CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL REFORM AFTER ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE V. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION I. FACTS AND HOLDING ........................................................... 157 A. FACTS ............................................................................. 159 B. HOLDING ....................................................................... 160 II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................... 161 A. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND 2 U.S.C. § 2A(C) ...... 161 B. DEFINING THE FUNCTION OF THE “LEGISLATURE” WITHIN THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND THE 1911 ACT .................................... 162 III. THE COURT’S DECISION .................................................... 167 A. THE MAJORITY OPINION ........................................... 168 1. DEFINING THE FUNCTION OF THE LEGISLATURE WITHIN THE RELEVANT PRECEDENT ...................... 169 2. WHETHER 2 U.S.C. § 2A(C) PERMITS ARIZONA’S ADOPTION OF THE INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ........................................................... 169 3. WHETHER THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE PERMITS ARIZONA’S ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ......... 170 4. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE: A SEEMING ATTEMPT AT CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTIVE POWER TO REGULATE ELECTIONS ............................................ 171 5. THE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE AS A LABORATORY TO ESTABLISH LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES ................ 172 B. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S DISSENT ..................... 174 1. THE LEGISLATURE UNDER THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE IS THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY WHICH MAKES LAWS ........................................................... 174 2. THE MAJORITY’S UNNECESSARY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF 2 U.S.C. § 2A(C) ..................................................................... 176 IV. ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 177 155 156 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 62 A. AIRC’S IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL ELECTORAL REFORM ............................................... 178 1. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF GERRYMANDERING ON AMERICA’S POLITICAL CULTURE: CLEAR CUT OR OPEN FOR DEBATE? ...... 178 2. THE IMPACT OF AIRC ON CONGRESSIONAL GERRYMANDERING .................................................. 180 a. The Case for Independent Redistricting Commissions ...................................................... 180 b. The Future of Independent Redistricting Commissions As a Result of AIRC ................... 183 B. AIRC’S IMPACT ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL REFORM ....................................................................... 184 1. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT ............. 184 2. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AIRC ON THE NPV COMPACT ................................................................. 186 V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 188 In an effort to eliminate the practice of gerrymandering congressional electoral districts, Arizona voters established an independent redistricting commission in 2000 and granted it autonomous congressional redistricting authority.1 This independent commission brought to the forefront deep concerns regarding the constitutionality of using a ballot initiative to adopt legislation aimed at congressional electoral reform. Subsequent litigation brought by the Arizona State Legislature culminated in the recent landmark Supreme Court decision Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC).2 In AIRC, a five-to-four majority found that the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and § 2a(c) of Title II of the United States Code permit the use of the ballot initiative to adopt congressional redistricting legislation.3 This Note proposes that AIRC may transform the American electoral process by enabling other states to adopt and improve upon the independent commission model. Section I of this Note discusses the facts relevant to the Court’s decision in AIRC. 1. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048–49 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 2. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015). 3. Id. at 2677. 2016] Ariz. Legislature v. Ariz. Redistricting Comm’n 157 Next, Section II provides a background of the constitutional provisions, congressional statutes, and case law relevant to understanding the issue of the constitutionality of the Arizona Commission. Section III outlines the rationale the Court used to find the enactment of the commission constitutional, as well as a discussion of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion. Finally, Section IV analyzes the impact of the Court’s interpretation of the “state legislature” under the Elections Clause and § 2a(c) in AIRC. More specifically, this section examines whether the adoption of electoral legislation by ballot initiative will reduce gerrymandering by allowing states to improve the independent commission model. It also discusses the potential impact that AIRC may have on presidential electoral reform through the effective dissolution of the Electoral College by the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. I. FACTS AND HOLDING In 2000, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 106—a ballot initiative4 aimed at “ending the practice of gerrymandering5 and improving voter and candidate participation in elections.”6 Proposition 106 amended the Arizona Constitution7 to divest the state legislature of congressional redistricting authority and reallocated this authority to the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC or the Commission).8 From 4. The Arizona Constitution reserves the power for voters to propose any amendment to the constitution through a voter initiative. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(2). The initiative power is in keeping with the principle that “[t]he legislature and electorate share lawmaking power under Arizona’s system of government.” Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 308 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Ariz. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5. Gerrymandering is named after former Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry. Laughlin Mcdonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 244 (2009) (noting that “in 1812 [Gerry] approved a redistricting plan containing a bizarre, salamander-shaped district designed to enhance the political fortunes of his own political party”). The Supreme Court has noted that partisan gerrymanders are “incompatib[le] . with democratic principles.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004). 6. Joint Appendix at 50, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314), 2014 WL 6847178. 7. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. 8. Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 50, 61. Prior to the adoption of Proposition 106, the Arizona State Legislature established congressional districts by proposing legislation that was debated in committee, approved or disapproved by the body as a whole, and then approved or disapproved by the governor. Id. at 16–17; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048 158 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 62 1912 until 2000, Arizona used a multi-step legislative process to adopt its congressional districts. First, a legislator would introduce proposed redistricting legislation.9 Second, the proposed legislation would be referred to a bipartisan, joint committee on redistricting.10 Third, the joint committee would then recommend the proposal to the legislative body as a whole for approval or modification.11 Finally, upon passage the redistricting measure was sent to the Governor for approval or disapproval.12 Proposition 106 amended the Arizona Constitution to outline the composition of the AIRC, providing that the commission consist of five members; no more than two may be from the same political party, and none may have been a public official, candidate for public office, lobbyist, or officer of a political party.13 The commission on appellate court appointments14 establishes a bipartisan nomination pool of twenty-five candidates (Nomination Pool).15 Then, state legislative leaders appoint four members from the Nomination Pool. These four commissioners then select a fifth member from the nomination pool who may not be registered with any political party already represented on the commission.16 The term of each commissioner lasts until the appointment of the next commission, which occurs the year following every federal census.17 Once the AIRC is appointed, it must convene after each census to establish final district boundaries and certify the new districts to the Arizona Secretary of State.18 Additionally, the (D. Ariz. 2014) (“From the first year of its statehood in 1912 until 2000, the Arizona State Legislature . was granted the authority by the Arizona Constitution to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of gubernatorial veto.”), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 9. See Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 16. 10. Id. 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3). 14. The commission on appellate court appointment is one of four Arizona judicial nominating commissions and is composed of sixteen members: ten public members, five attorney members, and the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court sitting as chair. Judicial Nominating Commissions, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.azcour ts.gov/jnc (last