EXTREME MAKEOVER? (I): ISRAEL’S POLITICS OF LAND AND FAITH IN EAST JERUSALEM Middle East Report N°134 – 20 December 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 A. JERUSALEM TODAY ..................................................................................................................... 1 B. ISRAELI OBJECTIVES: TERRITORY AND DEMOGRAPHY ................................................................. 4 C. JERUSALEM TOMORROW .............................................................................................................. 5 II. JERUSALEM’S THREE BELTS .................................................................................... 7 A. THE OUTER BELT: CONSOLIDATING GREATER JERUSALEM........................................................ 10 B. THE MIDDLE BELT: JERUSALEM’S RESIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS ................................................ 13 C. THE INNER BELT: ISRAEL’S HOLY BASIN ................................................................................... 15 III. TEMPLE MOUNT ACTIVISM .................................................................................... 21 IV. TERRITORIAL CHANGES AND THE CONCEPT OF VIABILITY .................... 25 V. CONCLUSION: CAN THE EGG BE UNSCRAMBLED? ........................................ 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ........................................................................... 31 The following additional maps are included in the main text: Jerusalem and Its Environs ........................................................................................................................ 2 Occupied East Jerusalem .......................................................................................................................... 9 Jerusalem’s Inner Core ........................................................................................................................... 16 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 32 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2009 ... 33 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 35 Middle East Report N°134 20 December 2012 EXTREME MAKEOVER? (I): ISRAEL’S POLITICS OF LAND AND FAITH IN EAST JERUSALEM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Jerusalem no longer is the city it was in 2000, when Israe- lution. Part II, Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering Away lis and Palestinians first negotiated its fate. In the interval, of East Jerusalem, looks at the emaciation of Palestinian much has changed, complicating the task of unscrambling political life in the city. the Jerusalem egg based on the formula presented by Pres- ident Clinton in December of that year: what is Jewish There are several critical territorial flashpoints. Particularly would be Israeli; what is Arab would be Palestinian; and significant are two horizontal bands – one each in central a special regime would govern sites holy to the three mon- and southern Jerusalem – that would extend a Jewish con- otheistic religions. It has become commonplace in some tinuum from west to east across the entire municipality quarters to decree that partitioning is now unfeasible giv- and beyond. Planning for residential units in the central en the pace and shape of settlement construction. Feasi- band (dubbed “E-1”) and in the southern band (including bility is an inexact science and, in theory at least, willing a new settlement, the first in Jerusalem since Har Homa mapmakers and determined policymakers still could im- in 1997, known as Givat HaMatos) – both of which have plement the same principle, if not draw precisely the same been on hold for several years owing to international line, as twelve years ago. pressure – has now resumed. E-1 is widely perceived as particularly damaging, because it would all but disconnect Yet, two things are incontrovertible. First, expansion of East Jerusalem from a Palestinian state and sever its urban Jewish settlements or neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem expanse. In southern Jerusalem, new Israeli construction raises the political price of partition and thus lowers its threatens to completely envelope some Arab neighbour- likelihood. The upshot is that the international community, hoods. These are only two of the disquieting settlement and notably the U.S., will have to pressure Israel to limit projects that the Israeli government has pushed forward further alteration to Jerusalem’s physical landscape; this following the 29 November 2012 UN General Assembly challenge is particularly acute today in light of recent set- resolution declaring Palestine a non-member observer state. tlement announcements that many see as potentially fatal Whether international pressure will stop these develop- to any two-state solution. The second, less tangible but ments, and for how long, is yet unclear. equally consequential reality is that changes in Israel and the region have intensified religious and historical claims Of all developments in the city, potentially the most ex- to the city. Whenever negotiations resume, each side will plosive lie within the inner core, where Jewish settlement need to acknowledge the other’s ties to Jerusalem and its within dense Palestinian neighbourhoods has accelerated. religious sites, and both sides will have to be open to cre- A ring of national parks, which open lands to Israeli usage ative solutions in tune with this new, emerging climate. and limits it for Palestinians, is being built around the city’s historic core. Within these parks, Israel has licensed ––––––––––––– archaeological and educational projects; the largest, the City Since Clinton offered his parameters, the Jewish popula- of David in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan, has tion of East Jerusalem has grown significantly in each of become one of Israel’s most successful tourist attractions, the three belts – an outer belt that defines Greater Jerusa- with over 400,000 visitors a year. At the centre of contesta- lem, a middle belt that surrounds the city centre, and an tion stands the Holy Esplanade – Har HaBayit (The Tem- inner belt that runs through the city’s core – that structure ple Mount) to Jews and al-Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Israeli settlement in and around the city. The good news Sanctuary) to Muslims – which has an outsized effect on is that, so far, much of the increase has been in previously the conflict. Potent political-cum-theological developments built-up areas. The bad news is that settlement construction in Israel over the past fifteen years have prompted de- over the past 45 years has been so extensive as to make even mands for Jewish worship on the plateau, a potentially minor developments in strategic locations highly detrimen- explosive issue that will constrain the kinds of political tal to prospects of one day dividing the city. This report, solutions Israel someday might pursue. the first of two issued simultaneously, examines this evo- Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith in East Jerusalem Crisis Group Middle East Report N°134, 20 December 2012 Page ii A parallel evolution has taken place on the Palestinian side. vent settlement construction in E-1, protect the territorial The weakening of the non-Islamist national movement foundations for Jerusalem’s ultimate soft partition and coupled with Hamas’s greater influence almost certainly prepare the ground for a mutual recognition of claims. will hamper the search for an accommodation on this matter. It is early days still, but there is reason to suspect A negative diplomatic agenda of this sort – preventing that the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood – notably in Egypt harmful developments – is important but cannot suffice. – and the enhanced role of public opinion throughout the Nor is it likely to be sustainable; over time, it will erode. region will make it more difficult for Arab leaders to en- Also needed is a more positive vision. It is not too early to dorse solutions that opponents can portray as inconsistent dust off old proposals for the city, updating them in light with Islamic principles. of what did not work over a decade ago and what has changed since. Nor is it too late to more assertively sup- The implication of all this is not clear. Some critics of port the Arab presence and specifically residential con- Israel’s Jerusalem policy believe that accelerating settle- struction in the eastern part of the city, as opposed to ment in the inner core, the encroachment of Jewish settle- simply opposing Jewish building there. The international ments into Arab areas in the middle belt and the quicken- community, including Jordan, should push for an increase ing of planning for E-1 and its corresponding belt along in Arab residential development, in the form of both new the southern rim threaten the viability of a Palestinian neighbourhoods – not a single one has been permitted in state. Others contend that whatever has been built by acts the past 45 years – and new housing in existing ones. This of political will ultimately can be un-built by acts of polit- is not simply a matter of housing rights, but rather a fun- ical will. damental political issue of improving Palestinians’ ability to remain