EN BANC G.R. No. 221697 - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE­ LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents. G.R. No. 221698-700 - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE­ LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS, and AMADO T. VALDEZ, Respondents. Promulgated: March 8, 2016 x---------------------------------------------------------------------~~o=;::.-~ CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I am honored to concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez. I submit this Opinion to further clarify my position. Prefatory The rule of law we swore to uphold is nothing but the rule ofjust law. The rule of law does not require insistence in elaborate, strained, irrational, and irrelevant technical interpretation when there can be a clear and rational interpretation that is more just and humane while equally bound by the limits of legal text. The Constitution, as fundamental law, defines the mm1mum qualifications for a person to present his or her candidacy to run for President. It is this same fundamental law which prescribes that it is the People, in their sovereign capacity as electorate, to determine who among the candidates is best qualified for that position. In the guise of judicial review, this court is not empowered to constrict the electorate's choice by sustaining the Commission on Elections' actions that show that it failed to disregard doctrinal interpretation of its powers under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, created novel jurisprudence in relation to the citizenship of foundlings, misinterpreted and misapplied existing jurisprudence relating to the requirement of residency for election purposes, and declined to appreciate the evidence presented by petitioner as a whole and instead insisted only on three factual grounds j Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700 which do not necessarily lead to its inference. The Commission on Elections' actions are a clear breach of its constitutional competence. It acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of as well as excess of jurisdiction. It is our law that a child, abandoned by her parents and left at the doorsteps of a rural cathedral, can also dream to become President of the Republic of the Philippines. The minimum requirements of the Constitution is that she be a natural-born Filipina at the time of the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy and have domicile in the Philippines for at least ten (10) years prior to the elections. 1 Given the facts of this case, petitioner has complied with these requirements. When she filed her certificate of candidacy, this court has yet to squarely rule on the issue of whether a foundling-a child abandoned by her parents-is a natural-born Filipino citizen. There are earlier rulings-Senate Electoral Tribunal Decision2 and the Bureau of Immigration Order3-that clearly state that petitioner is a natural­ born Filipina. She was elected as Senator of the Republic, garnering more than 20 million votes. 4 The position of Senator requires that the person be a natural-born Filipino. 5 The assertion that petitioner made in her Certificate of Candidacy for President that she is a natural-born citizen is a grounded opinion. It does not constitute a material misrepresentation of fact. In much the same way, a Justice of this court does not commit material misrepresentation when he or Const., art. VII, sec. 2 provides: I ARTICLE VII. Executive Department SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 2706-2736. The Decision was concurred in by Senators Paolo Benigno "Barn" A. Aquino IV, Pilar Juliana "Pia" S. Cayetano, Cynthia A. Villar, Vicente C. Sotto III, and Loren B. Legarda, and dissented from by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro and Arturo D. Brion, and Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay. Id. at 3827, Petitioner's Memorandum. 4 COMELEC Official May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections Results <http://www.comelec.gov. ph/?r= Arch ives/Regu larE lections/2013 NLE/Results/SenatorialE lections201 3> (visited March 7, 2016). Const., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department SECTION 3. SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700 she construes the Constitution in an opinion submitted for this case that a foundling is a natural-born citizen absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the first place, this is an interpretation of law-not a statement of material fact. Doing justice and discharging our duty to uphold the rule of law require that we conclude that foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens absent any evidence that proves the contrary. This is the inescapable conclusion when we read the provisions on citizenship in the context of the entire Constitution, which likewise mandates equality, human dignity, social justice, and care for abandoned children. The Constitution requires that either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen. 6 It does not require an abandoned child or a foundling to identify his or her biological parents. 7 It is enough to show that there is a convincing likelihood that one of the parents is a Filipino. Contrary to the respondents' submissions, it is not blood line that is required. One of the parents can be a naturalized Filipino citizen. 8 The reference is only one ascendant generation. The constitutional provision does not absolutely require being born to an indigenous ethnicity. There is no rational basis to conclude that the loyalty to this country of a foundling, discovered in a rural area and adopted by well-to-do parents, will be more suspect than a child born to naturalized Filipino parents. That a foundling is a natural-born Filipino, unless clear and convincing evidence is shown otherwise, is also the definitive inference from contemporaneous acts of Congress9 and the Executive. 10 This is also the availing conclusion considering our binding commitments in international law. 11 There is clear and convincing evidence from the history of the actual text of the entire Constitution. 6 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1 provides: ,f ARTICLE IV. Citizenship SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (I) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 7 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1. 8 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1. 9 See Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998) and Rep. Act No. 8043 (1995). 10 See Rollo (G.R. No. 221697), pp. 22-26, Petition. Petitioner was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau oflmmigration on July 18, 2006. The President of the Philippines appointed her as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board-a government position that requires natural-born citizenship--on October 6, 2010. 11 On August 21, 1990, we ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. We also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on October 23, 1986. Concurring Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700 In the case at bar, petitioner discharged her burden to prove that she is natural-born when the parties stipulated as to her status as a foundling found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo. 12 When the yardsticks of common sense and statistics are used, 13 it borders on the absurd to start with the presumption that she was born to both a foreign father and a foreign mother. In all likelihood, she was born to at least a Filipino father or to a Filipino mother, or both. Foundlings present the only ambiguous situation in our Constitution. There is no slippery slope. Malevolent actors that wish to avail themselves of this doctrine will have to prove that they are foundlings. They will have to do so with the requisite quantum of proof for immigration purposes. They will have to do so if it is also necessary for them for purposes of being candidates in a relevant election. The Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it went beyond its competence under Section 78 14 of the Omnibus Election Code and the Constitution by not ruling exclusively on whether there was material misrepresentation. The questioned Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc in these cases create a new and erroneous doctrine on this point of law. It is contrary to the text and spirit of the Constitution. Likewise, this court has yet to decide on a case that squarely raises the issue as to whether the period of residency required by the Constitution of a candidate running for public office can only commence after he or she reacquires his or her Filipino citizenship. Neither has this court expressed the ratio decidendi that only when he or she has a resident visa can we commence to count his or her period of residency for election purposes.