CHAPTER 8 Operations Security For Patriot units to successfully accomplish their mission on the air-land battlefield, information about friendly unit activities, plans, and operations must be denied to enemy forces until it is too late for these forces to effectively react. Operations security (OPSEC) and ADA survivability are synonymous for all practical purposes. Generally, OPSEC includes the coordinated application of a wide range of techniques and procedures to deny information to an enemy. It is primarily common sense systematically applied to a unit's situation and mission. Coun- tersuppression actions are taken to protect friendly operations from attack. OPSEC and countersuppression actions and procedures fall into four catego- ries, the first three of which are OPSEC areas: * Countersurveillance - action to protect the true status of friendly operations. * Countermeasures -actions to remove or reduce the enemy intelligence and electronic warfare threat. * Deception - actions to create a false picture of friendly activities and operations. * Countersuppression - actions taken to directly defend or enhance the defensive capability of the unit. CONTENTS page page Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Section III - DECEPTION AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE ..... 8-2 DECEPTION OPERATIONS ............... 8-10 8-10 STANDINGOPERATING PROCEDURES ... 8-6 DUMMY POSITIONS...................... DECOYS ... ... ....................... 8-11 Section II - COUNTERMEASURES Section IV - COUNTERSUPPRESSION MOVEMENT..8-9STINGER AND SMALL ARMS FIRES...... 8-11 RADAR EMISSION CONTROL ............. 8-9 NBC DEFENSE TECHNIQUES.............8-12 8-1 FM 44-15 Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Measures and actions in this subcate- the KG-27 used with the AN/GRC-103 UHF gory are those takei to prevent location of the radio, and the VINSON family of speech unit by visual, electronic, or photographic secure devices. means. Countersurveillance encompasses the following four areas: This equipment sends an unintelligible signal to receivers not having the same equip- 1. Signal security (SIGSEC). ment. If the enemy has a limited SIGINT capacity, monitoring these secure nets will 2. Electronic counter-countermeasures. probably be of lower priority than nets oper- 3. Information security. ating in the clear. 4. Physical security. These secured radio nets allow easy, rapid communications and are not as vulner- Countersurveillance measures comprise able to certain forms of electronic counter- the bulk of the actions available to the unit measures. To maintain secure nets, it is commander when incorporating OPSEC into essential that proper encryption codes and his operations. authenticators are used. Codes are changed SIGNAL SECURITY regularly as prescribed. Signal security encompasses actions units can use to minimize enemy interception and Transmission Security. When using direc- analysis of radar and radio signals. Catego- tional antennas (dipole, flyswatter, dish), ries of SIGSEC are electronic security units should position antennas to keep trans- (ELSEC), communications security, and mission lobes from facing directly toward the TEMPEST. enemy. This will decrease vulnerability to ESM and ECM. Whenever possible, emplace Electronic Security equipment where terrain will mask transmit- ELSEC is the protection of transmis- ters from the enemy. sions from noncommunication devices. It includes measures such as approved operat- Emission Security. Brevity is also one of ing procedures, proper siting techniques, the keys to COMSEC. Unless a need exists to maintenance procedures, and training pro- transmit, radios should remain silent. Neces- grams. Radar emission control is the princi- sary AM and FM transmissions should be pal ELSEC measure and is addressed in sec- kept short, 20-30 seconds to include short tion II. concise RATT messages. As much reporting as is tactically feasible should be transmitted (Ccmriunications Security via written reports and courier. The remainder COM()SEDrinc udes meas ires taken to should be channelled into the UHF system deny the nem info:mation from friendly because that system normally operates 24 comm oic.ltions.tu This includeb crypto secur- hours a day. ity, trar smissicn security, emission security, physical security of COMSEC information, Physical Security of COMSEC Informa- and mE asulres to ir_ sure the authenticity of tion. COMSEC materials must be very closely commuylicati< n .. controlled. Limited dissemination is very important. Generally, radio operators should Crypto Security. Crypto security centers on not have more than two or three changes of the use ar d cor trol of speech secure equip- secure codes. If operations lend themselves to ment and codes. This equipment currently closer control, the new codes should be issued consists of buik encryption devices, such as on an "as. needed" basis. 8-2 FM 44-15 Additionally, physical security of radio or away from enemy forces. This will reduce encryption equipment is of great importance. their vulnerability to jamming and detection. If a properly coded KY-57, for example, fell into enemy hands, the enemy would have Power Levels access to the most sensitive unit communica- Sometimes it is possible to burn through tions. Therefore, speech secure devices should ECM by stepping up the power of the trans- be guarded much the same as classified mitter. To preserve this option, always oper- paper; properly stored, accounted for, and ate on the lowest power level that will suffice. used. This will also reduce the range at which the Authenticity of Communications. In cases threat can detect Patriot transmissions. when secure nets are not available, tactical Antennas operations (TACOPS) codes must be used. To Radar antennas prove are directional by design, authenticity of clear text messages, as are certain radio antennas. Directional authentication tables are required. It is radio antennas should be used whenever imperative that all radio transmissions be possible. They will also channelize the signal secured or authenticated. and have the effect of boosting the radiated power in the desired direction. TEMPEST Hazards This addresses those SIGSEC considera- INFORMATION SECURITY tions that are less obvious. For example, radios and telephones may "leak" transmis- Compromise of information security is the primary means sions, known as TEMPEST hazards. If radio- whereby enemy forces receive the bulk of frequency shielding of radio and command their intelligence. Some sources are lost documents, classified waste shelters (ECS, CRG, and ICC) is damaged, improperly disposed, passing sensitive infor- the unit may be transmitting in directions mation in the clear, discussing classified that are unplanned. Another common matters in unsecured areas, TEMPEST hazard is collocating secured and generally wirelines with nonsecured ones. These lines failing to follow proper plans and procedures. must have, as a minimum, a 6-foot separation. Control ELECTRONIC COUNTER- The most important area is document COUNTERMEASURES control. Not only do documents contain a Electronic counter-countermeasures are wealth of information, but, in addition, their taken to protect friendly electronic emitters compromise almost always affects more than from enemy detection, location, and identifi- one organization. cation. ECCM, in this OPSEC context, Considerations Two things to consider in includes use of proper power settings, antenna document control are administrative control siting, masking and remoting radio anten- and physical security. Administrative con- nas, equipment checks for radiation leakage, trol is the use of access rosters and classifica- and proper training. tion markings. Physical security is the pro- tection of documents during storage, use, and Siting transportation. Units should attempt to emplace the radar set and radio antennas so that side and Dissemination. Custodians should verify backlobes are absorbed or blocked. If this is clearances and the need-to-know of everyone not possible, try to orient these lobes parallel requesting access to classified information. 8-3 FM 44-15 Only the minimum information necessary to certain addition procedures should be imple- the mission should be extracted or distrib- mented as the conditions are not always the uted to verified using personnel. same. Denial. Units must always be prepared to Storage. In many cases, regular four-drawer deny their classified material to enemy safes are too heavy to transport or are unavail- forces. Measures range from simple evacua- able. Usually, field safes or field filing cabi- tion to the destruction of materials. Since nets are used. These containers are generally rapid destruction may become necessary, too small for the number of documents in a documents should be maintained in central Patriot unit. Additionally, a field filing cabinet storage facilities. If documents and equip- is not secure. Therefore, documents should be ment must be destroyed use document de- kept in a continually manned location (CP, stroyers and thermite grenades. Document staff operations vans). destroyers are placed in file drawers while Classified waste. These papers (carbons, thermite may be placed on the outside of the typewriter ribbon, extra or superceded mate- container. It is better to overuse flame devices rial) must be securely stored until destroyed. than to leave classified materials for the It is recommended that this material be enemy. burned daily. Field Security Procedures Site Police. A thorough clean up of