View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2006-06 Weinberger-Powell and transformation perceptions of American power from the fall of Saigon to the fall of Baghdad Abonadi, Earl E. K. Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2793 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS WEINBERGER-POWELL AND TRANSFORMATION: PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN POWER FROM THE FALL OF SAIGON TO THE FALL OF BAGHDAD by Earl E. K. Abonadi June 2006 Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim Second Reader: Richard Hoffman Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2006 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Weinberger-Powell and Transformation: Perceptions 5. FUNDING NUMBERS of American Power from the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad 6. AUTHOR(S) Earl E. K. Abonadi 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The Limited War argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The Never Again argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz’s case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, Transformation, force, Limited War, 15. NUMBER OF 1991 Gulf War, Panama, Afghanistan, Lebanon, doctrine, network-centric, precision-guided PAGES munitions, AirLand Battle, Active Defense 113 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution unlimited WEINBERGER-POWELL AND TRANSFORMATION: PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN POWER FROM THE FALL OF SAIGON TO THE FALL OF BAGHDAD Earl E. K. Abonadi Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 1992 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2006 Author: Earl Abonadi Major, U.S. Army Approved by: Donald Abenheim Thesis Advisor Richard Hoffman Second Reader Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The Limited War argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The Never Again argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz’s case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger- Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger- Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 A. THE PROBLEM OF FORCE AND TRANSFORMATION .................... 1 B. THE HISTORICAL STRUGGLE WITH THE USE OF FORCE ............ 2 C. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT............................................................. 5 D. DEFINING THE PROBLEM ................................................................. 8 E. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE EXAMINATION.............................. 10 II. VIETNAM AND THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN DECLINE (1969–1981) ... 13 A. COMING TO GRIPS WITH LIMITED WAR........................................ 13 B. DIMINISHING AMERICAN POWER?................................................ 14 C. THE SEEDS OF AMERICAN RESURGENCE................................... 19 III. NEW VISION: REAGAN AND THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE (1981– 1888)............................................................................................................. 23 A. REAGAN’S NEW AGENDA............................................................... 23 B. SHULTZ’S ARGUMENT .................................................................... 25 C. WEINBERGER’S COUNTER AND A NEW DOCTRINE ................... 27 D. IMPACT OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE .................................. 31 IV. THE POWELL DOCTRINE, JUST CAUSE, AND THE 1991 GULF WAR (1989-1992)................................................................................................... 33 A. THE EDUCATION AND RISE OF COLIN POWELL.......................... 33 B. A MILITARY RESURGENT ............................................................... 36 C. THE FIRST TEST: OPERATION JUST CAUSE................................ 40 D. THE 1991 GULF WAR AND THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE......................................................................................... 43 E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VICTORY................................................... 48 V. CLINTON, THE NEW GLOBAL AGE, AND THE DECLINE OF WEINBERGER-POWELL (1993–2000)........................................................ 51 A. NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT ....................................................... 51 B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE USE OF FORCE....... 56 C. THE SEEDS OF TRANSFORMATION .............................................. 63 VI. A NEW BUSH VISION, REVOLUTIONS, AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF WEINBERGER-POWELL (2001–).......................................................... 69 A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NEW VIEWS ON FORCE....... 69 B. PROSPECT OF AN RMA IN ACTION ............................................... 71 C. AFGHANISTAN’S LEGACY: THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD ................ 74 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 81 A. THE ROAD FROM SAIGON TO BAGHDAD..................................... 81 B. THE FUTURE OF THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE......... 83 LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 89 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 101 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security Affairs department.