JUDGING IN THE PUBLIC REALM A Kantian Approach to the Deliberative Concept of Ethico-Political Judgment and an Inquiry into Public Discourse on Prenatal Diagnosis Cornelis Dekker Linköping Studies in Arts and Science, No. 466 Department of Technology and Social Change, Linköping University Linköping 2009 Linköping Studies in Arts and Science • No 466 At the Faculty of Arts and Science at Linköpings universitet, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from the Department of Technology and Social Change at the Tema Institute. Distributed by : Department of Technology and Social Change Linköping University SE- 581 83 Linköping, Sweden http://www.tema.liu.se/tema-t/ Edition 1:1 ISBN: 978-91-7393-739-9 ISSN: 0282-9800 © Cornelis Dekker Print: Liu Tryck. Linköping 2009. Cover design: Tomas Hägg CONTENTS 1. PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND ETHICO-POLITICAL JUDGMENT 9 1.1 An inquiry into public deliberation 10 1.2 The deliberative concept of ethico-political judgment 17 1.3 Outline 30 Φ PART 1 THE IDEAL OF ETHICO-POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW TO DELIBERATE 2. JUSTIFYING JUDGINGS 33 2.1 Kantian normative reasons 34 2.2 Intersubjectivity from Kant to Habermas 49 2.3 The unforced force of normative reasons 62 3. THE CAPACITY TO JUDGE 69 3.1 Arendt on the power of judgment 69 3.2 ‘Enlarged thought’ and the law 87 3.3 Impartiality of judgment and the other 98 4. DELIBERATING IN A PLURALIST WORLD 103 4.1 Too different to deliberate? 104 4.2 The deliberative justification of judgments 114 4.3 From sensus communis to consensus? 119 Φ Φ PART 2 JUDGING IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE: HOW WE DO DELIBERATE 5. THE INQUIRY OF JUDGING IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 125 5.1 Public discourses considered 125 5.2 Inquiring into judging 128 5.3 On the inquiry into public discourse 137 6. JUDGING IN DUTCH PUBLIC DISCOURSE 143 6.1 ‘The unborn life’: the protection and quality of life 143 6.2 ‘Attitudes towards the disabled’: the valuation of the disabled 149 6.3 ‘Implications of new choices’: medicalization and autonomy 155 6.4 ‘The limits of medicine’: distinguishing ‘severe’ and ‘less severe’ afflictions? 163 7. JUDGING IN SWEDISH PUBLIC DISCOURSE 171 7.1 ‘The unborn life’: human dignity and suffering 171 7.2 ‘Attitudes towards the disabled’: grading human dignity? 177 7.3 ‘Implications of new choices’: can autonomy be realized? 183 7.4 ‘The limits of medicine’: Heading toward liberal eugenics? 191 8. JUDGING CONSIDERED 199 8.1 ‘The unborn life’: irreconcilable disagreement? 200 8.2 ‘Attitudes towards the disabled’: a role for experience? 204 8.3 ‘Implications of new choices’: agreement about autonomy? 207 8.4 ‘The limits of medicine’: justifying limits? 210 8.5 Judging and deliberation 212 Φ Φ Φ PART 3 JUDGING IN THE PUBLIC REALM: ENHANCING DELIBERATION 9. ENHANCING PUBLIC DELIBERATION 215 9.1 Shaping deliberative practices 216 9.2 The contribution of ethics to public deliberation 222 9.3 Judging and deliberating: the ideal of ethico-political judgment 228 LITERATURE 235 SOURCES 250 ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS OF KANT A Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2006). AQE ‘Beantwortung der Frage. Was ist Aufklärung?’ (1784). ‘An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment’’, in Political Writings, trans. by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007). CJ/KrU Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790. In Werke, Band 8. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975). Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1952). CPR Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007). CPrR Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788). Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Thomas K. Abbott. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books (1996). EP ‘Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral’ (1763). ‘Enquiry concerning the clarity of the principles of natural theology and ethics’, in Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, trans. by G.B. Kerferd and D.E. Walford. Manchester (1962). FI Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). First Introduction to the Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Haden. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1965) Gr Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Thomas K. Abott. Toronto: Broadview (2005). LE Vorlesungen über Ethik. Lectures on Ethics, trans. by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001). LL Vorlesungen über Logik. Lectures on Logic, trans. by Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004). MM Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2006). OBS Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764). Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. by John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of California Press (1960). OT ‘Was heiβt: Sich im Denken orientieren?’ (1786). ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, in Political Writings, trans. by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007). PP ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’ (1795). ‘Perpetual Peace’, in Political Writings, trans. by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007). Prol Prolegomena zur einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to present itself as a science, trans. by Peter G. Lucas. Manchester: Manchester University Press (1953). TP ’Über den Gemeinspruch: ‘Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’’ (1793). ‘On the common saying: ‘This may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice’’ (‘Theory and Practice’), in Political Writings, trans. by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007). There is something to be said, my lord, for his point of view, And for yours as well, there is much to be said on both sides. Sophocles, Antigone Judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which the sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass Hannah Arendt Everything valuable is vulnerable Lucebert ACKNOWLEDGMENT Gratitude is a duty that is relevant when writing an acknowledgment. Gratitude consists of honouring a person because of the benefit he or she has rendered. I should start with Anders Nordgren. His constructive comments, suggestions, and ideas have been invaluable. I am very grateful to him. Göran Collste has provided very valuable comments which I have appreciated. I am, furthermore, indebted to the following people for their valuable comments: Martin Andersson, Mats G. Hansson, Lennart Nordenfelt, Anders Persson, Bo Pettersson, Johanna Romare, Tsjalling Swierstra, Jan Willner, Sven Widmalm, and Kristin Zeiler. I am very grateful to Peter-Paul Verbeek, who has commented on several versions of the thesis. Technological mediation made it possible to stay in touch. Hans Achterhuis and I have discussed texts over several dinners, of which I have pleasant memories. Henk Procee and I reflected upon reflective judgment, which I also have appreciated. I am grateful to Erik Malmqvist with whom I have discussed texts, also in the pub. I am indebted to the participants in the Technology, Practice, Identity Seminar at Tema Technology and Social Change and the Ethics Seminar at the Centre for Applied Ethics. I am also grateful to Boel Berner. Furthermore, I am indebted to Eva Danielsson, Agnese Grisle, and Christina Lärkner. I have discussed life as a doctoral student, as well as many other questions with Ulrika Engdahl and Anders Johansson and have pleasant memories of the numerous lunches, pub visits, dinners, and coffee breaks. The thesis is dedicated to Simon and Elsa. 7 8 CHAPTER 1 Public deliberation and ethico-political judgment The point of this inquiry is that we should enhance discussions about moral and political questions. We should, in other words, deliberate. I shall speak of deliberation in two senses: as a public discussion in the various arenas of the public sphere, in the sense of giving and asking for reasons, and as the weighing up of matters in the mind by thinking on the basis of the standpoints of others. As a matter of fact, we do deliberate. We wish to voice our concerns and to exert influence. Still, we may aim to enhance the way we deliberate. In this inquiry, a deliberative concept of ethico-political judgment will, to this end, be elaborated on. An argument for public deliberation is that it may ensure the legitimacy of democratic decisions. From this perspective, deliberation is closely connected with our understanding of democracy. Understandings of democracy can differ. Representative democracy can take different shapes. Many argue that we should enhance our representative democracy by conversing more at different levels. John Dewey captured the essence of what is now called ‘deliberative democracy’, a democracy whereby citizens are increasingly involved in discussions concerning a public course of action. If we are dissatisfied with democratic institutions, the remedy is not simply to extend or refine aggregating individual interests or preferences but to have more and better democratic deliberation: The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.1 What if we are not dissatisfied with our institutions? Perhaps we do not have a problem with legitimacy? Given the plurality of viewpoints in society, for instance with regard to prenatal diagnosis, my hypothesis is that we need and can also enhance the legitimacy of decisions. There are proponents and opponents, and even those who lie in between; and choices have to made.