce Aune, Member Gateih Matthews, Member Harlan Sturm, Member on, Department Head osophy Department ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people deserve to be richly thanked for their help, in various ways, with this project. Among these folks are David Braddon-Mitchell, Ben Bradley, David Chalmers, Fred Feldman, Gary Hardegree, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson, and Erik Wielenberg. Gary Matthews and Bruce Aune deserve special thanks for their helpful roles as committee members for this project. Jay Garfield likewise deserves special thanks for his very helpful email correspondence on almost every issue in this project. Without Lynne Baker’s consistently encouraging words but equally consistent criticism, this project would be a mess — plain and simple. To her I owe a great deal. Of course, as usual, I alone deserve the blame for messiness that remains. I also want to thank my first philosophy teacher, Professor Richard Trammell. He’s to blame for the frustrations I’ve had with philosophy; but he’s also to thank for giving me the desire to persevere through those frustrations — and unto the Truth (I hope!). In addition, my family has always been important to me, and has never failed to be an unshakable source of strength. Thanks to Kathy, Beth, Mark, Rebecca, Dee Dee & Pop, and, especially, Mom and Dad. Above all, I wish to thank the most important person in my life — alas, another Australian! My wife, Katrina Higgins Beall, has been through this entire journey — indeed, she was there, four years ago in Australia, at the start of my frustrations with the Knowledge Argument. She has endured a great deal of stress since that time, especially IV while I’ve tried to write this project in a very short ttme-span. With my deepest gratitude and love, I dedicate this project to her - despite the fact that she won’t read it! V ABSTRACT A DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM AGAINST ATTACKS BASED ON QUALIA FEBRUARY 1998 JEFFREY C. BEALL, B.A., GROVE CITY COLLEGE M.DIV., PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Lynne R. Baker Qualia — the “what it’s like features” of minds — pose a great challenge to a materialist view of the world. The two strongest and most popular objections to materialism based on qualia are the Zombie Argument and the Knowledge Argument. The current dissertation defends (minimal) materialism against these two popular arguments. I argue that if zombie worlds exist, then qualia cause no physical events — they’re epiphenomenalp, or epiphenomenal with respect to the physical domain of our world. I argue, however, that there is good reason to reject the view that qualia are epiphenomenalp, and thus that there is good reason to deny the existence of zombie worlds. In turn, I argue that the Knowledge Argument likewise requires the existence of zombie worlds, and thus that the Knowledge Argument should likewise be rejected. vi PREFACE This project stems from a frustration I’ve had for the last four years. The frustration comes from Australia in the work of Frank C. Jackson - in particular, Jackson’s infamous Knowledge Argument against 1 materialism. For the last four years, I ve thought of various objections to the argument but none of them ultimately satisfied me. (The most frustrating part was the recurring pattern of thinking that this objection is the one onl t0 ’ y dlscover a few days later that that objection couldn 7 be one at all.) Along the way, I also consulted the objections of others. These, too, were ultimately unsatisfactory. But despite all these unsatisfactory objections, I still believed that something, somewhere, had to be wrong with the Knowledge Argument, though I couldn t exactly put my finger on it. Soon, frustration grew into disgust, and I was all but ready to solve the problem by ignoring it — which, of course, is a psychological solution but makes for no philosophical progress. During this near-quitting period, I began to notice a tremendous surge of interest in what is now called the Zombie Argument against materialism. Keith Campbell (another Australian) used this sort of argument against materialism in 1977, but not much more was made of it — until very recently. During the last year and a half, the Zombie Argument against materialism has become a very hot topic, both in (hardcopy) literature and electronic journals, discussion lists, et cetera. Much of this popularity has to do with the popularity of David Chalmers’ (yet another Australian!) Zombie Argument, published in his The Conscious Mind (1996). But irrespective of its origins, the Zombie Argument 1 All of Chapter 4 is devoted to Jackson’s argument, so I don’t bother giving references here in the Preface. has taken off; and it's now perhaps the most popular, and in many ways the most fundamental, argument against materialism today. Not long after soaking myself in zombie literature did I realize that I finally had a solid response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. As it turned out, the response I came up with against the Zombie Argument has an immediate application to the Knowledge Argument. Thanks to discussion with Jay Garfield - who, at the time, happened to be thinking about the same topic — my response to both arguments were quickly sharpened into their present form. This project presents these arguments. The basic thesis is that materialism is threatened by neither the Zombie Argument — which, for reasons that will be clear in the main discussion, takes center stage — nor the long-dreaded Knowledge Argument. This result is both philosophically and, of course, psychologically satisfying — at least to me! In some ways, this discussion is a narrow debate — a debate between so-called zombiephiles and minimal materialists. The framework of the debate will be made clear in both Chapter I and Chapter II. The heart of the project lies in Chapter III, and extends into Chapter IV. Chapter V, finally, is offered in response to general objections to the overall project objections that will be clear as things progress. But despite its potential narrowness, I do that hope the current discussion is of value to those whose views fall outside of its bounds. I hope so, anyway. viii 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT iii PREFACE Chapter 1. MINIMAL MATERIALISM, THE MIND, AND QUALIA i 1.1 Materialism and The Mind j 1.1.1 Broadly Logical Possibility 2 1 . 1.2 Supervenience 7 1.1.3 Materialism As Supervenience 10 1.1.4 Objections and Replies \ § 1.2 The Mind Versus Materialism 24 1 . 2.1 Mind: Intentional and Phenomenal 24 1 .2.2 Materialism and The Intentional Mind 28 1 .2.3 Materialism and The Phenomenal Mind 34 1.3 Review of Chapter 1 2. THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT 2.1 Zombies, Zombie Worlds, and The Zombie Argument 50 2.1.1 Zombies 50 2. 1 .2 Zombie Worlds 53 2. 1 .3 The Zombie Argument Against Materialism 55 2.2 Some Common Objections to the Zombie Argument — and Replies 58 2.2 . The Question-Begging Objection 58 2.2.2 The Conceivability Objection 62 2.2.3 The “If you believe it, then you got it” Objection 69 2.2.4 Two Objections Against “Intentional Duplicates” 73 2.2.4. 1 The Qualitative Belief Objection 74 2. 2. 4. 2 The “Qualia Are Necessary For Some Beliefs” Objection 79 IX 1 1 2.3 Review of Chapter 2 THE MAIN DEFENSE AGAINST THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT 92 3.1 The Epiphenomenalp Objection 93 3 11 The Epiphenomenalp Argument 93 3.1.2 Objections and Replies 99 3. 1.2.1 The Causal Overdetermination Objection (0.1) 99 3. 1.2. 2 Causal closure and question-begging objection (0.2) 102 3. 1.2.3 The Partial Causation Objection (0.3) 104 3. 1.2.4 The Overdetermination Objection - Again (0.4) 106 3.1.3 Review of Subchapter 3.1 3.2 Epiphenomenalp qualia? jq9 3.2.1 The Case From Commonsense 1 10 3.2.2 The Argument from Complete Science 1 13 3.2.3 Why the argument from complete science fails 115 3.3 Review of Chapter 3 120 ZOMBIE WORLDS & THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT 123 4.1 The Story of Mary and The Knowledge Argument 124 4.1.1 The Story of Mary 124 4.1.2 The Knowledge Argument 126 4.2 Common Objections to the Knowledge Argument 128 4.2. 1 The Intensional Fallacy Objection 1 29 4.2.2 The “no metaphysics from epistemology” Objection 1 3 4.2.3 The Question-Begging Objection 134 4.3.14.2.4 The Language Objection 138 4.2.5 The Abilities Objection 141 4.2.6 The Different Descriptions or “Modes” Objection 145 4.2.7 Review of 4.2 150 4.3 Zombie Worlds & the Real Problem with the Knowledge Argument 151 Zombie Worlds & The Knowledge Argument 151 4.3.