Learning from Joe Slovo NCHR workshop on advancing Socio Economic Rights: Session 7 – Group 1 In this activity participants will engage in a critical review of the case, examine the interests and perspectives of the different actors and assess the concepts of 'participation' and 'community' in the setting of a large and dynamic informal settlement. They will analyse the interventions made to secure the rights of the residents past and present and extract key lessons for future engagement. • To bring together human rights practitioners and social activists to critically review the interventions to enable Joe AIMS Slovo residents to access well located and affordable housing and prevent their displacement to Delft. • To examine what might have been done differently to more effectively secure their tenure and rights to housing. • To reflect on the nature of the “community” in Joe Slovo and the meaning of “participation” in this setting. • To identify the key lessons arising from the Joe Slovo case • To understand how the actions of the different spheres of government impacted on the outcomes at Joe Slovo. 1. The facilitator provides a brief introduction to the two scenarios under review (Learning from Joe Slovo and The ACTIVITY rights of others – foreign nationals and xenophobic violence OUTLINE in South Africa). 2. Participants break into self selected working groups to analyse the scenario of their choice. 3. Once in the group participants select a facilitator and rapporteur who will make notes from the discussion. 4. Participants familiarise themselves with the scenario, discuss the key questions and identify lessons for improved practice. 5. Participants report back on their deliberations to the plenary. 1 | Page 1. If we could turn the clock back how might organisations advocating for socio economic rights have worked with KEY QUESTIONS residents to secure a more equitable and sustainable outcome in Joe Slovo and prevent eviction? 2. How do we conceptualise “community” and “participation” in a setting like Joe Slovo? What implications does this have for involving residents in planning and development decision making? 3. How would an emphasis on tenure security to formalise the occupancy rights of the people in the informal settlement earlier in the process have made a difference to the outcome at Joe Slovo? 4. Housing allocation processes, affordability, fire and environmental risk are crucial areas highlighted by the Joe Slovo experience. What can we learn from how these issues were handled? 5. How do activists and lawyers strike a balance between the rights of residents in a particular area and the wider ‘public interest’? How do we assess ‘the public interest’ in terms of informal settlement upgrading and housing development in a context like Joe Slovo? 6. What are the key lessons of the Joe Slovo experience? Joe Slovo case background Joe Slovo timeline RESOURCES 2 | Page Joe Slovo: Case background Introduction This scenario1 reviews the history of Joe Slovo informal settlement since its inception in the late 1980’s . It examines the failure to enable poor households to secure rights to housing and secure tenure on well located land in the City of Cape Town. The settlement was established by former occupants of the Langa hostels and people living in backyard shacks. The original Joe Slovo informal settlement was well located with respect to transport nodes , educational facilities and economic opportunities. This made it one of the fastest growing informal settlements in the city. The settlement is relatively close to the Cape Town Central Business District (CBD) 1 The scenario has been prepared by Rick de Satgé with input and comment by Steve Kahanovitz, Lwazi Kubukeli and Kate Tissington. 3 | Page and has rail access to the city. Commuters can catch trains to town which eases the cost of commuting and provides reliable access to the workplace and trading opportunities in nearby Langa, Pinelands, Epping etc. Rapid settlement expansion Within Joe Slovo a dwelling count conducted in May 1996 found that there were 1 195 informal homes. These had increased to 2,153 by May 19982 and by 2000 the number had grown to 4,3003 dwellings – an increase of 100% in two years. By 2003, there were 5,431 dwellings in Joe Slovo.4 Rising levels of risk This rapid densification, combined with a variety of other factors, contributed to driving up disaster risk on a number of fronts. During this period residents experienced a series of devastating fires which killed several people, destroyed thousands of dwellings and caused millions of rands worth of damage. In the winter months sections of the settlement experienced serious flooding due to inadequate, or non‐existent storm water drainage. This period of rapid settlement expansion was also characterised by increased social tension and competition for resources between the residents and their neighbours. A 2004 evaluation of the Ukuvuka campaign to mitigate the risk of informal settlement fire, alluded to political rivalry between leaders of various zones and noted a history of tension between residents in formal housing in Langa and people in the settlement. It reported anecdotal evidence that fire engines had been stoned or otherwise interfered with on at least one occasion which informants attributed to persons in Langa who wished to see the settlement burn. Between 1995 and 1999 a survey of fire incidence across ten informal settlements5 in the Cape Peninsula revealed a total of 1 612 reported informal dwelling fires which destroyed a total of 10,206 informally constructed homes. Over this period, annual fire events increased by 96%, rising from 213 in 1995 to 418 in 1999. Of all dwellings destroyed, 3,227 (32%) were recorded in Langa/Joe Slovo. Significant environmental and public health hazards developed in this rapidly densifying settlement, despite the provision of increasing levels of service from 2000 onwards (in 2003 there were 21 communal standpipes and 1200 toilets at Joe Slovo).6 Comprehensive housing programme and the N2 Gateway project These problems, coupled with the strategic and highly public nature of the site next to the N2 highway and en route to/from Cape Town International Airport contributed to the decision to launch the N2 Gateway housing project on the site. In his State of the Nation address in May 2004, President Mbeki referred to a new comprehensive programme dealing with human settlement and social infrastructure, which would provide rental‐housing stock for the poor and enable insitu upgrades ‐ already captured in law in chapters 2 Abbott, J. (1999) in DiMP (2002) 3 The Development Support Department of the City of Cape Town conducted the 2000 count 4 City of Cape Town IDP (2004/2005) 5 Bonteheuwel, Brown’s Farm, Elsies River, Gugulethu, Imizamo Yethu, Langa, Manenberg, Nyanga, Redhill and Wallacedene. 6 City of Cape Town IDP (2004/2005) 4 | Page 12 and 13 of the national housing code. This was unveiled as Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements, and the N2 Gateway development was one of the pilot projects. The media launch of the project took place on 14th February 2005. According to the launch materials: The N2 Gateway Project is a crucial pillar of the realigned housing strategy within which arresting the growth of informal settlements and upgrading is central to the realisation of the aims, goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Housing Plan (CHP) (Emphasis added)7 The stated purpose of the project was to “comprehensively address the housing and development needs of communities in such a way that individual and household livelihoods are enhanced; people are housed in habitable, affordable and sustainable housing; the city is improved through urban renewal, regeneration, and socio‐economic development”. An official briefing document described the situation on the ground in Joe Slovo as follows “The households in the area suffer acute shelter and income poverty; their incomes are very depressed; education levels are extremely low; unemployment is three times higher than in the rest of the Western Cape; and, access to adequate water, sanitation and energy is poor but is slowly improving. These factors combine to create a socially toxic environment characterised by high levels of contact and social fabric crime.” Fragmentation and stratification As could also be expected the rapid growth of the settlement described above contributed to increasing social and political fragmentation and deepening stratification between established residents and new entrants. New entrants to the settlement reported being required to make payments to individuals and/or the committee in exchange for a site. As the settlement expanded a local rental market developed as established occupants rented out rooms or complete dwellings to incomers. Rental opportunities grew sharply after the government installed services in the settlement in 2000. Top down planning From its inception the N2 Gateway project was faced with criticism concerning the inadequate involvement of the Joe Slovo residents in the planning of the development. There were concerns about the lack of informed dialogue on the implications of the project design ( with its many changes ) for poor and marginal households. Government tended to engage in ‘consultation by committee’ rather than engaging more directly with residents in different zones. This calls into question the representivity, interests and effectiveness of the established committee structures and their ability to represent and communicate with 20,000 people. Over 7 N@ gateway media launch pack 5 | Page time two recognised committees 8developed within the settlement. However these were shadowed by a variety of informal networks and social structures whose voices were not heard. Political contestation As the timeline in Appendix 1 below highlights in more detail, theN2 Gateway project became something of a political football as the National Department of Housing, the Provincial Department of Housing and Local Government and the City of Cape Town argued about their respective roles and responsibilities, together with the feasibility and cost of the project.