TO DECLARE WAR J. GREGORY SIDAK* INTRODUCTION ................................................ 29 I. DID AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR REQUIRE A PRIOR DECLARATION OF WAR?................ 36 A. Overture to War: Are the PoliticalBranches Willing to Say Ex Ante What a "War" Is? ...................... 37 B. Is It a Political Question for the Judiciary to Issue a DeclaratoryJudgment Saying Ex Ante What Is or Will Constitute a "War"? .................................. 39 C. The Iraq Resolution of January 12, 1991 .............. 43 D. Why Do We No Longer Declare War When We Wage War? ................................................ 48 E. The President's War-Making Duties as Commander in Chief ................................................ 50 F. The Specious Dichotomy Between "General War" and Undeclared "'Limited War"........................... 56 II. THE COASE THEOREM AND THE DECLARATION" OF WAR: POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS A NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ........ 63 A. Coasean Trespasses and Bargains Between the Branches of Government ....................................... 64 B. PoliticalAccountability, Agency Costs, and War ........ 66 C. American Sovereignty and the United Nations .......... 71 III. THE ACCOUNTABLE FORMALISM OF DECLARING WAR: LESSONS FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON JAPAN .... 73 A. Provocation and Culpability: Is America Initiating War or Is Pre-Existing War "Thrust Upon" It? ............. 75 B. The Objectives of War: The President'sLegislative Role as Recommender of War .............................. 79 * A.B. 1977, A.M., J.D. 1981, Stanford University. Member of the California and District of Columbia Bars. In writing this Article, I have benefitted from the comments and protests of Gary B. Born, L. Gordon Crovitz, John Hart Ely, Daniel A. Farber, John Ferejohn, Michael J. Glennon, Stanley Hauerwas, Geoffrey P. Miller, Richard John Neuhaus, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Eugene V. Ros- tow, Ronald D. Rotunda, Melinda Ledden Sidak, Thomas A. Smith, Matthew L. Spitzer, Barry R. Weingast, and Edwin D. Williamson, and from the research advice of Charlotte White. The views expressed here are solely my own. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:27 C. Bicameralism and Presentment: The President's Legislative Role as Signatory to War ................... 81 1. The ConstitutionalError of Conventional Wisdom .. 82 a. The view that presentment is unnecessary ....... 82 b. The view that presentment is necessary .......... 84 2. The Historical Operation of Bicameralism and Presentment in the War-Making Context ........... 85 3. Barriersto Exit: The Peace-KeepingImplications of Congress'sLimited Power to End War ............. 86 D. Voluntarily Enhancing PoliticalAccountability Over the Decision to Initiate War Beyond What Bicameralism and Presentment Require ............................. 89 1. Declining to Convert the Decision to Wage War into a Continuous Variable Through the Appropriations Process ........................................... 89 2. PrecludingAnonymity by Voting on War by Roll Call .............................................. 90 3. Declining to Convert the Decision to Wage War into a Bundled Decision ............................... 91 E. Summary and Implications: Credible Threats and the Public and Private Orderings of War .................. 93 IV. WAGING WAR FROM NEW HAVEN ........................ 98 A. Professor Carter: Waging War Through the AppropriationsPower ................................. 99 1. The Dichotomous Choice of War ................... 100 2. The Decision to Appropriate Money Does Not Render Unlawful Actions Lawful .................. 102 3. The Decision Not to Appropriate Money to Continue Prosecutinga Validly Declared War Is Not Equivalent to Repealing a Declaration of War ...... 103 4. The Struggle Over the Unitary Executive ........... 105 B. The Koh Signatories: In Curious Defense of Ambiguity. 108 C. Professor Ely and the War Powers Resolution .......... 110 D. Is the Judiciary Competent to Specify, Monitor, and Enforce an Injunction Circumscribing the President's Use of Offensive Military Force?....................... 113 E. Judges as Generals ................................... 116 F. The Moral Visibility of Collective Action ............... 118 V. CONCLUSION ............................................. 120 Vol. 41:27] TO DECLARE WAR INTRODUCTION Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. 1 - James Madison (1788) The science of warfare has itself been greatly changed; the interrela- tionships between states have become much more numerous, more complicated, and more important; and the community of nations has developed an organization and has accepted new principles through which it attempts to control the right to make war. These forces have all had their impact upon the declaration of war; and recent happen- ings raise doubt as to whether war will ever again be declared by bel- ligerents. Under these changed circumstances, the declaration of war seems to be regarded by some as an anachronism to be discarded. - Professor Clyde Eagleton (1938)2 Recent events give cause to contemplate these two observations, made 150 years apart, on the function served by that provision in the Constitution that empowers Congress "To declare War."' 3 Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Six days later, President Bush ordered Oper- ation Desert Shield, the deployment of the largest American combat force since the Vietnam War, to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi at- tack.4 On November 8, Mr. Bush ordered a virtual doubling of the ex- isting 230,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf, and stated that such additional strength would provide the United States "an adequate offen- sive military option."'5 On November 29, at the urging of President Bush, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, which demanded that Iraq unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.6 This resolution also authorized member nations to "use all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait 7 and to achieve compliance with the 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 269-70 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 2. Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declarationof War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 19, 19 (1938). 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 4. These events are summarized in Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Forces to Saudi Ara- bia As Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al; see also Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1216 (Aug. 8, 1990). 5. The President's News Conference, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1789, 1790 (Nov. 8, 1990); see also Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1834 (Nov. 16, 1990). 6. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2693d mtg. (1990). 7. Id. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:27 eleven other Security Council resolutions passed in response to Iraq's in- vasion of Kuwait.8 After President Bush's November 8 announcement of his intention to secure an "offensive military option," eleven law professors, led by Professor Harold Hongju Koh of Yale, whom I shall call collectively the "Koh Signatories," filed a memorandum of law amicus curiae in support of a complaint, styled as Dellums v. Bush, which had been filed by fifty- four members of Congress to enjoin preliminarily President Bush from ordering United States armed forces to make war on Iraq "absent mean- ingful consultation with and genuine approval by Congress." 9 In brief, the Koh Signatories argued that Congress alone has the power to declare "war"; that the judiciary is competent to say what "war" is and should issue a declaratory judgment stating that the offensive use of the Ameri- can forces in Operation Desert Shield implied by President Bush's No- vember 8 remarks would constitute a "war"; and that the President consequently should be preliminarily enjoined from taking offensive mili- tary action in the Gulf until Congress had the opportunity to approve a declaration of war or to express its approval for offensive military action in some other manner.10 On December 13, 1990, Judge Harold Greene 8. The eleven prior resolutions were U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg. (1990) (condemning the invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2933d mtg. (1990) (imposing economic sanctions on Iraq); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2934th mtg. (1990) (declaring Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2937th mtg. (1990) (demanding release of foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2938th mtg. (1990) (authorizing the use of force to intercept maritime shipping to or from Iraq or Kuwait); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2939th mtg. (1990) (establishing guidelines for provision of foodstuffs to Iraq in humanitarian circumstances); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2940th mtg. (1990) (demanding that Iraq protect diplomatic and consular personnel); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2942d mtg. (1990) (limiting the casts in which the United Nations would permit exceptions to the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2943d mtg. (1990) (regulating air and water transportation to and from Iraq and Kuwait); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2951st mtg. (1990) (reminding Iraq of its liability for loss of