NAMING AND NECESSITY PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Saul A. Kripke | 184 pages | 01 Mar 2003 | John Wiley and Sons Ltd | 9780631128014 | English | Oxford, United Kingdom Naming and Necessity - WikiMili, The Best Wikipedia Reader There are five categories of basic human needs, including biological needs, safety, love, esteem and self-actualization. The importance of each category forms a pyramid. Biological needs form the base as they are of the greatest importance in maintaining life. These needs include food, water, air, shelter, sex and sleep. Once a person has met his or her biological needs, the next concern is for safety. This category includes some type of law and order, freedom from fear, and protection from hostile situations, weather and people. After a person feels secure, love becomes important. The need for love is not just romantic love but a feeling of community and belonging. After achieving the first three needs, people need a sense of accomplishment and independence. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers. Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in Titled Reference and Existence , they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity , and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press. Quentin Smith has claimed that some of the ideas in Naming and Necessity were first presented at least in part by Ruth Barcan Marcus. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. Smith's view is controversial, and several well-known scholars for example, Stephen Neale and Scott Soames have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that his account is mistaken. In the first lecture, Kripke introduced a schematic semi-formal version of the kind of "theory of naming" he was criticising — Apparently, the theses and condition had been written up on a board for all to see. This text was reproduced, as quoted below, in the "lightly edited" transcript of p. Kripke's main goals in this first lecture are to explain and critique the existing philosophical opinions on the way that names work. In the midth century, the most significant philosophical theory about the nature of names and naming was a theory of Gottlob Frege 's that had been developed by Bertrand Russell , the descriptivist theory of names , which was sometimes known as the 'Frege—Russell description theory'. Before Kripke gave his 'Naming and Necessity' lectures, a number of criticisms of this descriptivist theory had been published by leading philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein , John Searle and Peter Strawson. However, Kripke believed that the existing arguments against the Frege—Russell descriptive theory of names failed to identify the real problems with the theory. In 'Lecture II', Kripke reconsiders the cluster theory of names and argues for his own position on the nature of reference, a position that contributed to the development of the causal theory of reference. In 'Lecture III', Kripke's main aim is to develop his account of the necessity of identity relations, and to discuss many of the implications of his account to issues like the identity of natural kinds , the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity, the notion of metaphysical essences, and the mind—body problem in philosophy of mind. Kripke begins by summarizing the conclusions drawn in the first two lectures. Central to his previous lectures was his attack on the descriptivist theory of reference. Kripke offers two lines of criticism against Descriptivism. First, he points out that descriptions believed by speakers about a referent are not uniquely specifying, and thus are incapable of fixing reference. His second line of criticism states that even in those limited cases where the speaker does believe something uniquely specifying, what is uniquely specified turns out not to be the referent. Two other issues arise by way of recapitulation: First, Kripke concedes that there exist certain limited cases where descriptions do in fact determine reference. In these cases, however, they do no other semantic work. They don't allow us to characterize names as abbreviations or synonyms of the description. Second, Kripke argues that while some philosophers offer a revisionary account of identity, this revisionary account is inadequate, and we must instead stay with the standard account of identity, which is not a relation between names, but a relation between an object and itself. The referent of names is usually determined by a series of causal links between people who have used the name. Second, when the referent of a name is determined by a property attributed to the thing named, the link is contingent, rather than necessary or essential. People begin using the name ' Jack the Ripper ' to refer to the person responsible for the murder of five women in London. So, the name was fixed to its referent by a description. However, the person who carried out the murders might have been jailed for another crime and, thus, might never have had the property of murdering those women. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent. Third, identity is not a relation that holds between names. It is a relation that holds between an object and itself. When someone accurately claims that two names refer to the same object, the claim is necessarily true, even though it may be known a posteriori. Thus, Kripke claims to have successfully refuted the assumption made by everyone before him that anything that is necessarily true will be known a priori i. In the philosophy of language, Naming and Necessity is among the most important works ever, ranking with the classical work of Frege in the late nineteenth century, and of Russell, Tarski and Wittgenstein in the first half of the twentieth century. Naming and Necessity played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers —that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language. In the philosophy of language, a proper name , for example a name of a specific person or place, is a name which is ordinarily taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning and it has become a central problem in analytic philosophy. The common-sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic , where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and inexistent entities without becoming meaningless, and he showed that sometimes more than one proper name may identify the same entity without having the same sense , so that the phrase "Homer believed the morning star was the evening star" could be meaningful and not tautological in spite of the fact that the morning star and the evening star identifies the same referent. This example became known as Frege's Puzzle and is a central issue in the theory of proper names. Saul Aaron Kripke is an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition. Since the s, Kripke has been a central figure in a number of fields related to mathematical logic, modal logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, and recursion theory. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. Analytic philosophy is a branch and tradition of philosophy using analysis which is popular in the Western World and particularly the Anglosphere, beginning around the turn of the 20th century in the contemporary era and continues today. In the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia, the majority of university philosophy departments today identify themselves as "analytic" departments. In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in , reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning. In metaphysics and the philosophy of language, an empty name is a proper name that has no referent. David John Chalmers is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator or absolute substantial term when it designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which that thing exists. A designator is persistently rigid if it also designates nothing in all other possible worlds. A designator is obstinately rigid if it designates the same thing in every possible world, period, whether or not that thing exists in that world. Rigid designators are contrasted with connotative terms , non-rigid or flaccid designators , which may designate different things in different possible worlds. A causal theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms. Naming and Necessity | work by Kripke | Britannica But over the past century, there have been more than 3,, Davids and over 1,, Barbaras. William and Elizabeth Jones Love them or loathe them, the British royal family have long been the inspiration for baby names. There were 3,, Williams born between and and 1,, Elizabeths. Good luck keeping up with the Joneses, though; there were 1,, of these in Michael and Linda Brown The fourth most common last name in was Brown, with 1,, occurrences.