Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1996-12 The command and control of Special Operations Forces Brown, Harry S. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39299 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE COMMAND AND CONTROL .OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES by Harry S. Brown December 1996 Thesis Advisor: Rodney Minott Second Reader: Wayne Hughes Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 19970626 051 Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Public reporting burden for this collection of infonnation is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction. searching existing data sources, of this gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of infonnation. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect collection of infonnation, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Infonnation Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0!88) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 1996. Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Harry Scott Brown 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACI' (maximum 200 words) Today integrated operations are a prime requirement of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) of all services. None can unilaterally conduct operations because of strategic lift and logistic limitations. No unit is capable of all types of missions nor should any unit or its leadership believe it is capable of all types of missions. SOF must become more able to integrate jointly with all branches and services to secure its future effectiveness. This thesis looks at historical examples of four integrated operations and illustrates some definitive problems associated with them. It shows how four variables are especially significant to all levels of an operation. These variables may affect the outcome of operations significantly enough to be considered essential. The thesis summarizes the problems associated with each operation and looks at some future implications for joint warfare. 15. NUMBER OF 14. SUBJECI' TERMS Command and Control; Unity of Command; Unity of Effort; Simplicity PAGES and Timing 138 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF TION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE TION OF ABSTRACI' ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Harry S. Brown Captain(P), United States Army B.S., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, May, 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 1996 Author: Approved by: Frank C. Petho, Chairman Department of National Security Affairs lll iv ABSTRACT Today integrated operations are a prime requirement of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) of all services. None can unilaterally conduct operations because of strategic lift and logistic limitations. No unit is capable of all types of missions nor should any unit or its leadership believe it is capable of all types of missions. SOF must become more able to integrate jointly with all branches and services to secure its future effectiveness. This thesis looks at historical examples of four integrated operations and illustrates some definitive problems associated with them. It shows how four variables are especially significant to all levels of an operation. These variables may affect the outcome of operations significantly enough to be considered essential. The thesis summarizes the problems associated with each operation and looks at some future implications for joint warfare. v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 A. THE PROBLEM ..................................................................................................... 1 B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 3 C. THE PHENOMENON OF COMMAND AND CONTROL. .................................. 4 1. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ................................ 6 2. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Missions ........................................................ 7 3. General Purpose Forces (GPF) ............................................................................ 8 D. DEFIN"ffiONS ......................................................................................................... 8 E. SCOPE ..................................................................................................................... 10 F. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................. 11 ll. IRAN RESCUE (EAGLE CLAW) ................................................................................. 13 A. DESERT ONE .......................................................................................................... 13 1. Situation .............................................................................................................. 13 2. The Rescue Mission- Concept of the Operation ................................................. 16 3. The Operation- Plans and Training ..................................................................... 17 4. Conduct of the Operation ..................................................................................... 20 B. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF COMMAND .............................................................. 22 1. Command Structure - The Chain of Command ................................................... 24 C. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF EFFORT ..................................................................... 26 D. ANALYSIS OF SIMPLICITY ................................................................................. 27 E. ANALYSIS OFTIMING......................................................................................... 28 vii F. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 29 III. GRENADA (URGENT FURY) ..................................................................................... 31 A. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 31 1. Situation - Political and Military ......................................................................... 31 2. Mission - Concept of the Operation .................................................................... 32 3. The Operation- Plans and Training by the JCS .................................................. 34 4. Conduct of the Operation .................................................................................... 35 B. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF COMMAND ............................................................. 38 1. Command Structure - The Chain of Command ................................................. .43 C. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF EFFORT .................................................................... 44 D. ANALYSIS OF SIMPLICITY ................................................................................ 46 E. ANALYSIS OF TIMING ........................................................................................ 46 F. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 47 IV. PANAMA (JUST CAUSE) ........................................................................................... 51 A. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 51 1. Situation- Political and Military .......................................................................... 51 2. Mission - Concept of the Operation .................................................................... 54 3. Concept of the Operation .............................................. .' ...................................... 55 4. Operational Guidance from the Operations Order (OPORD) .............................. 57 5. Outcome of the Operation .................................................................................... 59 B. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF COMMAND .............................................................. 61 C. ANALYSIS OF UNITY OF EFFORT ....................................................................