Lord, Lewis, and the Institutional Theory of Art Author(s): Peggy Zeglin Brand Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Spring, 1982), pp. 309- 314 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429688 Accessed: 09-08-2017 22:42 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429688?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The American Society for Aesthetics, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 09 Aug 2017 22:42:09 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms PEGGY ZEGLIN BRAND Lord, Lewis, and the Institutional Theory of Art IN "Convention and Dickie's Institutional lack of spontaneity in artworks, i.e., the Theory," Catherine Lord maintains loss the of flexibility espoused by Dickie's defi- following thesis: nition, is established by Lord via two routes: a) arguing that being a work of (L) If a work of art is defined as institutional and conventional, then the definition artpre- is incompatible with institutionality cludes the freedom and creativity associated (Incompatibility Argument), and b) argu- with art.' ing that the creation, presentation, and ap- Lord also maintains that the antecedent of preciation of a work of art is not governed this conditional is false. In this note, I will by conventions (Nonconventionality Argu- ment.) (In order to remain consistent with argue that (i) certain confusions and as- Lord's emphasis, analysis (a) will mainly sumptions prevent Lord from showing the discuss the freedom, originality and con- antecedent is false, and (ii) even if the ventions involved in the creation of a work antecedent is assumed to be true, there are of art; other conventions of presentation counterexamples to the entire conditional. and appreciation will play a more impor- With regard to (ii), I will suggest that con- tant role later in argument (b).) ventionality is necessary for creativity. The following reformulates Lord's In- I. compatibility Argument (a): (1) If a work of art is defined as institutional, Let us consider Lord's discussion of the then the practice of making works of art is antecedent in which the two concepts "in- essentially conservative. stitution" and "convention" are brought (2) If the institution is conservative, then the institutional definition precludes creativity. together to jointly justify the Institutional .'. (3) If a work of art is defined as institutional, definition's "loss of flexibility." 2 Lord para- then the institutional definition precludes phrases George Dickie's aims in Art and creativity. the Aesthetic as providing an institutional (4) The making of a work of art involves free- definition of "work of art" that allows for dom, creativity, originality and spontaneity. flexibility or creativity, and the specifica- .'. (5) A work of art is not to be defined as insti- tutional. tion of conventions governing the creation, presentation, and appreciation of the aes- Dickie defines "institution" as an estab- thetic features of art objects. With regard lished, continuing, traditional practice, per- to these aims, Lord adds, "Convention so haps complete with a unique history, e.g., crucial to the second aim may undermine the institution of theater.4 The particular the first, the attainment of flexibility which Dickie claims for his definition."3 This institution of art encompasses a bundle of systems, comprised of persons with learned PEGGY ZEGLIN BRAND is an artist and instructor in roles and patterns of behavior. Although the Humanities Department at the University the ofdefinition he proposes is comprised of Arizona. necessary and sufficient conditions, he holds This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 09 Aug 2017 22:42:09 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 310 BRAND that his definition does not Let uspreclude now consider Lord'sthe discussion of actual creative activity of artists.the Nonconventionality Rather, it Argument (b) which allows for the constant expansion states that works of ofthe art are not governed boundaries of art by its very by conventions. looseness: In itskeeping with Lord's ac- informal character does notcount, Ipreclude will also make referenceex- to David perimentation in which subsystems Lewis's definition becomeof "convention," but will new art forms, and subsequently, cite a more recent,almost and perhaps, clearer anything is allowed to become version art. of the definition. Lord utilizes Lord's contention that an institution is Lewis's definition in order to contrast an essentially conservative, self-perpetuating, "independent" account of convention with and at times punitive, leads her to conclude that provided by Dickie. The definition of- that the practice of creating works of feredart, by Lewis is as follows: as an institution, is similarly constituted. (C) A regularity R, in action or in action and be- An objection must be made, however, to lief, is a convention in a population P if and the unsubstantiated assumptions underlying only if, within P, the following six conditions premises (1) and (2); Lord provides no evi- hold. (Or at least they almost hold. A few dence for an institution's essential conserv- exceptions to the 'everyone's' can be tol- erated.) atism, premise (1), nor an explanation of (i) Everyone conforms to R. such conservatism precluding creativity (ii) Everyone believes that the others con- within the institution of art-making, prem- form to R. ise (2). Weitz characterizes the Institutional (iii) This belief that the others conform to Theory as "establishmentarian," but Lord's R gives everyone a good and decisive mention of this fact does not constitute evi- reason to conform to R himself. dence for (2). (iv) There is a general preference for gen- Even granting, for a moment, that the eral conformity to R rather than slightly- less-than-general conformity-in particu- art-making institution runs the risk of be- lar, rather than conformity by all but coming "ultraconservative,"5 it does not any one. follow that normal artistic activity would (v) R is not the only possible regularity necessarily suffer any ill effects. For sup- meeting the last two conditions . There is at least one alternative R' . pose the established practice or continuing (that) could have perpetuated itself as tradition of creating artworks is novelty it- a convention instead of R. self: every work of art is enmeshed in an (vi) ... the various facts listed in conditions art historical context and builds upon the (i) to (v) are matters of common (or past, in a manner of speaking, but most mutual) knowledge.6 importantly, every work of art is also origi- Using (C), Lord's Nonconventionality Ar- nal in some way. (This might explain why gument (b) can be reformulated as: almost no one wants to accept fakes, for- (6) Let R* =the conventions governing the geries, and copies as works of art.) If so, creation, presentation and appreciation of then the charge of ultraconservatism would artworks and let P* = the members of the simply reflect an increase in the practice art institution or the artworld. Then conditions of (i) through (vi) of (C) of making and viewing works that flaunt hold. this novelty. Such a state of affairs would (7) But for R* and P*, (iv), (v), and (vi) of (C) certainly not yield a loss of creativity. Thus, do not hold. with the possibility that both (1) and (2) . (8) R* is not a convention, i.e., works of art of the Incompatibility Argument are false, are not conventional. i.e., Lord has not shown that the institu- tion of art-making is conservative nor that One initial problem with this argument the institution's conservatism precludes is cre- that Lord fails to be clear about conven- ativity, premise (3) is also suspect; tionsviz., R* in (6). It is not clear whether the Lord has not shown that Dickie's institu- argument depends upon R* as represent- tional definition of a work of art does in ing Dickie's notion of the one primary con- fact preclude creativity. Thus the Incom- vention in art, or secondary conventions, patibility Argument (a) fails. or both. My assumption is that R* repre- This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 09 Aug 2017 22:42:09 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Institutional Theory of Art 311 sents any and all conventions in the art- world. Lord's criticism of Dickie's notion world, since (8) is intended to show that of a primary convention would merit con- works of art are not conventional at all. siderable consideration if indeed her main But in order to show (8), Lord must showcontention in (8) of the Nonconventional- that neither the primary convention itynor Argument was that this so-called con- any secondary conventions are really ventioncon- is simply a regularity, due to (7). ventions. Premise (7) states that conditions (iv) Despite Dickie's use of several descrip- through (vi) of Lewis' (C) are violated, i.e., tions, the primary conventions in art the can conditions stipulating general prefer- best be characterized as the essential under- ence for conformity (iv), an alternative R' standing (or knowledge) between artist(s) (v), and mutual knowledge (vi).