Notes 163 Notes Chapter 1. Introduction 1A brief look at the titles of studies on sovereignty in the 1990s shows this interest. For instance, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Brookfield: Elgar, 1992); Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, eds, Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communication in the 1990s (Norwood: Ablex, 1992); Marianne Heiberg, ed., Subduing Sov- ereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene (London: Pinter, 1994); David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Thomas Martin, ‘The End of Sovereignty’, Democracy and Nature 3(2) (1996); Thom Kuehls, Beyond Sovereign Territory (Minneapolis: Uni- versity of Minnesota Press, 1996); and Richard Kearney, ‘Beyond Sovereignty’, Index on Censorship, 27(5) (1998). 2 See Resolutions 682, 664 and 674 (1990), and 686 (1991), of the United Nations Security Council. 3 See Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambo- dia Conflict and Annex 1. UNTAC Mandate. 4Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Thomas J. Bierstaker and Cynthia Weber, eds, State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 5 F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1986), p. 26. 6 Ibid., pp. 1–26. 7 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Lon- don: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 8. 8Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1995), pp. 48–52. 9 Ibid., ch. 4. 10 Ibid., pp. 88–136, 215–20. 11 Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, pp. 34–9. 12 Ibid., p. 121. 13 Ibid., p. 127. 14 Cynthia Weber, ‘Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/ Intervention Boundary’, Review of International Studies 10(3) (1992), p. 216. 163 164 Notes 15 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), II-13. 16 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933. 17 See Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good, trans. by J.F. Huntington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 171. 18 See Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, new edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 584. 19 See Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 16–19. 20 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, II: The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 353–4. 21 See Franz Susemihl and R.D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle (London: Macmillan, 1894), p. 381. 22 Charles Howard McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 80–1, 118. 23 See Hinsley, Sovereignty, pp. 27–60. 24 Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (New York: Cooper Square, 1974), pp. 28–30. 25 Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and Publicists (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 41–2. 26 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1966), p. xxiv. 27 Ibid., pp. 36–8. 28 Ibid., p. 57. 29 Ibid., p. 307. 30 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty, ed. Julian Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; originally published 1576), p. 1. 31 Ibid., p. 13. 32 Ibid., pp. 34, 46. 33 Ibid., p. 35. 34 Ibid., p. 46. 35 Ibid,. p. 50. 36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985; originally published 1651), p. 227. 37 Ibid., p. 81. 38 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 308. 39 Ibid., pp. 166–302. 40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. by G.D.H. Cole (London: Everyman’s Library, 1968; originally published in French 1762), p. 240. 41 Ibid., p. 21. 42 Ibid., p. 175. 43 Ibid., pp. 20, 21. Notes 165 44 Ibid., pp. 14, 15 45 Vattel, The Law of Nations, I, translated from French (London: J. Newbery et al., 1760; originally published 1758), p. 1. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 10. 48 Ibid., p. 19. 49 This relationship is similar to that of the two concepts of liberty formulated by Isaiah Berlin in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (delivered in 1957), in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Positive liberty is being one’s own master, liberty to. Nega- tive liberty is being without interference, liberty from. Nationalism is one of the most powerful positive liberty doctrines in the modern era. In order to achieve a ‘higher’ and ‘truer’ self, man must incor- porate himself into his nation. Constitutionalism is an attempt to set up rules for the protection of negative liberty. In order to pro- tect individual rights, there must be fundamental rules that any political power cannot override. When man pursues his ‘higher’ and ‘truer’ self, the nation appears to be the highest ‘social whole’. It is a moral claim that the nation be the supreme holder of state sovereignty. When individual liberty is strongly protected, constitutional rules function to restrain any kind of public power. It is then a legal claim that constitutional rules have priority over the principle of sovereignty. Just as the two concepts of liberty coexist, the two types of sovereignty coexist. However, we can still trace tensions between the two belief systems. 50 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’, The British Year Book of International Law 1946 (London, Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1946), pp. 19–20. See also Hedley Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations’, in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, eds, Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 51 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, 4th edn (Waltham: Blaisdell, 1968), p. 26. 52 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 53 See Martin Wight’s description of ‘Western values’ as ‘the constitu- tional tradition’ and the principle of ‘the golden mean’ represented by many Anglo-American thinkers, in Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 89–91. 54 See the phrase ‘international constitutionalism’ employed in Friedrich, Constitutional Government, p. 31. 55 Hugo Grotius, The Illustrious Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annotations (London: T. Warren, 1654), pp. 84–6. 166 Notes Chapter 2. Classical Constitutional Notions of Sovereignty 1 Julian H. Franklin points out that in sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies Europe Bodin’s notion of indivisible sovereignty was influential, but vigorously criticised. Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Con- stitutions: Bodin and His Critics’, in J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1991), p. 298. 2 J.P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 (Lon- don: Longman, 1986), chs. 1, 2, 3. 3 Sir Edward Coke spoke in the debate on the Petition of Right: ‘I know that prerogative is part of the law, but “sovereign power” is no Parliamentary word in my opinion.’ Robert C. Johnson et al., eds, Commons Debates 1628, III (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 495. Hedley Thomas, common lawyer, on the inviolability of private property and sovereignty, praised the ‘so ancient, honourable and happy state, so prudently compact of the sovereignty of the king and the liberty of the subject’. Elizabeth Read Foster, ed., Proceed- ings in Parliament 1610, II: House of Commons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 195, 197. 4 Referring to the predecessors of post-Bodinian public lawyers, Lawson distinguished between ‘personal sovereignty’ and ‘real sovereignty’ or majesty. According to Lawson, while the king possesses personal sovereignty, real sovereignty is in the community. It is ‘the power of constitution’ in the sense that the consent of the community is the foundation of a commonwealth. George Lawson, Pacta Sacra et Civilis, ed. Conal Condren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1660), pp. 45–9. 5The contrast between ‘sovereignty in the Lockean tradition’, which includes Lawson and the American Federalists, and ‘sovereignty in Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau’ is discussed, for instance, in Julie Mostov, Power, Process, and Popular Sovereignty (Philadelphia: Temple Univer- sity Press, 1992), pp. 52–72. 6 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967; originally published 1690), pp. 326–7. 7 Ibid., p. 385. 8 Ibid., p. 445. 9 Ibid., p. 385. 10 Ibid., p. 424. 11 Ibid., p. 435. 12 Julian H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 124. 13 Raghuveer Singh, ‘John Locke and the Idea of Sovereignty’, Indian Notes 167 Journal of Political Science, 20(4) (1959), p. 328. Singh emphasises that Locke ‘belongs to the second tradition of Western political thought’ distinct from the ‘Hobbesian-Austinian’ tradition. 14 See Locke, Two Treatises, p. 391. The maxim ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex’ was widely cited by seventeenth century pamphleteers. The maxim was the title of a book published in 1648, whose subtitle was The Peoples Safety is the Sole Soveraignty. The author wrote: ‘Is not the State at large the absolute King, and the King (so-called) the king- doms Steward? Is not the King and all Magistrates the Kingdoms ministers and servants? Is it not their duty and glory to serve the Kingdom? . though he is above every one, yet not all; and com- mon safety is the sole Sovereign.’ Salus Populi Solus Rex: The Peoples Safety is the Sole Soveraignty, or the Royalist Out-reasoned (1648), p.